[-empyre-] grasshoppers, faces, and being wrong

[Katherine Behar]

hello empyreans,

wow. i see it's been a busy month. i've been mistily aware of things  
brewing over here, but i've been at the beach (!), attempting to put  
"things" aside to take in some sun and sea. please forgive my slipping  
in under the wire with some late-breaking thoughts just as the month  
closes out. this is my first post to this list where i've been lurking  
on and off for many years. so thanks to you all for luring me out. i  
admit it's a bit intimidating and i've just been hours at a marathon  
of catching up; here are some thoughts:

i have bits and pieces to say about a number of things, not just  
feminism and art, but also nihilism and ethics, structures and  
queerness, and the big question about OOO/SR and politics. but perhaps  
since my name came up in passing in relation to object-oriented  
feminism, i'll start there as a way to get into the question about  
being or not being political. at the risk of rehashing, i'm beginning  
with a couple of moments from earlier in the month. if you’ve already  
moved on, by all means, please skip to the bullet points at the end.

earlier, jack wrote:

> "Hence, having occupied the status of "object" for some time within  
> both the symbolic and the imaginary of the cultures within which we  
> participate, surely the category of "female" should allow for some  
> access to the question of what is it like to be an object."

yes, exactly. thank you for stating it so clearly.

when i first encountered OOO/SR, i was quite excited. i am an artist,  
and i found initially that these writings provided a far better  
language to discuss my artwork than any i had found previously  
elsewhere (for example the languages of art history, critical theory,  
cultural studies, media archaeology, art criticism, etc.) and indeed  
sounded a lot like things that i myself had written about my work over  
the years in artist statements and the like. however, i was also  
uncomfortable with some aspects of OOO, for example "feminism 101." my  
objection was not at all to the idea that humans might be objects --  
this position is completely central to my artwork. however, the idea  
that this position is a) new and b) liberating (finally we are free  
from the shackles of correlationism) sounds all wrong to me. a good  
many humans are quite used to the position of being an object, have  
been objects for a long time, and have not found it to be especially  
liberating. in my opinion, these questions and problems, that have  
been addressed extensively feminist and queer (though this is less my  
area) scholarship, must *of course* be included in any discussion of  
humans as objects. that set of legacies/bibliographies/citations  
should be written (back) in. so, too, the work of artists who have  
also been working on these questions for many decades, is a history  
that should not be forgotten or ignored -- and it is hard to say which  
is more precarious queer/feminist/whateverist theory or the primacy of  
the word over the (art) object. to be clear, this is not at all a  
question of rank/hierarchy about who has it worse, but this is simply  
to say that all are important to include in a yes, *flat*, way, which  
is itself something i deeply appreciate about the spaces of empyre.  
after all, it is from this arty/object-y/performance-y history -- not  
the history of philosophy about which i know really precious little --  
that i at least arrived at a strikingly similar set of ideas or  
approach in my practice. again, i'm not saying this to talk about  
myself but just to say that it *is* possible to get from here to  
there, from point A to point B, even if it looks unlikely, if A and B  
look incompatible, on the surface.

perhaps my initial excitement got me a bit carried away, but i still  
feel that it's important to recoup and remix in these "alternative" (i  
think actually primary) histories or intellectual ingredients for OOO.  
at any rate, i already felt like a stake holder and felt unwilling to  
sit by and let this way of working with nonanthropocentrism and  
objecthood turn into something i didn't like, or, more precisely,  
couldn't use. hence object-oriented feminisms (OOF). [[with the first  
discussions in 2010 i was hoping to take a more proactive stance at  
spurring some discussion with people better equipped than i. last  
year, with emmy mikelson, i curated *And Another Thing,* an exhibition  
that traces nonanthropocentrism in art (we are working on an expanded  
catalogue with essays that address some of these questions with  
punctum books), and as has been mentioned there will be another set of  
OOF panels at the SLSA conference in september. I think it's important  
to mention that in addition to the names ian mentioned, we do have  
some boys! the full line up includes: kate hayles, tim morton,  
patricia clough, ian bogost, steven shaviro, anne pollock, jamie skye  
bianco, eileen joy, rebekah sheldon, and me. i truly hope that some of  
you will be able to attend and that maybe we can continue by speaking  
in person, too.]]

all of which is to say that everything is in process -- productively,  
i hope, half-baked, and so an excellent time for interested parties to  
jump into the mess i hope we'll all make of things. micha and zach,  
i'm huge fans of both of your work, and so zach, i confess it's  
especially for me a bit distressing to hear you write about OOF in the  
past tense as having fallen prey to a correlationist trap. i realize  
that we read a small snippet taken out of context, but it sounds as  
though you are writing the entire enterprise off as “indifferent,”  
which i hope is not the case. i speak just for myself, but

> "various marginalized struggles of the everyday, [...] sexual and  
> racial violence, [...] the dirty political battles that constitute  
> the realities and realisms of the queer, the transgendered, the  
> persons of color"

are pretty much the meat of my work so, yeah. maybe we could talk  
about it? even offlist as july approaches. i'm around.

as to the charge of OOO/SR’s being masculinist, that, too, is a point  
i can and do absolutely appreciate and it’s something emmy and i talk  
about frequently. to our thinking, though, this objection reiterates  
the very problem it seeks to critique. objections to saying that the  
subject is an object see this as a denigration and prefer to preserve  
and indeed extend the category of subject to objectified/marginialized  
others who have not traditionally enjoyed masculine privileges (even  
the smaller privileges like citation). in other words the masculinist  
charge equates a subject’s being an object with a feminization of the  
subject. but i object to this objection because just like calling  
something masculinist isn’t a compliment, neither is it a compliment  
to feminize something. my interest in OOF is that OOO/SR lets us think  
outside of the categories of subject and object (or female and male)  
-- which opens the possibility for something really trans, really  
beyond the current (binary) state of affairs.

one thing i've been thinking a lot about as a nonphilosopher is that  
ontologies are truth claims and want to be complete. in contrast, many  
of us were brought up with an understanding of truth as first and  
foremost radically relativized. personally, i am a little bit  
exhausted by that. (makes me want to run away to the beach.)  
regardless, we certainly we can consider this the other way around,  
too: to insist on the salience of post-structuralism, capitalism,  
psychoanalysis for *everything* is to turn those relativizing gestures  
into master narratives. it’s the compulsion to partake in those  
narratives, more even than the narratives themselves that i find  
worrying.

the other part of the truth claim aspect of ontologies, is that for  
some odd reason i fear i will never understand it seems to matter  
quite a bit that ontologies be right. as an artist, i am not  
especially interested in being right or complete, so i have  
conveniently shunted the truth claim question to the side to clear  
room for myself for thinking and doing. (you'll note in OOF object  
oriented feminisms leaves OOO's last O for ontology out to make room  
for the gutsier grunt of effort for getting things done.) i think  
often what's right (true or ethical) gets worked out in the doing, but  
besides all that, i'm interested in how OOO/SR might carve out some  
space for us to be totally, utterly wrong. not wrong like incorrect,  
but wrong like botched, like “oh girl, that’s all wrong,” or even  
indifference to correctness. being wrong, i think, is radical,  
political work, if ever there was such. most of all now. and most of  
all when we find ourselves in hallowed halls. can OOO/SR be that  
"toolbox"? i haven't a clue. we'll have to try it out. the worst thing  
that can happen is that it *will* work.

if, as patricia says, OOO/SR is about a structure, then what are the  
possibilities for operating or inoperativity in this structure, for  
performatively engaging it, and being, as she says, noise. (i am  
thinking here noise as something wrong like serres' parasite.)

this is a very long post and i hate long posts, so i will wrap up  
quickly. some of the things i am thinking about in relation to the  
question of can OOO/SR work be political work, noisy work are:

* mereology. OOO/SR has a weird (levi bryant says "strange") way of  
thinking about the relation between individuals and aggregates.  
patricia started to discuss this in relation to the latour piece on  
tarde and data visualization. this, with the question of relation, is  
where things get political, i think.

* relation. OOO/SR reopens the question, with the opportunity to think  
both of non-human relations and of no relations. right now, i'm  
leaning rather heavily toward the latter. i'd like everything to leave  
everything else alone. seriously. quit picking at it. just let it all  
be, as the world without us in a thacker kind of way. crazy talk, i  
know, but maybe OOO/SR accommodates it?

* discontinuity. really, i think that discontinuity -- cutting ties,  
establishing boundaries, respecting fundamental differences of kind  
not of degree -- is precisely political at this moment. i think that  
perhaps OOO/SR would make for forms of radical separateness, bringing  
up questions of how to account for any relations at all within this  
type of form.

one way of thinking this is that the smooth flows of relation / smooth  
spaces of capital or even economy of commonality that becomes the  
affordance necessary for segmentation in databases make us susceptible  
to capture in agre's sense. in this way the political work is to  
register disconnect, to be a bad (wrong) fit. something so very wrong  
that it can't get incorporated, systematized, captured, (as in the  
question is queer studies coopted, pink washed?) something which  
doesn't register. which brings us to......

