RE: [-empyre-] Accidents (was for example)
> I'm not suggesting obviously little roses in the brain, etc. I'm simply
> saying that 1. roses aren't represented, but when recalled are constructed
> (again Sartre etc.)
Whether they are reconstructed from other representations or are otherwise
represented in information in the brain, they are information constructs in
the brain, are they not? One doesn't have to have studied neurology or
computer science to grasp this point. If we assume that the brain has its
own numerous symbolic representation languages, rather than having to store
real roses in real brains, then we have already agreed that the brain
converts sensory data to information.
Also, if they are "reconstructed"--and I would agree that the properties of
roses are many so it is likely that the reconstruction or instantiation is
numerously processual--perhaps you might outline how this process, just in
general, might not be algorithmic. What does it mean to you to say that such
a process might not be algorithmic?
and that 2. the reconstructing need not be
> algorithmic. I don't think the brain 'computes' in other words in any way
> similar to that of a computer; the model is awkward.
I think the problem is in getting the outline rather than trying to think of
it in terms of, oh, a Pentium or whatever.
Two books that come to mind are The Society of Mind by Marvin Minsky, and
Computer Science, A Modern Introduction by Goldschlager and Lister. They're
both not recent but they deal with issues that don't seem to have changed
much. Which, by the way, is the thing about studying Computer Science: the
study of computer science doesn't deal so much with Word or Director or any
modern software so much as the underlying principles that are far less
subject to change over time.
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