Re: [-empyre-] Re: Poetics of DNA II



John,

On Oct 4, 2007, at 1:51 PM, John Hopkins wrote:

Judith...

I identify the DNA/gene as non-arbitrary and fixed only in the limited sense that unlike language where there is no intrinsic relation between signifier and signified, DNA at least has the statistically significant tendency for its acids to pair only with certain other acids. This is not to say that what parts of DNA or chromosomes may function as a gene is not flexible, nor widely variant, nor that there is not a wide range of alternatives always changing in the biosphere.

all IS change... it is only in our re-presentations that we avoid change, and in that avoidance we sow the seeds of our quickening and dying... a re-presentation cannot change -- once made, it is a static grasp at that-which-it-cannot-touch.

Except of course even representations change from one moment to the next.

I speak of determinism only on the molecular level. I would suggest that everything else is quite a complex moving open system.

the molecular being a reductive re-presentation of a complex changing system...

In this context, yes, perhaps, but then context changes from that representation in that context to this one

There can be no such thing as empiricism as long as language is involved in any stage or human observers intercede in measurements that are made with tools requiring interpretation. Social sciences are particularly problematic in this regard since they often envision issues of language and representation as countable incidents based on protocols that do not take the vagaries of representation itself into account. Of course, not all of them do this, but enough.

why don't all of of them take this into account -- or do ANY of 'them' take this into account? The account is spent in the sense that people who take re-presentation to be the thing/phenomena/ action/activity itself are missing the thing/phenomena/action/ activity itself...
assuming one can ever get to the thing/activity itself in any way except through some kind of representation, even mental

In so far as anyone ever conceived of DNA as a code, it was always already paradigmatic, since Shroedinger referred to some agency as that before DNA's structure was even discerned (an dby someone who had read Schroedinger). Calling DNA a code certainly does not define how it functions, but the paradigm does condition how we think about DNA--and how some scientists approached it--i.e. "decoding." DNA is not a code. It is a chemical. If we need an analogy, cipher is the better one.

DNA is a re-presentation of a life-system that is still poorly understood except for its affects on the overall system. A "chemical" is a re-presentative construct of an observed phenomena.

Absolutely and since what we are doing here is reducing complex ideas to a representational interchange that is bound to be misunderstood this what we have to work with.

Science in my usage refers to inquiries that pose and answer questions premised on what investigators believe are physical phenomena, answered often in mathemetical equations, and accounting for the error of experiment.

isn't science the process of constructing self-reflexive re- presentations that are accurate within the knowledge-space where-in science holds sway?

Only within the space where the the knowledge-science holds sway.


And cheers back,

Judith
cheers,
jh
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