* face /nonrecognition. this comes back around to the first week's  
discussions of the face, faciality, and non-recognition. what does it  
mean to not recognize? to not understand or relate to something else,  
or to not oneself be recognized. i am very interested in this. in a  
piece i wrote a couple of years ago for the first OOF, i wrote about  
malabou's idea of plasticity and botox as a way to deaden the face, to  
shut down the face's communicative ports, what i called "botox  
ethics." this is a kind of sympathetically self-objectification by  
self-deadening - i think this has resonances with tim's gorgeous  
response to heather about nihilism, and the sameness of really owning  
up - really self-implicating - as being a thing:

> This ties in with a fear of a certain kind of Buddhism,
> a fear that is isometric with homophobia, being
> a fear of physical intimacy with the same(ness)
> installed at the core of Western thinking.
>
> I'm not an apocalyptic person. I think the world
> has ended and that this is the afterlife already.
>
> Namely the Anthropocene, the moment at which
> human history intersects with geological time
> (incipit 1790).

is this undifferentiation discontinuous? or why do we want to hold on  
to our integrity, our edges? it does sound "wrong," doesn't it?

oy. sorry for this obscene lengthiness. thank you all very, very much  
for an amazing month.

katherine


On Jun 28, 2012, at 1:44 AM, <empyre-request at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au> <empyre-request at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au 
 > wrote:

