Re: [-empyre-] free will and determinism

I wouldn't disagree with this - it's related, at least as I can tell from
the abstract (I'm now sick myself btw) to Rodney Brooks' subsumption
architectures, and Merlin Donald's work - both of which I like a great
deal. But there is still the issue of linearity and phenomenology, and
this is where the complexity comes in.

The description also sounds like Shank's and Abelson's work years ago on
scripts and understanding, but I might be missing the point.

- Alan

On Thu, 20 Nov 2003, Henry Warwick wrote:

> --- Alan Sondheim <> wrote:
> >
> >
> > I also want to point out in relation to your quotes,
> > Tobias, that - re:
> > people like Schutz and Husserl, consciousness itself
> > isn't linear, but
> > multiply-layered, compacted; the presence is
> > presencing. Think of driving
> > and 'forgetting' what one is doing - and finding
> > oneself further along the
> > road - it's not just paralleling, but it's layered
> > shifting, each
> > inextricably-woven element of which is spread in
> > space-time.
> Ummm, I don't know if it's really so philosophical and
> complex or if it's really more neurological and
> simple. The link below goes to a fascinating article
> about recent issues in perceptual neuroscience.
> Extra-ordinary references to Quantum physics may not
> be necessary, as things such as driving cars and see
> the color "red" inhabit our world  - seeing is a kind
> of acting... the abstract is pretty clear. The paper
> is fairly easy to read, although the implications of
> this kind of research are really quite astounding.
> One argument I see is the Strong AI argument we had
> recently (last week, two weeks ago? I've been very ill
> lately) are dispensed with as the (computer /
> algorithm / mind-object-language) model, from this
> perspective is so off target, it's not even "wrong".
> Read this:
> :
> A  sensorimotor account of vision and visual
> consciousness by J. Kevin O'Regan  & Alva NoŽ,
> Behavioral  and Brain Sciences, 24 (2001) 939-1031.
> bstract:
>   Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical and
> psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea
> that when we see, the brain produces an internal
> representation of the world. The activation of this
> internal representation is assumed to give rise to the
> experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of
> approach is that it leaves unexplained how the
> existence of such a detailed internal representation
> might produce visual consciousness.  An alternative
> proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way
> of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the
> environment. Activity in internal representations does
> not generate the experience of seeing. The outside
> world serves as its own, external, representation. The
> experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters
> what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor
> contingency.  The advantage of this approach is that
> it provides a natural and principled way of accounting
> for visual consciousness, and for the differences in
> the perceived quality of sensory experience in the
> different sensory modalities.  Several lines of
> empirical evidence are brought forward in support of
> the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments
> in sensorimotor adaptation, visual "filling in",
> visual stability despite eye movements, change
> blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.
> Also: in the same vein I would recommend
> Ramachandran's Reith lectures:
> and especially his lecture on art:
> best to all.
> HW
> _______________________________________________
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