Re: [-empyre-] C. S. Peirce and Code

[Roman Danylak <rdanylak@it.uts.edu.au>]

When people say "digital writing" how is this different to pen writing? Is
this different to typewriter writing? Does it then make a difference  to the
language  used if you write on an electronic word processor?

Do I compose language differently for the telephone?

Roman Danylak




The interpretation of IP in law states



 On 15/10/05 7:26 PM, "Bill Seaman" <bseaman@risd.edu> wrote:

> The question is, in terms of Code and the potentials it brings about
> (as idea and code intermingle to provide the experience for the
> reader/participant) do we need to develop new language and approaches
> related to our understanding of digital Writing? Who best addresses
> this at this time?
> 
> ----
> I asked Marcus off list to talk about his ideas on Pierce and how
> they might be applied to our current subject. I wonder if he might
> answer here in more detail (although he is busy with the list itself).
> 
> Giselle may also want to talk about this.
> 
> ----
> Peirce defines Semiosis:
> 
> By Semiosis I mean an action, an influence, which is, or involves, a
> co-operation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object and its
> interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in anyway
> resolvable into actions between pairs. (Peirce, 1931, p.484)
> 
> -----
> 
> I will often return to Peirce's definition of the sign, because it is
> sufficiently open and all of my media-elements can be considered as
> signs in terms of this definition:
> 
> A sign [or representation] stands for something to the idea which it
> produces, or modifies. Or, it is a vehicle conveying into the mind
> something from without. That for which it stands is called its
> object; that which it conveys, its meaning; and the idea to which it
> gives rise, its interpretant. (Peirce, 1931, p.171)
> 
> -----
> Peirce points toward part of the problem:
> 
> But an endless series of representations, each representing the one
> behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute object at its limit.
> The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation.
> In fact it is nothing but the representation itself conceived as
> stripped of irrelevant clothing. But this clothing never can be
> completely stripped off; it is only changed for some more diaphanous.
> So there is an infinite regression here. Finally, the interpretant is
> nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is
> handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretant again.
> Lo, another infinite series. (Peirce, 1931, p.171)
> 
> 
> 
> PEIRCE, C. 1931. Collected Papers, Volume I-VIII. Cambridge: Harvard
> University Press.
> See also
> PEIRCE, C. 1966. Selected Writings. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.
> 
> 
> 
> b