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> Today's Topics:
>
>   1. Re: Meillassoux / Harman (Timothy Morton)
>   2. Re: Meillassoux / Harman (Timothy Morton)
>   3. Re: Week 4 - Bio/Nano/Materialisms - the transperversal
>      aesthetic of Texas grasshoppers (Timothy Morton)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 23:56:46 -0500
> From: Timothy Morton <timothymorton303 at gmail.com>
> To: soft_skinned_space <empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au>
> Subject: Re: [-empyre-] Meillassoux / Harman
> Message-ID: <AD8F21A6-FB5D-4A84-A4D7-AC57CEAE54D5 at gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain;	charset=us-ascii
>
> Hi Rob,
>
> Lots of artists and musicians are now tuning into OOO.
>
> You wrote:
>
> "The object in itself being accessible as simply the sum of its  
> unique (fnarr) aesthetic properties valenced in terms of their  
> efficacy at reflecting the ego of the gentlemanly spectator is a  
> vision of OOO that would cause its proponents to clop furiously."
>
> That's almost the opposite I'm afraid. Back to the lab!
>
> Tim
>
>
> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>
> On Jun 27, 2012, at 4:15 PM, Rob Myers <rob at robmyers.org> wrote:
>
>> The object in itself being accessible as simply the sum of its  
>> unique (fnarr) aesthetic properties valenced in terms of their  
>> efficacy at reflecting the ego of the gentlemanly spectator is a  
>> vision of OOO that would cause its proponents to clop furiously.
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 23:57:27 -0500
> From: Timothy Morton <timothymorton303 at gmail.com>
> To: soft_skinned_space <empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au>
> Subject: Re: [-empyre-] Meillassoux / Harman
> Message-ID: <2DACD36D-1892-48F8-BE19-9266E649DD4F at gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> I think that's right, Peter. Tim
>
>
>
> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>
> On Jun 27, 2012, at 5:00 PM, Peter Gratton <pmgratton at gmail.com>  
> wrote:
>
>> Thanks Tim. Otherwise, I was going to say to the advance of the  
>> "mesh" which non-synchronous and fully temporal?
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 4:46 AM, Timothy Morton <timothymorton303 at gmail.com 
>> > wrote:
>> Yes--this is where Graham and I differ Peter. For me what is called  
>> "present" I just a metaphysical construct and what truly exists is  
>> past and future... Tim
>>
>> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>>
>> On Jun 27, 2012, at 3:02 AM, Peter Gratton <pmgratton at gmail.com>  
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi all,
>>> I'm actually completing a book on SR this month. I do find much  
>>> invigorating in this work. But I want to note one thing: for  
>>> Harman, entities do not emit time. It is but a "tension in its  
>>> sensual qualities"--that is, not in it "hidden" reality. See his  
>>> diagram on p. 114 of the Quadruple Object. In his essay "The Road  
>>> to Objects," Harman sums up his view:
>>> According to the object-oriented model only the present exists:  
>>> only objects with their qualities, locked into whatever their  
>>> duels of the moment might be. In that sense, times seems to be  
>>> illusory, though not for the usual reason that time is just a  
>>> fourth spatial dimension always already present from the start.  
>>> Instead time does not exist simply because only the present ever  
>>> exists. Nonetheless, time as a lived experience [i.e, within the  
>>> sensuous?here he follows Husserl to the letter] cannot be denied.  
>>> We do not encounter a static frame of reality, but seem to feel a  
>>> passage of time. It is not pure chaos shifting wildly from one  
>>> second to the next, since there is chance with apparent endurance.  
>>> Sensual objects endure despite swirling oscillations in their  
>>> surface adumbrations, and this is precisely what is meant by the  
>>> experience of time. Time can be defined as the tension between  
>>> sensual objects and their sensual qualities.[i]
>>>
>>> Thus the relation of objects is "apparent" and at the "sensuous"  
>>> level--not at the level of the real object and its real qualities.  
>>> And thus things in themselves are forever present. This, to say  
>>> the least, needs to be discussed whenever OOO comes up: since if  
>>> objects in their reality are forever in the present, then how to  
>>> explain objects such as music, films, or, as Harman discussed in a  
>>> recent interview, "The Arab Street." This is what Husserl realized  
>>> in his time lectures of 1905-1911: moving beyond the mathematical,  
>>> he realizes that he must think how to adequately explain music,  
>>> for example--hence his theory of protensions and retentions. And  
>>> nevermind Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze, etc. My task in my work is  
>>> to think a real time.
>>>
>>> [i] ?The Road to Objects,? 176, my emphases.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 at 2:12 PM, Timothy Morton <timothymorton303 at gmail.com 
>>> > wrote:
>>> Hi---each entity (a thought, an amethyst geode, a bartender) emits  
>>> spacetime just as Einstein argued . Graham's The Quadruple Object  
>>> and my not yet out Realist Magic go into this.
>>>
>>> Each entity "times" in the way Heidegger reserves for Da-sein and  
>>> Derrida reserves to the trace.
>>>
>>> Time and space are not neutral containers but are emergent  
>>> properties of beings.
>>>
>>> Tim
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>>>
>>> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:15 PM, davin heckman  
>>> <davinheckman at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> You are right....  I should do more reading.  I find the thoughts
>>>> engaging and, since I am in transit, I am eager to get more
>>>> information where I can.
>>>>
>>>> Ultimately, underneath my questions, I suppose, are some thoughts  
>>>> on
>>>> relationality and time.  You have all of these things that have  
>>>> to do
>>>> with chairs, but only the chair is the chair.  And there are these
>>>> things that have to do with chairs, but which are real in their own
>>>> right.  But an idea about a chair kind of flickers in and out of
>>>> consciousness, never having a discrete edge, and only become  
>>>> something
>>>> definitive when their edges are marked out in some way. It's  
>>>> tempting
>>>> to think that one's writing about a thought is separate from the
>>>> thought itself, but typically the act of writing or performing a
>>>> thought tends to calcify and reinforce it through a feedback loop.
>>>> Every time one thinks about a chair, one does not invent a new  
>>>> object.
>>>> Similar to a computer program pulling modular entities and reusing
>>>> them again and again, our thoughts repeat the concept in our
>>>> imagination.  On the other hand, imaginary iterations are not the  
>>>> same
>>>> as digital iterations.  Less like a computer, we pull the modular
>>>> concept into action and interpret it with a variety of tones.  I
>>>> wouldn't want to say these singular thoughts don't exist, but on  
>>>> the
>>>> other hand, they don't have the same reality as those thoughts  
>>>> which
>>>> are articulated and taken up into collective discourse....  and  
>>>> even
>>>> still, a discursive "thing" gains a level of significance when it
>>>> represents some empirical process.
>>>>
>>>> I care about this because a chair changes from one moment to the  
>>>> next.
>>>> It becomes materially altered as time unfolds, yet we are  
>>>> comfortable
>>>> saying that the chair on day one is that chair on day five.  In  
>>>> other
>>>> words, each moment does not unleash a separate chair.  In my mind,
>>>> "weight" might be its subjective intensity, its empirical  
>>>> durability,
>>>> its social hegemony, its procedural utility, its digital  
>>>> ubiquity, its
>>>> aesthetic elegance....  though none of these qualities are directly
>>>> analogous to the other, suggesting that there are a variety of  
>>>> types
>>>> of being.
>>>>
>>>> All these thoughts are a jumble....  I'll take your advice and do  
>>>> some reading.
>>>>
>>>> Davin
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 11:28 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu 
>>>> > wrote:
>>>>> A chair is a chair. A picture of a chair is a picture of a  
>>>>> chair. A
>>>>> definition of a chair is a definition of a chair. None are all  
>>>>> chairs, but
>>>>> all have something to do with chairs. At least, that's the OOO  
>>>>> contention.
>>>>> There are no planes of existence? except for Harman (and Tim, to  
>>>>> some
>>>>> extent), who distinguishes sensual from real objects. For  
>>>>> Graham, the idea
>>>>> of a chair is different from the real chair, which recedes from  
>>>>> all
>>>>> encounters. I think this is maybe the conclusion you arrive at  
>>>>> in your
>>>>> second paragraph below.
>>>>>
>>>>> NOTHING about OOO privileges the material (i.e., the tangible,  
>>>>> physical)
>>>>> chair primacy over the others. As for "the same weight" ? well,  
>>>>> that depends
>>>>> on what you mean by "weight." What do you mean?
>>>>>
>>>>> I hate to say it, but it's maybe not possible to make further  
>>>>> progress
>>>>> without reading some of this material in depth?
>>>>>
>>>>> Ian
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:13 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Ian and Tim,
>>>>>
>>>>> Do the differences with which we treat objects syncs up with
>>>>> ontological difference, and thus, is there something to some of  
>>>>> the
>>>>> different categorizations we could possibly develop for objects?
>>>>>
>>>>> I do think there is plenty of room to see these things from a  
>>>>> fresh
>>>>> perspective, but I also wonder if not, for instance, Kosuth's  
>>>>> chairs
>>>>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_and_Three_Chairs> highlight  
>>>>> the ways
>>>>> that discrete objects can differ from each other, but also the  
>>>>> ways in
>>>>> which there are consistencies that can yoke them together in odd  
>>>>> ways.
>>>>> A picture of a chair is not a chair, a definition of chair is  
>>>>> not a
>>>>> chair, instructions about a chair is not a chair, a chair as a
>>>>> sculpture is not necessarily a chair.....  yet, in some  
>>>>> fundamental
>>>>> way, all are chairs.... in a general sense of their concept and
>>>>> recognition.  Put all three things together, and you have a  
>>>>> "chair"
>>>>> which occupies all three planes of existence simultaneously.  On  
>>>>> the
>>>>> other hand, they can occupy niches within conceptual frameworks (a
>>>>> chair within a game, for instance, can be very "real" to the other
>>>>> objects in the game).
>>>>>
>>>>> Each way of recognizing the chair (the picture, instructions, the
>>>>> chair as chair, chair as sculpture, three chairs as conceptual  
>>>>> work,
>>>>> etc) would suggest that each is a distinct object in some sense,  
>>>>> which
>>>>> makes me wonder then, whether or not all other possible thoughts  
>>>>> about
>>>>> a chair have being, or if we afford the material object of the  
>>>>> chair
>>>>> primacy.  In which case, does a digital rendering of the chair  
>>>>> carry
>>>>> the same weight as an unexpressed idea about a chair, too.  At  
>>>>> some
>>>>> point, doesn't ontology lead into this thicket?
>>>>>
>>>>> Davin
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 9:08 PM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu 
>>>>> >
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> There is no reason why holding that everything exists equally  
>>>>> entails
>>>>>
>>>>> "reducing all that can be known about a being to a simple  
>>>>> recognition of
>>>>>
>>>>> being."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Ian
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jun 24, 2012, at 5:44 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree, this is a good starting point....  that all things that  
>>>>> exist
>>>>>
>>>>> have being as their common condition of existence (that is, they  
>>>>> are
>>>>>
>>>>> not "not beings"), which is a sort of foundational ontological
>>>>>
>>>>> similarity.  But if the only significant ontological claim we  
>>>>> can make
>>>>>
>>>>> about things is either yes or no, do they exist or not, then this
>>>>>
>>>>> means all things carry this single quality, which is to say that  
>>>>> there
>>>>>
>>>>> is no difference between things.  If we admit difference, then  
>>>>> we must
>>>>>
>>>>> account for those differences in meaningful ways.  For instance,
>>>>>
>>>>> waffle #1 differs from waffle #2 in a different way than waffle #1
>>>>>
>>>>> differs from a toaster (or waffle #1 changes in the course of  
>>>>> being
>>>>>
>>>>> eaten, it is still in one meaningful sense the "same" waffle  
>>>>> after it
>>>>>
>>>>> has been bitten, but in another sense, it is a different waffle,  
>>>>> too.
>>>>>
>>>>> While both toasters and waffles are different from something  
>>>>> like an
>>>>>
>>>>> idea or a "memory" rendered in media (a waffle recipe or story  
>>>>> about
>>>>>
>>>>> waffles) or a process habituated in muscle memory (the habit of  
>>>>> making
>>>>>
>>>>> a waffle or eating one).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> My concern is that if we reduce all that can be known about  
>>>>> being to a
>>>>>
>>>>> simple recognition of being, we commit to a kind of abstraction  
>>>>> and
>>>>>
>>>>> alienation from being of the sort that happens when markets try to
>>>>>
>>>>> mediate everything through the common denominator of dollars.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Davin
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:46 PM, Timothy Morton
>>>>>
>>>>> <timothymorton303 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Davin,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> We obviously treat different entities differently.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But this is not the same as saying that these entities are  
>>>>> ontologically
>>>>>
>>>>> different.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yours, Tim
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jun 20, 2012, at 5:51 AM, davin heckman  
>>>>> <davinheckman at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Thank you Ian, for these thoughts.  My initial encounter with this
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> work came via a brief discussion of "flat ontology," which I found
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> somewhat offputting.  I followed up by reading through the  
>>>>> re:press
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> book.  What I like the most, I suppose, is the sense that the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> discussions are in motion with a lot of people participating.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Reading some of the discussion of mereology, I find they  
>>>>> resonate with
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> one of my favorite passages from Hegel.  Pardon me for  
>>>>> cannibalizing
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> another piece of writing (a draft of which can be found here:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/disturbed-dialectic-literary-criticism) 
>>>>> .
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the dialectical  
>>>>> process:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> might say the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the  
>>>>> truth of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one  
>>>>> another,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at  
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic  
>>>>> unity in
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as  
>>>>> necessary
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the  
>>>>> life of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> the whole." [1]
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Viewed from within the Hegelian process, the Real is positioned
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> outside its present manifestations, consisting, rather, of the  
>>>>> dynamic
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> processes that comprise its totality.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This insight, crucial to critical practice, requires revision in  
>>>>> light
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> of technical change. By revision, I do not mean that we need to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> fundamentally alter Hegel?s argument, I only mean to suggest  
>>>>> that we
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> see this passage with respect to new temporal modalities that have
