Re: [-empyre-] Re: Ontological equality



Is it your intention to suggest that the final question is a reflection of the first ?

Technologies, and what is Code as Nick uses the term but a technology, are always social before they are technical; and has any technology ever been more social than DNA? The social machine that surrounds genetics and DNA has always been social before being technical. Borrowing from Deleuze but without the desire, it's quite clear that technologies remain marginal until there exists a social machine which can absorb the technology, the code into it's phylum.

So then Nick, are your politics ready and what do you mean by politics ?

s
Nicholas Ruiz III wrote:
That biopoiesis is the Code's evolved protocol, and
that Craig Venter's (and other biotech gurus)
particularly anthropic poiesis mimetically doubles,
simulates and virtualizes such illustrates the
wonderfully and terribly bizarre state of this
concept, DNA poetics...

In a sense, we might speak of a potential terrorism
involved in such a hijacking of the Code, no?


Or perhaps, it's all for the better...? Biotech firms
think so...and many patients that use their products,
too...

No longer is it a matter of 'imagining' some degree of
Code control...authorial power rests in our
biosubstance now: is our politics ready?


Nick

--- Eugene Thacker <eugene.thacker@lcc.gatech.edu>
wrote:


Instead of intervening in or manipulating nature,
would the mastery of mastery
be something like the creation of new laws of nature
(perhaps Venter would like
to see himself in this guise...)? Does this also
describe somewhat paradoxical
attempts to instrumentalize self-organization,
emergence, and complexity?

The title of Brian's post - 'ontological equality' -
actually gets at the
problem quite directly. The absolute assertion of
equality leads one to forms of
pantheism or mysticism...or, from the all-too-human
vantage point, nihilism. But
then even the counter-assertion of 'difference'
still requires some notion of
the common, or that within which difference differs.
For some, Deleuze's
assertion of difference-in-itself simply reverts
back to pantheism/univocity/
immanence.

Perhaps this is why Badiou begins from nothing, or
the void. All of the
discussion on being and ethics presumes a notion of
being-as-generosity,
positivity, presentation. But even Badiou will still
assert an efficacy of the
subject (though radically retooled via set theory)
with the notions of fidelity,
situation/event, and the generic. (I apologize for
my shoddy reading of Badiou,
but at times I feel the lefty-May'68 subject
furtively enters his discussion...)

What if, in addition to the problem of ontological
equality, then opens onto
another problem, which is that of causality
(ontological action)? Or maybe the
relation between equality and causality is itself
the issue - that is, the
concept of 'relation' itself?...

But maybe this is a way to bring things back to
Judith's notion of a poetics of
DNA. I take 'poiesis' here to be nonhuman, but not
in the Latourian sense.
Poiesis has, at least since Aristotle, been about
affectivity (pathos), and
there is no affectivity without circulation and
relation.

-Eugene






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