[-empyre-] artificial societies?

[Mitchell Whitelaw <mitchell.whitelaw@canberra.edu.au>]

A question for Mauro and Ken. One of the most striking things about 
your works is this notion of "artificial societies." This is explicit 
in Mauro's work and writing, and more implicit in Ken's, but still 
present in complex / multiple agencies such as Autopoiesis. These works 
(and others like them) involve interacting, and increasingly, 
"communicating" agents, and take an interest in the global or emergent 
properties of large groups of these agents.

But how, exactly, are these systems "societies"? If we call them that, 
what does that imply for both how we view these systems, and how we 
understand the societies (or whatever) we live in?

One of the strong critiques of a-life science from cultural / 
anthropological scholars like Stefan Helmreich, is that in creating 
"model agents," a-life science is (deliberately or not) propagating a 
certain set of ideologies and values about the nature of agency (most 
often, a-life agents resemble the autonomous, "free will" type subject 
of liberal humanism and lassez-faire capitalism).

What are the implications of this critique for your "artificial 
societies"? Can these systems be platforms for experimenting with 
prospective societies (..."as it could be") or are they stuck with 
reproducing society and subjectivity "as we know it?"

cheers,

Mitchell

(Slightly devil's advocate for the moment but hopefully also writing 
what others are thinking.)