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> shaken up the pursuit of knowledge.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I come at many of the same issues, but my inclination lead me to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> embrace a kind of "humanism," but one which cannot easily  
>>>>> understand
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> as we continually muddle the conversations of humanism with an
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ontology that is expressed in our metaphors.  One grip I have  
>>>>> with the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> use of Deleuze or McLuhan, is the idea that our capacity to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> personalize prosthetics has a tendency to be reduced to a  
>>>>> situation in
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> which it becomes possible to imagine that we see machines,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> interpersonal relationships, people with tools, etc. as the same
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> thing.  When, in fact, my psychic investment in my bike or  
>>>>> computer,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> while deep, is not nearly as deep or as complex as my psychic
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> investment in my (which I can only refer to as mine with a sense  
>>>>> of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> obligation to, rather than ownership over) child.  If my bike  
>>>>> decided
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> to bite me.....which it can't, even if it can hurt me....  I  
>>>>> would not
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> feel so simultaneously restrained in my response AND emotionally
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> florid as I would if my 8 year old bit me for some crazy reason  
>>>>> (but
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> with my three year old, I he is only a missed nap away from  
>>>>> engaging
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> in something so obvious and horrible as biting someone).  A  
>>>>> bike, on
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> the other hand, can hurt me a lot more than a bite from a  
>>>>> toddler, and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I suppose I am not above kicking a bike and yelling....  but I  
>>>>> have
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> very limited feelings about a bike malfunction or hitting my thumb
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> with a hammer.  On the other hand, a bike goes wherever I want  
>>>>> it to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> go (except when there's an accident).....  a toddler, not so  
>>>>> much....
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> an eight year old, he usually comes with a counter proposal (and  
>>>>> it is
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> a monstrous adult that would treat kids like a bike, insist that  
>>>>> they
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> only go where told, speak when it is demanded).  A lot of really  
>>>>> deep
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> thinking about human subjectivty simply does not go this  
>>>>> far....  and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> part of this has to do with a poor understanding of objects.   
>>>>> What is
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> worse is when this understanding infects interpersonal  
>>>>> relationships
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> in the context of a Randian sort of world where there is "no such
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> thing as society, only individuals" (yet, bosses treat workers  
>>>>> like
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> bikes and bad boyfriends treat their partners like robots).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I am very excited to read more.  I feel like it is important to  
>>>>> free
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> our thinking from patterns and habits of the past.  In  
>>>>> particular, the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> culture of academic citation has gone from being about finding  
>>>>> good
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ideas where they are to deriving authority from the aura of the  
>>>>> great
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> figure.  I also have no problem with accumulations of wisdom that
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> translate into an inherited perspective, but this can't close us  
>>>>> off
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> to thinking.  So....  thank you for this!
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Davin
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu 
>>>>> >
>>>>>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Davin,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm about to disappear into a mess of meetings, but let me offer  
>>>>> a brief
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> response:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> What you're touching on here is what Levi Byrant sometimes calls  
>>>>> the "weird
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> mereology" of OOO. The song isn't "just" the sound waves (what  
>>>>> Harman calls
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> an underming position) nor is it just the social context of  
>>>>> creation and use
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> (an overmining position). A song is a song, and indeed, the song  
>>>>> in an MP3
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> file is a different thing than the song as an abstraction in  
>>>>> human culture.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Neither is more object nor more real (well, "real" has a  
>>>>> different meaning
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> for Harman than it does for Levi and me).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I talk about this a bit in the first chapter of Alien  
>>>>> Phenomenology, and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Levi does as well in the mereology section of Democracy of  
>>>>> Objects. Also,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> here are a  blog post from Levi on the subject that weaves the two
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> together:
>>>>>
>>>>> http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/08/12/more-strange-mereology/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm not answering sufficiently but wanted to get something out  
>>>>> to you
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> rapidly.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ib
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Ian Bogost, Ph.D.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Professor
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Director, Graduate Program in Digital Media
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Georgia Institute of Technology
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Digital Media/TSRB 320B
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 85 Fifth Street NW
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Atlanta, GA 30308-1030
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ibogost at gatech.edu
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> +1 (404) 894-1160 (tel)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> +1 (404) 894-2833 (fax)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jun 15, 2012, at 4:11 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Ian,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Since we are on the topic of OOO, I was wondering what the  
>>>>> ontological
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> status of something like a song is?  I have to admit, I have a  
>>>>> real
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> hard time swallowing a pure ontology that essentially defines the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> subjective as outside of being, as a sort of on or off  
>>>>> proposition, as
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> opposed to also a turning on (or is it being turned on? Or  
>>>>> simply to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> be turned or to turn?) (I am generally skeptical about a variety  
>>>>> of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> posthumanisms that go beyond a critique of a monolithic Humanism,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> because I think that consciousness carries specific tendencies  
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> seem to fundamentally frame all possibilities for knowledge).   
>>>>> However
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> it is entirely possible that I am missing out on a discussion  
>>>>> that has
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> been unfolding without me.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But here's my thought:  With a song, you have something that can  
>>>>> be
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> rendered in "objective" form....  maybe an mp3 file or a sheet of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> notes or record or something.  If this is what we mean by a song,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> then, fine, that's an object.  But a song only really starts doing
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> something when it is unfolding within the context of memory and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> anticipation.  It only is a song when it is listened to by a  
>>>>> subject,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> which is to say it is an object that has a singular temporal  
>>>>> being as
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> it is listened to, which is distinct from how it is being  
>>>>> listened to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> and replayed even by the same user.  (And we aren't even  
>>>>> beginning to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> talk about non-recorded music).  The only way a song becomes a  
>>>>> purely
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> discrete object is when it is removed from its temporal  
>>>>> existence and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> understood as a totality, and detached from an audience.  And  
>>>>> while we
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> can sit around and all talk about, say, "Another One Bites the  
>>>>> Dust,"
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> after we squeeze it into a conceptual file type and label it,  
>>>>> the fact
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> that we can discuss something that can only mean something if is
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> experienced as a process AND an object within the context of a
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> experience, suggests that sometimes being is realized by the  
>>>>> relations
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> of things, rather than the things themselves.  My suggestion is  
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> the ontological nature of the song cannot be described in  
>>>>> objective
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> terms without missing what a song is.  Without the non-objective
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> component of its being, a song is just sound.  If we say, well,  
>>>>> "Hey,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> when this sound occurs, people do X, Y, and Z," we can find  
>>>>> ourself
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> thinking that these effects are produced by the object, but this  
>>>>> sort
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> of thought experiment only gives us half an understanding of the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> object's being.  You also have to think of that song in relation  
>>>>> to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> the current context, to itself over time, to the individual and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> collective experience of its audience, to the culture, etc.  
>>>>> Again, a
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> great means to produce estrangement, but not the complete  
>>>>> account of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> what the thing is.  At the risk of sounding chauvinistic, I can  
>>>>> see
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> that it might be expedient to regard a distant moon without  
>>>>> regard to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> its historical relationship to the human.  It's useful to think  
>>>>> of a
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> distant moon as a quantity of data.  But the closer we get to  
>>>>> human
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> existence, the more likely we are to encounter types of things  
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> exist, but that cannot be understood properly as a bundle of  
>>>>> discrete
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> data.  Maybe there are some texts that address precisly these  
>>>>> sorts of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> concerns.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This is where I think ontology cannot simply be objective.  It  
>>>>> must,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> of course, be able to establish the differences between things, to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> render those things it claims to understand in discrete form,  
>>>>> insofar
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> as they can be considered as such.  On the other hand, we know  
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> most of what the world is made of is common and that the laws of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> physics, for instance, harness discrete things under a kind of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> continuity.  So, along with the conditions of radical difference  
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> a philosophy of objects implies, there are the conditions of  
>>>>> radical
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> connectivity.  Both features are equally present, which is to  
>>>>> say they
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> offer us little in the way of productive knowledge EXCEPT  
>>>>> insofar as
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> we can bind and sever, cut or tie, digitize or analogize within  
>>>>> this
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> framework of matter.  The 21st century loves digitizing  
>>>>> things.....
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> it helps computers see the world, it helps them count us,  
>>>>> predict our
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> behavior, weigh it, value it, direct it, etc.  But the digital  
>>>>> is only
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> half of our existence....  the analog process is equally present  
>>>>> in
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> language and cognition....  and it is just as equpped to help us
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> understand the world by creating categories of things and  
>>>>> identifying
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> common qualities.  In "Notes on the Uncanny," Freud identifies  
>>>>> this
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> struggle as productive of a kind of unsettling (the person that  
>>>>> acts
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> like an object/the object that acts like a person)...  but it  
>>>>> does not
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> simply have to be a "scary" process....  the move from discrete to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> connected or from one into multiple can also be deeply  
>>>>> satisfying and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> reassuring of being.  If both processes are equally useful, then  
>>>>> what
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> presides over these two tendencies?  Temporal consciousness that  
>>>>> can
