Re: [-empyre-] Re: Poetics of DNA II
John,
On Oct 4, 2007, at 1:51 PM, John Hopkins wrote:
Judith...
I identify the DNA/gene as non-arbitrary and fixed only in the
limited sense that unlike language where there is no intrinsic
relation between signifier and signified, DNA at least has the
statistically significant tendency for its acids to pair only with
certain other acids. This is not to say that what parts of DNA or
chromosomes may function as a gene is not flexible, nor widely
variant, nor that there is not a wide range of alternatives always
changing in the biosphere.
all IS change... it is only in our re-presentations that we avoid
change, and in that avoidance we sow the seeds of our quickening
and dying... a re-presentation cannot change -- once made, it is a
static grasp at that-which-it-cannot-touch.
Except of course even representations change from one moment to the
next.
I speak of determinism only on the molecular level. I would
suggest that everything else is quite a complex moving open system.
the molecular being a reductive re-presentation of a complex
changing system...
In this context, yes, perhaps, but then context changes from that
representation in that context to this one
There can be no such thing as empiricism as long as language is
involved in any stage or human observers intercede in measurements
that are made with tools requiring interpretation. Social
sciences are particularly problematic in this regard since they
often envision issues of language and representation as countable
incidents based on protocols that do not take the vagaries of
representation itself into account. Of course, not all of them do
this, but enough.
why don't all of of them take this into account -- or do ANY of
'them' take this into account? The account is spent in the sense
that people who take re-presentation to be the thing/phenomena/
action/activity itself are missing the thing/phenomena/action/
activity itself...
assuming one can ever get to the thing/activity itself in any way
except through some kind of representation, even mental
In so far as anyone ever conceived of DNA as a code, it was always
already paradigmatic, since Shroedinger referred to some agency as
that before DNA's structure was even discerned (an dby someone who
had read Schroedinger). Calling DNA a code certainly does not
define how it functions, but the paradigm does condition how we
think about DNA--and how some scientists approached it--i.e.
"decoding." DNA is not a code. It is a chemical. If we need an
analogy, cipher is the better one.
DNA is a re-presentation of a life-system that is still poorly
understood except for its affects on the overall system. A
"chemical" is a re-presentative construct of an observed phenomena.
Absolutely and since what we are doing here is reducing complex ideas
to a representational interchange that is bound to be misunderstood
this what we have to work with.
Science in my usage refers to inquiries that pose and answer
questions premised on what investigators believe are physical
phenomena, answered often in mathemetical equations, and
accounting for the error of experiment.
isn't science the process of constructing self-reflexive re-
presentations that are accurate within the knowledge-space where-in
science holds sway?
Only within the space where the the knowledge-science holds sway.
And cheers back,
Judith
cheers,
jh
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