Re: [-empyre-] free will and determinism

--- Alan Sondheim <> wrote:
> I also want to point out in relation to your quotes,
> Tobias, that - re:
> people like Schutz and Husserl, consciousness itself
> isn't linear, but
> multiply-layered, compacted; the presence is
> presencing. Think of driving
> and 'forgetting' what one is doing - and finding
> oneself further along the
> road - it's not just paralleling, but it's layered
> shifting, each
> inextricably-woven element of which is spread in
> space-time.

Ummm, I don't know if it's really so philosophical and
complex or if it's really more neurological and
simple. The link below goes to a fascinating article
about recent issues in perceptual neuroscience.
Extra-ordinary references to Quantum physics may not
be necessary, as things such as driving cars and see
the color "red" inhabit our world  - seeing is a kind
of acting... the abstract is pretty clear. The paper
is fairly easy to read, although the implications of
this kind of research are really quite astounding. 

One argument I see is the Strong AI argument we had
recently (last week, two weeks ago? I've been very ill
lately) are dispensed with as the (computer /
algorithm / mind-object-language) model, from this
perspective is so off target, it's not even "wrong".

Read this:


A  sensorimotor account of vision and visual
consciousness by J. Kevin O'Regan  & Alva Noë,
Behavioral  and Brain Sciences, 24 (2001) 939-1031.


  Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical and
psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea
that when we see, the brain produces an internal
representation of the world. The activation of this
internal representation is assumed to give rise to the
experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of
approach is that it leaves unexplained how the
existence of such a detailed internal representation
might produce visual consciousness.  An alternative
proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way
of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the
environment. Activity in internal representations does
not generate the experience of seeing. The outside
world serves as its own, external, representation. The
experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters
what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor
contingency.  The advantage of this approach is that
it provides a natural and principled way of accounting
for visual consciousness, and for the differences in
the perceived quality of sensory experience in the
different sensory modalities.  Several lines of
empirical evidence are brought forward in support of
the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments
in sensorimotor adaptation, visual "filling in",
visual stability despite eye movements, change
blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.

Also: in the same vein I would recommend
Ramachandran's Reith lectures:

and especially his lecture on art:

best to all. 


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