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> mobilize processes of digitization and analogy?  Another place to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> think through this is in relation to a variety of attempts at
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> taxonomy.  At some point, a poodle has to be a poodle and a wolf  
>>>>> has
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> to be a wolf, but in relation to squids, both can be canines.  We
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> could say that well, we are talking about layers of qualities that
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> enable us to categorize this object or that object.  But without  
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> history of the poodle we don't really know how one canine can be a
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> fashion accessory and the other is a part of a wild ecology, all  
>>>>> of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> which (domesticating work dogs, turning tool animals into fashion
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> animals, thinking about animals as people, killing wild animals,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> restoring wildness, etc) radically alter the parameters of being  
>>>>> based
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> on thoughts about being.  To take it back to queer thought,  
>>>>> around the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> bend of singular identities is the knowlege that such queerness  
>>>>> does
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> not preclude deep relationality.  My reading is that the fruits of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> this thought are an affirmation of the idea that the well-worn  
>>>>> paths
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> of prescribed human behavior do not necessarily lead to earnest
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> relationships, it is not to reject relationship itself in favor of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> individualism because capitalism has been doing this since the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> transformation of labor into commodity.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Why does this matter?  I care about politics, but I am not going  
>>>>> to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> say that OOO cleaves to this or that kind of politics....  it  
>>>>> doesn't
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> matter.  If a statement is discernibly true, then I have an  
>>>>> obligation
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> to bend my ideas around the true statement.  And my sense, based  
>>>>> on
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> very limited reading, is that OOO is trying to figure out what  
>>>>> we can
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> know about being.  So, while it is worth considering the political
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> implications of speculative thought, I think Galloway is a bit  
>>>>> wrong
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> to suggest that something is "bourgeois" or something just because
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> financial markets also offer a flat ontology via capital.  The  
>>>>> only
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> thing that really matters is whether or not a philosophy can get  
>>>>> us to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> a mutually agreed upon knowledge of the world that can be  
>>>>> transmitted
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> effectively from one context to another and continue to be useful.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I have been lazy about following this month's discussion, but I  
>>>>> like
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> the idea of queering technology, of the productively broken  
>>>>> tool.  It
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> is an area that has affinities with regards to my own reading of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> electronic literature.....  taking Jakobson's discussion of  
>>>>> poetics up
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> through Darko Suvin's discussion of "cognitive estrangement," and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> looking at the ways that digital literary practices perform a  
>>>>> similar
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> process with regards to instrumental languages. My thought is  
>>>>> that OOO
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> is productive in that it asks us to engage in a thought experiment
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> about pure objectivitiy, and in doing so, reveals the critical
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> necessity of subjective and intersubjective aspects of human being
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> that are embedded in our broader assertions about being.  I  
>>>>> think that
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> a lot of the "posthumanisms" try to simply go beyond something  
>>>>> that we
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> have never understood in the first place: that being human is
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> essentially a kind of queer existence, all the much more so when  
>>>>> we
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> insist that it is not. For my part, I want my human rights.  So  
>>>>> while
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I am sympathetic, generally, with many of the aims of the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> posthumanists I encounter, I generally think that "Humanism" has  
>>>>> yet
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> to adequately describe being human.  Like Habermas said of  
>>>>> modernity,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> it's daunting and messy and incomplete (like most things worth  
>>>>> doing).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Living in Norway right now (moving in a couple weeks,  
>>>>> unfortunately),
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> humanism seems to be working out pretty well here.  The problems  
>>>>> of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> the world do not stem from a love of humanity, they stem from our
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> growing estrangment from humanity and increased clustering into
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> paranoid, exclusionary enclaves (Why do you think everyone watches
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Zombie movies? Blasting away at legions of dirty anthropoidal  
>>>>> morons
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> trying to eat what you have, a perfect gospel for post democratic
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> capitalism).  In a world of Darwinian evolution, we are not  
>>>>> entirely
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> selected, we alter the landscape of an objective process through  
>>>>> our
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> dialogue with an objective sphere that exists, that we inhabit,  
>>>>> and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> that we think about, but which does not simply constitute us.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I admit these thoughts are poorly formed....  and I am very busy  
>>>>> these
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> days....  so I might not be able to reply as quickly as I would
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> normally.  But am very interested in these conversations.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Davin
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Jun 14, 2012 at 4:16 PM, frederic neyrat <fneyrat at gmail.com 
>>>>> > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I would like - if possible - to get one or two examples about the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> objects concerned by your statement:"all objects equally exist,  
>>>>> but
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> not all objects exist equally." I guess - but I just guess -  
>>>>> that the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> first part of the sentence is ontological and the second part  
>>>>> could be
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> political, but maybe I'm wrong. Thanks in advance.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Best,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Frederic Neyrat
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 2012/6/14 Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Ok, sigh, let me try this again.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The "as much as" is not a judgement of value, but of existence.  
>>>>> This is the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> fundamental disagreement that played out in the comments to  
>>>>> Galloway's work
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> and in the many responses elsewhere. The world is big and  
>>>>> contains many
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> things. I've put this principle thusly: "all objects equally  
>>>>> exist, but not
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> all objects exist equally."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It's possible that such a metaphysical position isn't for  
>>>>> everyone. But if
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> your idea of "being political" is as exclusionary and  
>>>>> deprecatory as both
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Galloway's post and my limited experience thusfar here on  
>>>>> empyre, then
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> perhaps you can explain why that a model worth aspiring for? Why  
>>>>> that is
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> virtuous and righteous?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Ian
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jun 14, 2012, at 2:57 PM, Rob Myers wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 06/14/2012 07:02 PM, Ian Bogost wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> As for queer and feminist formulations, I agree with the spirit  
>>>>> of what
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> you say, but I'll reiterate my observation that SR/OOO is moving  
>>>>> in a
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> slightly different direction?one that concerns toasters and  
>>>>> quasars as
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> much as human subjects (note the "as much as" here). Why not  
>>>>> take this
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> work for what it is, at least for starters, rather than for what  
>>>>> it
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> isn't?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The "as much as" is precisely the problem.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Galloway's critique of OOO that Zach mentioned explains why:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://itself.wordpress.com/2012/06/03/a-response-to-graham-harmans-marginalia-on-radical-thinking/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But I wouldn't lump Meillassoux in with Harman. I think  
>>>>> Meillassoux's
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> philosophy can indeed be interesting for this debate because of  
>>>>> its
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> embracing of contingency and possibility.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> - Rob.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> empyre forum
>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> empyre forum
>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> -- 
>>> Peter Gratton
>>> pmgratton at gmail.com
>>> Spring-Summer 2012, Visiting Fellow, Humanities Research Centre,  
>>> Australia National University
>>> Co-Editor, Society and Space (Environment and Planning D)
>>> Society and Space open site
>>> Philosophy in a Time of Error weblog
>>> Department of Philosophy
>>> Memorial University of Newfoundland
>>> St. John's, NF
>>> A1C 5S7 CANADA
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 at 2:12 PM, Timothy Morton <timothymorton303 at gmail.com 
>>> > wrote:
>>> Hi---each entity (a thought, an amethyst geode, a bartender) emits  
>>> spacetime just as Einstein argued . Graham's The Quadruple Object  
>>> and my not yet out Realist Magic go into this.
>>>
>>> Each entity "times" in the way Heidegger reserves for Da-sein and  
>>> Derrida reserves to the trace.
>>>
>>> Time and space are not neutral containers but are emergent  
>>> properties of beings.
>>>
>>> Tim
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>>>
>>> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:15 PM, davin heckman  
>>> <davinheckman at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> You are right....  I should do more reading.  I find the thoughts
>>>> engaging and, since I am in transit, I am eager to get more
>>>> information where I can.
>>>>
>>>> Ultimately, underneath my questions, I suppose, are some thoughts  
>>>> on
>>>> relationality and time.  You have all of these things that have  
>>>> to do
>>>> with chairs, but only the chair is the chair.  And there are these
>>>> things that have to do with chairs, but which are real in their own
>>>> right.  But an idea about a chair kind of flickers in and out of
>>>> consciousness, never having a discrete edge, and only become  
>>>> something
>>>> definitive when their edges are marked out in some way. It's  
>>>> tempting
>>>> to think that one's writing about a thought is separate from the
>>>> thought itself, but typically the act of writing or performing a
>>>> thought tends to calcify and reinforce it through a feedback loop.
>>>> Every time one thinks about a chair, one does not invent a new  
>>>> object.
>>>> Similar to a computer program pulling modular entities and reusing
>>>> them again and again, our thoughts repeat the concept in our
>>>> imagination.  On the other hand, imaginary iterations are not the  
>>>> same
>>>> as digital iterations.  Less like a computer, we pull the modular
>>>> concept into action and interpret it with a variety of tones.  I
>>>> wouldn't want to say these singular thoughts don't exist, but on  
>>>> the
>>>> other hand, they don't have the same reality as those thoughts  
>>>> which
>>>> are articulated and taken up into collective discourse....  and  
>>>> even
>>>> still, a discursive "thing" gains a level of significance when it
>>>> represents some empirical process.
>>>>
>>>> I care about this because a chair changes from one moment to the  
>>>> next.
>>>> It becomes materially altered as time unfolds, yet we are  
>>>> comfortable
>>>> saying that the chair on day one is that chair on day five.  In  
>>>> other
>>>> words, each moment does not unleash a separate chair.  In my mind,
>>>> "weight" might be its subjective intensity, its empirical  
>>>> durability,
>>>> its social hegemony, its procedural utility, its digital  
>>>> ubiquity, its
>>>> aesthetic elegance....  though none of these qualities are directly
>>>> analogous to the other, suggesting that there are a variety of  
>>>> types
>>>> of being.
>>>>
>>>> All these thoughts are a jumble....  I'll take your advice and do  
>>>> some reading.
>>>>
>>>> Davin
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 11:28 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu 
>>>> > wrote:
>>>>> A chair is a chair. A picture of a chair is a picture of a  
>>>>> chair. A
>>>>> definition of a chair is a definition of a chair. None are all  
>>>>> chairs, but
>>>>> all have something to do with chairs. At least, that's the OOO  
>>>>> contention.
>>>>> There are no planes of existence? except for Harman (and Tim, to  
>>>>> some
>>>>> extent), who distinguishes sensual from real objects. For  
>>>>> Graham, the idea
>>>>> of a chair is different from the real chair, which recedes from  
>>>>> all
>>>>> encounters. I think this is maybe the conclusion you arrive at  
>>>>> in your
>>>>> second paragraph below.
>>>>>
>>>>> NOTHING about OOO privileges the material (i.e., the tangible,  
>>>>> physical)
>>>>> chair primacy over the others. As for "the same weight" ? well,  
>>>>> that depends
>>>>> on what you mean by "weight." What do you mean?
>>>>>
>>>>> I hate to say it, but it's maybe not possible to make further  
>>>>> progress
>>>>> without reading some of this material in depth?
>>>>>
>>>>> Ian
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:13 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Ian and Tim,
>>>>>
>>>>> Do the differences with which we treat objects syncs up with
>>>>> ontological difference, and thus, is there something to some of  
>>>>> the
>>>>> different categorizations we could possibly develop for objects?
>>>>>
>>>>> I do think there is plenty of room to see these things from a  
>>>>> fresh
>>>>> perspective, but I also wonder if not, for instance, Kosuth's  
>>>>> chairs
>>>>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_and_Three_Chairs> highlight  
>>>>> the ways
>>>>> that discrete objects can differ from each other, but also the  
>>>>> ways in
>>>>> which there are consistencies that can yoke them together in odd  
>>>>> ways.
>>>>> A picture of a chair is not a chair, a definition of chair is  
>>>>> not a
>>>>> chair, instructions about a chair is not a chair, a chair as a
>>>>> sculpture is not necessarily a chair.....  yet, in some  
>>>>> fundamental
>>>>> way, all are chairs.... in a general sense of their concept and
>>>>> recognition.  Put all three things together, and you have a  
>>>>> "chair"
>>>>> which occupies all three planes of existence simultaneously.  On  
>>>>> the
>>>>> other hand, they can occupy niches within conceptual frameworks (a
>>>>> chair within a game, for instance, can be very "real" to the other
>>>>> objects in the game).
>>>>>
>>>>> Each way of recognizing the chair (the picture, instructions, the
>>>>> chair as chair, chair as sculpture, three chairs as conceptual  
>>>>> work,
>>>>> etc) would suggest that each is a distinct object in some sense,  
>>>>> which
>>>>> makes me wonder then, whether or not all other possible thoughts  
>>>>> about
>>>>> a chair have being, or if we afford the material object of the  
>>>>> chair
>>>>> primacy.  In which case, does a digital rendering of the chair  
>>>>> carry
>>>>> the same weight as an unexpressed idea about a chair, too.  At  
>>>>> some
>>>>> point, doesn't ontology lead into this thicket?
>>>>>
>>>>> Davin
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 9:08 PM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu 
>>>>> >
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> There is no reason why holding that everything exists equally  
>>>>> entails
>>>>>
>>>>> "reducing all that can be known about a being to a simple  
>>>>> recognition of
>>>>>
>>>>> being."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Ian
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jun 24, 2012, at 5:44 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree, this is a good starting point....  that all things that  
>>>>> exist
>>>>>
>>>>> have being as their common condition of existence (that is, they  
>>>>> are
>>>>>
>>>>> not "not beings"), which is a sort of foundational ontological
>>>>>
>>>>> similarity.  But if the only significant ontological claim we  
>>>>> can make
>>>>>
>>>>> about things is either yes or no, do they exist or not, then this
>>>>>
>>>>> means all things carry this single quality, which is to say that  
>>>>> there
>>>>>
>>>>> is no difference between things.  If we admit difference, then  
>>>>> we must
>>>>>
>>>>> account for those differences in meaningful ways.  For instance,
>>>>>
>>>>> waffle #1 differs from waffle #2 in a different way than waffle #1
>>>>>
>>>>> differs from a toaster (or waffle #1 changes in the course of  
>>>>> being
>>>>>
>>>>> eaten, it is still in one meaningful sense the "same" waffle  
>>>>> after it
>>>>>
>>>>> has been bitten, but in another sense, it is a different waffle,  
>>>>> too.
>>>>>
>>>>> While both toasters and waffles are different from something  
>>>>> like an
>>>>>
>>>>> idea or a "memory" rendered in media (a waffle recipe or story  
>>>>> about
>>>>>
>>>>> waffles) or a process habituated in muscle memory (the habit of  
>>>>> making
>>>>>
>>>>> a waffle or eating one).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> My concern is that if we reduce all that can be known about  
>>>>> being to a
>>>>>
>>>>> simple recognition of being, we commit to a kind of abstraction  
>>>>> and
>>>>>
>>>>> alienation from being of the sort that happens when markets try to
>>>>>
>>>>> mediate everything through the common denominator of dollars.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Davin
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:46 PM, Timothy Morton
>>>>>
>>>>> <timothymorton303 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Davin,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> We obviously treat different entities differently.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But this is not the same as saying that these entities are  
>>>>> ontologically
>>>>>
>>>>> different.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yours, Tim
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jun 20, 2012, at 5:51 AM, davin heckman  
>>>>> <davinheckman at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Thank you Ian, for these thoughts.  My initial encounter with this
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> work came via a brief discussion of "flat ontology," which I found
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> somewhat offputting.  I followed up by reading through the  
>>>>> re:press
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> book.  What I like the most, I suppose, is the sense that the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> discussions are in motion with a lot of people participating.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Reading some of the discussion of mereology, I find they  
>>>>> resonate with
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> one of my favorite passages from Hegel.  Pardon me for  
>>>>> cannibalizing
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> another piece of writing (a draft of which can be found here:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/disturbed-dialectic-literary-criticism) 
>>>>> .
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the dialectical  
>>>>> process:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> might say the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the  
>>>>> truth of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one  
>>>>> another,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at  
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic  
>>>>> unity in
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as  
>>>>> necessary
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the  
>>>>> life of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> the whole." [1]
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Viewed from within the Hegelian process, the Real is positioned
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> outside its present manifestations, consisting, rather, of the  
>>>>> dynamic
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> processes that comprise its totality.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This insight, crucial to critical practice, requires revision in  
>>>>> light
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> of technical change. By revision, I do not mean that we need to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> fundamentally alter Hegel?s argument, I only mean to suggest  
>>>>> that we
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> see this passage with respect to new temporal modalities that have
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> shaken up the pursuit of knowledge.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I come at many of the same issues, but my inclination lead me to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> embrace a kind of "humanism," but one which cannot easily  
>>>>> understand
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> as we continually muddle the conversations of humanism with an
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ontology that is expressed in our metaphors.  One grip I have  
>>>>> with the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> use of Deleuze or McLuhan, is the idea that our capacity to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> personalize prosthetics has a tendency to be reduced to a  
>>>>> situation in
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> which it becomes possible to imagine that we see machines,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> interpersonal relationships, people with tools, etc. as the same
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> thing.  When, in fact, my psychic investment in my bike or  
>>>>> computer,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> while deep, is not nearly as deep or as complex as my psychic
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> investment in my (which I can only refer to as mine with a sense  
>>>>> of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> obligation to, rather than ownership over) child.  If my bike  
>>>>> decided
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> to bite me.....which it can't, even if it can hurt me....  I  
>>>>> would not
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> feel so simultaneously restrained in my response AND emotionally
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> florid as I would if my 8 year old bit me for some crazy reason  
>>>>> (but
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> with my three year old, I he is only a missed nap away from  
>>>>> engaging
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> in something so obvious and horrible as biting someone).  A  
>>>>> bike, on
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> the other hand, can hurt me a lot more than a bite from a  
>>>>> toddler, and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I suppose I am not above kicking a bike and yelling....  but I  
>>>>> have
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> very limited feelings about a bike malfunction or hitting my thumb
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> with a hammer.  On the other hand, a bike goes wherever I want  
>>>>> it to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> go (except when there's an accident).....  a toddler, not so  
>>>>> much....
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> an eight year old, he usually comes with a counter proposal (and  
>>>>> it is
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> a monstrous adult that would treat kids like a bike, insist that  
>>>>> they
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> only go where told, speak when it is demanded).  A lot of really  
>>>>> deep
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> thinking about human subjectivty simply does not go this  
>>>>> far....  and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> part of this has to do with a poor understanding of objects.   
>>>>> What is
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> worse is when this understanding infects interpersonal  
>>>>> relationships
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> in the context of a Randian sort of world where there is "no such
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> thing as society, only individuals" (yet, bosses treat workers  
>>>>> like
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> bikes and bad boyfriends treat their partners like robots).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I am very excited to read more.  I feel like it is important to  
>>>>> free
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> our thinking from patterns and habits of the past.  In  
>>>>> particular, the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> culture of academic citation has gone from being about finding  
>>>>> good
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ideas where they are to deriving authority from the aura of the  
>>>>> great
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> figure.  I also have no problem with accumulations of wisdom that
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> translate into an inherited perspective, but this can't close us  
>>>>> off
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> to thinking.  So....  thank you for this!
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Davin
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu 
>>>>> >
>>>>>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Davin,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm about to disappear into a mess of meetings, but let me offer  
>>>>> a brief
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> response:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> What you're touching on here is what Levi Byrant sometimes calls  
>>>>> the "weird
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> mereology" of OOO. The song isn't "just" the sound waves (what  
>>>>> Harman calls
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> an underming position) nor is it just the social context of  
>>>>> creation and use
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> (an overmining position). A song is a song, and indeed, the song  
>>>>> in an MP3
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> file is a different thing than the song as an abstraction in  
>>>>> human culture.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Neither is more object nor more real (well, "real" has a  
>>>>> different meaning
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> for Harman than it does for Levi and me).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I talk about this a bit in the first chapter of Alien  
>>>>> Phenomenology, and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Levi does as well in the mereology section of Democracy of  
>>>>> Objects. Also,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> here are a  blog post from Levi on the subject that weaves the two
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> together:
>>>>>
>>>>> http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/08/12/more-strange-mereology/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm not answering sufficiently but wanted to get something out  
>>>>> to you
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> rapidly.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ib
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Ian Bogost, Ph.D.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Professor
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Director, Graduate Program in Digital Media
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Georgia Institute of Technology
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Digital Media/TSRB 320B
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 85 Fifth Street NW
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Atlanta, GA 30308-1030
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ibogost at gatech.edu
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> +1 (404) 894-1160 (tel)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> +1 (404) 894-2833 (fax)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jun 15, 2012, at 4:11 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Ian,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Since we are on the topic of OOO, I was wondering what the  
>>>>> ontological
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> status of something like a song is?  I have to admit, I have a  
>>>>> real
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> hard time swallowing a pure ontology that essentially defines the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> subjective as outside of being, as a sort of on or off  
>>>>> proposition, as
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> opposed to also a turning on (or is it being turned on? Or  
>>>>> simply to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> be turned or to turn?) (I am generally skeptical about a variety  
>>>>> of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> posthumanisms that go beyond a critique of a monolithic Humanism,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> because I think that consciousness carries specific tendencies  
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> seem to fundamentally frame all possibilities for knowledge).   
>>>>> However
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> it is entirely possible that I am missing out on a discussion  
>>>>> that has
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> been unfolding without me.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But here's my thought:  With a song, you have something that can  
>>>>> be
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> rendered in "objective" form....  maybe an mp3 file or a sheet of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> notes or record or something.  If this is what we mean by a song,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> then, fine, that's an object.  But a song only really starts doing
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> something when it is unfolding within the context of memory and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> anticipation.  It only is a song when it is listened to by a  
>>>>> subject,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> which is to say it is an object that has a singular temporal  
>>>>> being as
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> it is listened to, which is distinct from how it is being  
>>>>> listened to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> and replayed even by the same user.  (And we aren't even  
>>>>> beginning to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> talk about non-recorded music).  The only way a song becomes a  
>>>>> purely
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> discrete object is when it is removed from its temporal  
>>>>> existence and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> understood as a totality, and detached from an audience.  And  
>>>>> while we
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> can sit around and all talk about, say, "Another One Bites the  
>>>>> Dust,"
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> after we squeeze it into a conceptual file type and label it,  
>>>>> the fact
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> that we can discuss something that can only mean something if is
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> experienced as a process AND an object within the context of a
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> experience, suggests that sometimes being is realized by the  
>>>>> relations
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> of things, rather than the things themselves.  My suggestion is  
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> the ontological nature of the song cannot be described in  
>>>>> objective
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> terms without missing what a song is.  Without the non-objective
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> component of its being, a song is just sound.  If we say, well,  
>>>>> "Hey,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> when this sound occurs, people do X, Y, and Z," we can find  
>>>>> ourself
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> thinking that these effects are produced by the object, but this  
>>>>> sort
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> of thought experiment only gives us half an understanding of the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> object's being.  You also have to think of that song in relation  
>>>>> to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> the current context, to itself over time, to the individual and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> collective experience of its audience, to the culture, etc.  
>>>>> Again, a
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> great means to produce estrangement, but not the complete  
>>>>> account of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> what the thing is.  At the risk of sounding chauvinistic, I can  
>>>>> see
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> that it might be expedient to regard a distant moon without  
>>>>> regard to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> its historical relationship to the human.  It's useful to think  
>>>>> of a
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> distant moon as a quantity of data.  But the closer we get to  
>>>>> human
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> existence, the more likely we are to encounter types of things  
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> exist, but that cannot be understood properly as a bundle of  
>>>>> discrete
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> data.  Maybe there are some texts that address precisly these  
>>>>> sorts of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> concerns.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This is where I think ontology cannot simply be objective.  It  
>>>>> must,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> of course, be able to establish the differences between things, to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> render those things it claims to understand in discrete form,  
>>>>> insofar
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> as they can be considered as such.  On the other hand, we know  
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> most of what the world is made of is common and that the laws of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> physics, for instance, harness discrete things under a kind of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> continuity.  So, along with the conditions of radical difference  
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> a philosophy of objects implies, there are the conditions of  
>>>>> radical
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> connectivity.  Both features are equally present, which is to  
>>>>> say they
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> offer us little in the way of productive knowledge EXCEPT  
>>>>> insofar as
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> we can bind and sever, cut or tie, digitize or analogize within  
>>>>> this
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> framework of matter.  The 21st century loves digitizing  
>>>>> things.....
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> it helps computers see the world, it helps them count us,  
>>>>> predict our
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> behavior, weigh it, value it, direct it, etc.  But the digital  
>>>>> is only
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> half of our existence....  the analog process is equally present  
>>>>> in
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> language and cognition....  and it is just as equpped to help us
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> understand the world by creating categories of things and  
>>>>> identifying
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> common qualities.  In "Notes on the Uncanny," Freud identifies  
>>>>> this
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> struggle as productive of a kind of unsettling (the person that  
>>>>> acts
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> like an object/the object that acts like a person)...  but it  
>>>>> does not
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> simply have to be a "scary" process....  the move from discrete to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> connected or from one into multiple can also be deeply  
>>>>> satisfying and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> reassuring of being.  If both processes are equally useful, then  
>>>>> what
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> presides over these two tendencies?  Temporal consciousness that  
>>>>> can
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> mobilize processes of digitization and analogy?  Another place to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> think through this is in relation to a variety of attempts at
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> taxonomy.  At some point, a poodle has to be a poodle and a wolf  
>>>>> has
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> to be a wolf, but in relation to squids, both can be canines.  We
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> could say that well, we are talking about layers of qualities that
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> enable us to categorize this object or that object.  But without  
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> history of the poodle we don't really know how one canine can be a
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> fashion accessory and the other is a part of a wild ecology, all  
>>>>> of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> which (domesticating work dogs, turning tool animals into fashion
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> animals, thinking about animals as people, killing wild animals,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> restoring wildness, etc) radically alter the parameters of being  
>>>>> based
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> on thoughts about being.  To take it back to queer thought,  
>>>>> around the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> bend of singular identities is the knowlege that such queerness  
>>>>> does
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> not preclude deep relationality.  My reading is that the fruits of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> this thought are an affirmation of the idea that the well-worn  
>>>>> paths
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> of prescribed human behavior do not necessarily lead to earnest
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> relationships, it is not to reject relationship itself in favor of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> individualism because capitalism has been doing this since the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> transformation of labor into commodity.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Why does this matter?  I care about politics, but I am not going  
>>>>> to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> say that OOO cleaves to this or that kind of politics....  it  
>>>>> doesn't
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> matter.  If a statement is discernibly true, then I have an  
>>>>> obligation
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> to bend my ideas around the true statement.  And my sense, based  
>>>>> on
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> very limited reading, is that OOO is trying to figure out what  
>>>>> we can
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> know about being.  So, while it is worth considering the political
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> implications of speculative thought, I think Galloway is a bit  
>>>>> wrong
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> to suggest that something is "bourgeois" or something just because
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> financial markets also offer a flat ontology via capital.  The  
>>>>> only
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> thing that really matters is whether or not a philosophy can get  
>>>>> us to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> a mutually agreed upon knowledge of the world that can be  
>>>>> transmitted
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> effectively from one context to another and continue to be useful.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I have been lazy about following this month's discussion, but I  
>>>>> like
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> the idea of queering technology, of the productively broken  
>>>>> tool.  It
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> is an area that has affinities with regards to my own reading of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> electronic literature.....  taking Jakobson's discussion of  
>>>>> poetics up
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> through Darko Suvin's discussion of "cognitive estrangement," and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> looking at the ways that digital literary practices perform a  
>>>>> similar
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> process with regards to instrumental languages. My thought is  
>>>>> that OOO
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> is productive in that it asks us to engage in a thought experiment
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> about pure objectivitiy, and in doing so, reveals the critical
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> necessity of subjective and intersubjective aspects of human being
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> that are embedded in our broader assertions about being.  I  
>>>>> think that
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> a lot of the "posthumanisms" try to simply go beyond something  
>>>>> that we
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> have never understood in the first place: that being human is
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> essentially a kind of queer existence, all the much more so when  
>>>>> we
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> insist that it is not. For my part, I want my human rights.  So  
>>>>> while
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I am sympathetic, generally, with many of the aims of the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> posthumanists I encounter, I generally think that "Humanism" has  
>>>>> yet
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> to adequately describe being human.  Like Habermas said of  
>>>>> modernity,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> it's daunting and messy and incomplete (like most things worth  
>>>>> doing).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Living in Norway right now (moving in a couple weeks,  
>>>>> unfortunately),
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> humanism seems to be working out pretty well here.  The problems  
>>>>> of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> the world do not stem from a love of humanity, they stem from our
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> growing estrangment from humanity and increased clustering into
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> paranoid, exclusionary enclaves (Why do you think everyone watches
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Zombie movies? Blasting away at legions of dirty anthropoidal  
>>>>> morons
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> trying to eat what you have, a perfect gospel for post democratic
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> capitalism).  In a world of Darwinian evolution, we are not  
>>>>> entirely
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> selected, we alter the landscape of an objective process through  
>>>>> our
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> dialogue with an objective sphere that exists, that we inhabit,  
>>>>> and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> that we think about, but which does not simply constitute us.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I admit these thoughts are poorly formed....  and I am very busy  
>>>>> these
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> days....  so I might not be able to reply as quickly as I would
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> normally.  But am very interested in these conversations.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Davin
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Jun 14, 2012 at 4:16 PM, frederic neyrat <fneyrat at gmail.com 
>>>>> > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I would like - if possible - to get one or two examples about the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> objects concerned by your statement:"all objects equally exist,  
>>>>> but
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> not all objects exist equally." I guess - but I just guess -  
>>>>> that the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> first part of the sentence is ontological and the second part  
>>>>> could be
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> political, but maybe I'm wrong. Thanks in advance.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Best,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Frederic Neyrat
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 2012/6/14 Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Ok, sigh, let me try this again.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The "as much as" is not a judgement of value, but of existence.  
>>>>> This is the
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> fundamental disagreement that played out in the comments to  
>>>>> Galloway's work
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> and in the many responses elsewhere. The world is big and  
>>>>> contains many
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> things. I've put this principle thusly: "all objects equally  
>>>>> exist, but not
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> all objects exist equally."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It's possible that such a metaphysical position isn't for  
>>>>> everyone. But if
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> your idea of "being political" is as exclusionary and  
>>>>> deprecatory as both
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Galloway's post and my limited experience thusfar here on  
>>>>> empyre, then
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> perhaps you can explain why that a model worth aspiring for? Why  
>>>>> that is
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> virtuous and righteous?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Ian
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jun 14, 2012, at 2:57 PM, Rob Myers wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 06/14/2012 07:02 PM, Ian Bogost wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> As for queer and feminist formulations, I agree with the spirit  
>>>>> of what
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> you say, but I'll reiterate my observation that SR/OOO is moving  
>>>>> in a
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> slightly different direction?one that concerns toasters and  
>>>>> quasars as
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> much as human subjects (note the "as much as" here). Why not  
>>>>> take this
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> work for what it is, at least for starters, rather than for what  
>>>>> it
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> isn't?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The "as much as" is precisely the problem.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Galloway's critique of OOO that Zach mentioned explains why:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://itself.wordpress.com/2012/06/03/a-response-to-graham-harmans-marginalia-on-radical-thinking/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But I wouldn't lump Meillassoux in with Harman. I think  
>>>>> Meillassoux's
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> philosophy can indeed be interesting for this debate because of  
>>>>> its
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> embracing of contingency and possibility.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> - Rob.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> empyre forum
>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> empyre forum
>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> -- 
>>> Peter Gratton
>>> pmgratton at gmail.com
>>> Spring-Summer 2012, Visiting Fellow, Humanities Research Centre,  
>>> Australia National University
>>> Co-Editor, Society and Space (Environment and Planning D)
>>> Society and Space open site
>>> Philosophy in a Time of Error weblog
>>> Department of Philosophy
>>> Memorial University of Newfoundland
>>> St. John's, NF
>>> A1C 5S7 CANADA
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> empyre forum
>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> empyre forum
>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>
>>
>>
>> -- 
>> -- 
>> Peter Gratton
>> pmgratton at gmail.com
>> Spring-Summer 2012, Visiting Fellow, Humanities Research Centre,  
>> Australia National University
>> Co-Editor, Society and Space (Environment and Planning D)
>> Society and Space open site
>> Philosophy in a Time of Error weblog
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Memorial University of Newfoundland
>> St. John's, NF
>> A1C 5S7 CANADA
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> empyre forum
>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
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> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2012 00:03:22 -0500
> From: Timothy Morton <timothymorton303 at gmail.com>
> To: soft_skinned_space <empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au>
> Subject: Re: [-empyre-] Week 4 - Bio/Nano/Materialisms - the
> 	transperversal	aesthetic of Texas grasshoppers
> Message-ID: <F820D231-5DB1-4FEE-97EF-CF7E00A73A76 at gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
> Thanks for this Heather. I too am leery of a
> certain kind of nihilism. Why would (human)
> horror be the special pampered affect of our
> age?
>
> I think personally, and this has been growing
> on me for a few months, that the at least
> philosophical solution is "underneath" nihilism,
> not in spite of it or over it.
>
> It's a little bit hard to explain in an email but
> one clear symptom is the fascination with and
> disavowal of nothingness in modern philosophy
> (ie since 1790).
>
> This ties in with a fear of a certain kind of Buddhism,
> a fear that is isometric with homophobia, being
> a fear of physical intimacy with the same(ness)
> installed at the core of Western thinking.
>
> I'm not an apocalyptic person. I think the world
> has ended and that this is the afterlife already.
>
> Namely the Anthropocene, the moment at which
> human history intersects with geological time
> (incipit 1790).
>
> Tim
>
>
> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>
> On Jun 27, 2012, at 6:24 PM, Heather Davis  
> <heathermargaret at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> The no-future future is definitely something that lays heavy on me,  
>> as a person and as a thinker, especially as it relates to what you  
>> call the 'nanocaust' with its differential racial/class  
>> distributions over this earth. it seems precisely at the level of  
>> the nano that these struggles are being played out, within and  
>> outside of our own bodies, other living organisms, the surface of  
>> the earth and the composition of water.
>>
>> what i have been struggling with for a while is a desire to avoid  
>> the kind of nihilism that would lead to a relishing in the terminal  
>> capitalism/empire moment we seem to be finding ourselves in. beauty  
>> in pure destruction  is at once a driver of social change and its  
>> expiration. This tendency, seen within certain strands of SR (I am  
>> thinking of Nick Land/Reza Negarestani) has an incredible appeal in  
>> its heightening of (nano) intensities, in maintaining destruction  
>> as an important political concept, but seems to also slide towards  
>> messianic end-of-the-world christian narratives of destruction and  
>> perfection. is it possible or desirable to think with this material  
>> moment, think with the dying cows, rapidly extinguishing species,  
>> without giving over to the pure pleasure of annihilation?  how do  
>> we think of the collective as necessarily reaching beyond the  
>> human, its transversal ontogenesis that encompasses the object  
>> revenge that you speak of (especially in relation to non-liv
> ing objects, such as chemicals, minerals, polymers, etc.) without  
> falling into a kind of christian rapture of the end times. perhaps  
> this is for me where art and theory provide a kind of breaking point/ 
> ambiguity that would enable a different kind of movement. in other  
> words, the anti-anti-utopian position of art (through it's multiple  
> negatives that leaves us where exactly?) provides this kind of  
> useful ambiguity that pushes in the direction of new organisms (such  
> as pinar's or ricardo's poetic nano-interventions)   operate as a  
> magical object, that is, the object that wards off the devil by  
> becoming the devil.
>>
>> I really love Pinar's categorization of 'post-natural ecosystems'  
>> and Elle's ethno-dysphoric cloning in this regard because this  
>> categorization offers a way to acknowledge the destruction of  
>> capitalism while refusing the scenario of apocalypse that gives too  
>> much weight to figures of origins and certainty. thank you for  
>> these interventions.
>> heather.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 5:57 AM, rrdominguez2  
>> <rrdominguez at ucsd.edu> wrote:
>> Hola Heather and all,
>>
>> The transperversal movement(s) that *particle group* attempts to  
>> trace via bio/nano scale(s) gestures may indeed call forth "a kind  
>> of material corollary" of affect/effect. Elle's capturing the EEG  
>> of "ethno-dysphoric cloning" or Pinar's new organ/ism pass and are  
>> passing between the utopian synthetics of particle capitalism(s)  
>> and the nanocaust (or the revenge of the object) - an apocalyptic  
>> materiality. The bio/nano aesthetic in the above work moves within  
>> and around a critical anti-anti-utopian condition of making these  
>> engines of imperceptibility visible - transperversal or a type of  
>> queering movement.
>>
>> But one does not have to look very far into the no-future future or  
>> the freeze dried past to see what grey ecology of bio/nano is  
>> manifesting via pre-set accidents or trans-effects at the bio/nano  
>> scale:
>>
>> Genetically modified grass linked to cattle deaths
>> http://wtvr.com/2012/06/24/genetically-modified-grass-linked-to-cattle-deaths/
>>
>> Indeed a new materialism transmuting feed grass into poison which  
>> now only Texas grasshoppers are enjoying (the transperversal moment).
>>
>> As artists we are all Texas grasshoppers - but for how long?
>>
>> Very best,
>> Ricardo
>>
>>
>>
>> On 6/24/12 5:27 PM, Heather Davis wrote:
>>> Hi all,
>>> Apologies for my tardy arrival. I am so excited to be a part of  
>>> this conversation with each of you, and find myself stunned by the  
>>> quality of thought and engagement of my brilliant interlocutors  
>>> here. Thank you for your contributions so for and to Zach and  
>>> Micha for initiating and curating this conversation. I am curious  
>>> about the way in which the nano, in each of your work, becomes a  
>>> kind of significant imperceptibility. I am thinking about how, in  
>>> a previous discussion this month, the idea of 'queer is  
>>> everywhere' was broached. My initial reaction to this was a kind  
>>> of doubt, not trusting the utopic overtones, nor the amorphous  
>>> quality of the statement that lacked the dissensus that  
>>> characterizes politics. What I appreciate about the nano, in each  
>>> of your works, Pinar, Ricardo, and Elle, is the way in which this  
>>> kind of utopic moment of the viral meets with an politics of  
>>> imperceptibility not as simply an aversion or counter-move to  
>>> surveillant systems (of sex, the state
> , neoliberal corporate models, etc.) but as an imperceptibility that  
> moves through the body to make significant changes. It makes me  
> wonder about the nano as being a kind of material corollary of  
> affect - that which carries a force, but is seen through its  
> effects, rather than in a chain of causes or origins. this is indeed  
> a queer position, a kind of passing that is important in its  
> movement, of what it touches and shifts, that is locatable in its  
> actions. the nano seems particularly adapted to this kind of effect,  
> movement.
>>>
>>> I cannot present here as beautiful a summary of the work that I am  
>>> doing, as it has yet to begin. Aside from dirt, which I love  
>>> because of its contaminating/contaminated qualities, because of  
>>> its amorphousness and its ability to be distinct while  
>>> encompassing a range of materials, metaphors, etc, I have become  
>>> increasingly fascinated with plastic. It marks our current age  
>>> that is seemingly ubiquitous, unfathomable (in its scale,  
>>> duration, reach) and also makes the nano a human possibility. for  
>>> it is only because of the creation of purely synthetic polymers  
>>> that we both have the ability to manipulate things at a nanoscale,  
>>> and are able to perceive the nano as a separate measurable scale.  
>>> I am interested in the way in which plastic, as a medium, connects  
>>> to a politics of imperceptibility.
>>>
>>> heather.
>>>
>>> On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 11:57 AM, Clough, Patricia <PClough at gc.cuny.edu 
>>> > wrote:
>>> Thanks to all who engaged during week 3   and welcome week 4     
>>> Patricia
>>> ________________________________________
>>> From: empyre-bounces at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au [empyre-bounces at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au 
>>> ] On Behalf Of Elle Mehrmand [ellemehrmand at gmail.com]
>>> Sent: Saturday, June 23, 2012 8:43 PM
>>> To: empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>> Subject: [-empyre-] Week 4 - Bio/Nano/Materialisms
>>>
>>> Hello out there,
>>>
>>> I am honored to have this opportunity to neuro-jaculate on this  
>>> list. The notions of materialisms/ immaterialisms/ bio- 
>>> materialisms/ -erialisms, within the context of the bio-political,  
>>> bring to mind the pixellated flesh of my holographic/  
>>> fauxlographic clones who live in my most recent performative  
>>> installation entitled fauxlographic. For the past year I have been  
>>> working within the speculative space of an ethno-dysphoric cloning  
>>> laboratory, where diasporic anxiety is analyzed through the  
>>> process of fauxlographic cloning. The clones enact sonic rituals,  
>>> singing in Farsi, English and Perz-ish [a faux-ish language],  
>>> based on multiple sources of information including embodied  
>>> memories, wikileaks cables, and textual/ visual/ aural references  
>>> concerning Iran and Persia. The ethno-dysphoric scientist analyzes  
>>> her dislocated subjectivity by performing a daily neurotic ritual  
>>> within a glass computing chamber while wearing an EEG neuro- 
>>> headset. As she neuro-jaculates with the clon
> es
>>> in order to (pars)e their data streams, the diasporic computing  
>>> sounds of the EEG oscillate in pitch based on her neural activity.  
>>> When high levels of CO2 are detected by the lab's sensors, the  
>>> clones become aware of those gazing upon them, resulting in an  
>>> anxious act of erasure and multiplication of their pixellated  
>>> flesh on the fauxlographic screen, reciprocating the affective  
>>> presence and implications of other bodies within the laboratory.  
>>> The use of organic sensors transforms the lab into a cyborgian  
>>> spatial interface, allowing for unconscious collaboration between  
>>> multiple bodies in space, confusing the somatic architecture of  
>>> the performance.
>>>
>>> // bodies
>>>
>>> [fragmented.dislocated.flesh]
>>>
>>> the metaphor of the split subject in a multitude of  
>>> representations calls for the split subjectivity of the diasporic  
>>> body. the hologram. the clone. the screenal flesh of the  
>>> projection. the reflection on the glass. the live specimen with a  
>>> neural prosthetic.
>>>
>>> //donna haraway's cyborg reconfigured
>>>
>>> the live specimen lays in a burst of stillness within the glass  
>>> chamber for 30 minutes. the liveness of her naked body creates an  
>>> affect that the clones cannot produce, but ultimately she will  
>>> become a reproduction of herself. she performs analysis on the  
>>> clones by means of neural computing. her experiments are open to  
>>> the public, allowing for multiple bodies to inhabit the  
>>> laboratory. the intersectionality of all of the bodies produce the  
>>> organic energy that is necessary for the installation to function.
>>>
>>> the fauxlographic clones are fragmented and displaced as they  
>>> interact with their ironic head scarfs from american apparel  
>>> through gestural research. the black scarf cuts into their  
>>> screenal skin, erasing their flesh due to the translucent nature  
>>> of the fauxlographic screen. they are never fully in or out of the  
>>> fabric, creating a fluidic relationship to the object, one that is  
>>> not part of a binary construct, but one that arises from a unique  
>>> space within the perception of being persian, and is expressed  
>>> through the gestures of their diasporic anxiety. fractured  
>>> elements of their being are echoed in the displacement of their  
>>> body parts. they are vulnerable in their nudity with their  
>>> pixellated flesh and informatic contents exposed, but that is the  
>>> nature of the clone.
>>>
>>> - elle mehrmand
>>>
>>> --
>>> elleelleelle.org<http://elleelleelle.org>
>>> assemblyofmazes.com<http://assemblyofmazes.com>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> empyre forum
>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> empyre forum
>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>
>>
>>
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>> empyre forum
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>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
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