[-empyre-] Meillassoux / Harman
Timothy Morton
timothymorton303 at gmail.com
Wed Jun 27 14:12:28 EST 2012
Hi---each entity (a thought, an amethyst geode, a bartender) emits spacetime just as Einstein argued . Graham's The Quadruple Object and my not yet out Realist Magic go into this.
Each entity "times" in the way Heidegger reserves for Da-sein and Derrida reserves to the trace.
Time and space are not neutral containers but are emergent properties of beings.
Tim
http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:15 PM, davin heckman <davinheckman at gmail.com> wrote:
> You are right.... I should do more reading. I find the thoughts
> engaging and, since I am in transit, I am eager to get more
> information where I can.
>
> Ultimately, underneath my questions, I suppose, are some thoughts on
> relationality and time. You have all of these things that have to do
> with chairs, but only the chair is the chair. And there are these
> things that have to do with chairs, but which are real in their own
> right. But an idea about a chair kind of flickers in and out of
> consciousness, never having a discrete edge, and only become something
> definitive when their edges are marked out in some way. It's tempting
> to think that one's writing about a thought is separate from the
> thought itself, but typically the act of writing or performing a
> thought tends to calcify and reinforce it through a feedback loop.
> Every time one thinks about a chair, one does not invent a new object.
> Similar to a computer program pulling modular entities and reusing
> them again and again, our thoughts repeat the concept in our
> imagination. On the other hand, imaginary iterations are not the same
> as digital iterations. Less like a computer, we pull the modular
> concept into action and interpret it with a variety of tones. I
> wouldn't want to say these singular thoughts don't exist, but on the
> other hand, they don't have the same reality as those thoughts which
> are articulated and taken up into collective discourse.... and even
> still, a discursive "thing" gains a level of significance when it
> represents some empirical process.
>
> I care about this because a chair changes from one moment to the next.
> It becomes materially altered as time unfolds, yet we are comfortable
> saying that the chair on day one is that chair on day five. In other
> words, each moment does not unleash a separate chair. In my mind,
> "weight" might be its subjective intensity, its empirical durability,
> its social hegemony, its procedural utility, its digital ubiquity, its
> aesthetic elegance.... though none of these qualities are directly
> analogous to the other, suggesting that there are a variety of types
> of being.
>
> All these thoughts are a jumble.... I'll take your advice and do some reading.
>
> Davin
>
> On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 11:28 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu> wrote:
>> A chair is a chair. A picture of a chair is a picture of a chair. A
>> definition of a chair is a definition of a chair. None are all chairs, but
>> all have something to do with chairs. At least, that's the OOO contention.
>> There are no planes of existence… except for Harman (and Tim, to some
>> extent), who distinguishes sensual from real objects. For Graham, the idea
>> of a chair is different from the real chair, which recedes from all
>> encounters. I think this is maybe the conclusion you arrive at in your
>> second paragraph below.
>>
>> NOTHING about OOO privileges the material (i.e., the tangible, physical)
>> chair primacy over the others. As for "the same weight" — well, that depends
>> on what you mean by "weight." What do you mean?
>>
>> I hate to say it, but it's maybe not possible to make further progress
>> without reading some of this material in depth…
>>
>> Ian
>>
>> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:13 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>>
>> Ian and Tim,
>>
>> Do the differences with which we treat objects syncs up with
>> ontological difference, and thus, is there something to some of the
>> different categorizations we could possibly develop for objects?
>>
>> I do think there is plenty of room to see these things from a fresh
>> perspective, but I also wonder if not, for instance, Kosuth's chairs
>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_and_Three_Chairs> highlight the ways
>> that discrete objects can differ from each other, but also the ways in
>> which there are consistencies that can yoke them together in odd ways.
>> A picture of a chair is not a chair, a definition of chair is not a
>> chair, instructions about a chair is not a chair, a chair as a
>> sculpture is not necessarily a chair..... yet, in some fundamental
>> way, all are chairs.... in a general sense of their concept and
>> recognition. Put all three things together, and you have a "chair"
>> which occupies all three planes of existence simultaneously. On the
>> other hand, they can occupy niches within conceptual frameworks (a
>> chair within a game, for instance, can be very "real" to the other
>> objects in the game).
>>
>> Each way of recognizing the chair (the picture, instructions, the
>> chair as chair, chair as sculpture, three chairs as conceptual work,
>> etc) would suggest that each is a distinct object in some sense, which
>> makes me wonder then, whether or not all other possible thoughts about
>> a chair have being, or if we afford the material object of the chair
>> primacy. In which case, does a digital rendering of the chair carry
>> the same weight as an unexpressed idea about a chair, too. At some
>> point, doesn't ontology lead into this thicket?
>>
>> Davin
>>
>> On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 9:08 PM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>
>> wrote:
>>
>> There is no reason why holding that everything exists equally entails
>>
>> "reducing all that can be known about a being to a simple recognition of
>>
>> being."
>>
>>
>> Ian
>>
>>
>>
>> On Jun 24, 2012, at 5:44 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>>
>>
>> I agree, this is a good starting point.... that all things that exist
>>
>> have being as their common condition of existence (that is, they are
>>
>> not "not beings"), which is a sort of foundational ontological
>>
>> similarity. But if the only significant ontological claim we can make
>>
>> about things is either yes or no, do they exist or not, then this
>>
>> means all things carry this single quality, which is to say that there
>>
>> is no difference between things. If we admit difference, then we must
>>
>> account for those differences in meaningful ways. For instance,
>>
>> waffle #1 differs from waffle #2 in a different way than waffle #1
>>
>> differs from a toaster (or waffle #1 changes in the course of being
>>
>> eaten, it is still in one meaningful sense the "same" waffle after it
>>
>> has been bitten, but in another sense, it is a different waffle, too.
>>
>> While both toasters and waffles are different from something like an
>>
>> idea or a "memory" rendered in media (a waffle recipe or story about
>>
>> waffles) or a process habituated in muscle memory (the habit of making
>>
>> a waffle or eating one).
>>
>>
>> My concern is that if we reduce all that can be known about being to a
>>
>> simple recognition of being, we commit to a kind of abstraction and
>>
>> alienation from being of the sort that happens when markets try to
>>
>> mediate everything through the common denominator of dollars.
>>
>>
>> Davin
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:46 PM, Timothy Morton
>>
>> <timothymorton303 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Hi Davin,
>>
>>
>>
>> We obviously treat different entities differently.
>>
>>
>>
>> But this is not the same as saying that these entities are ontologically
>>
>> different.
>>
>>
>>
>> Yours, Tim
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>>
>>
>>
>> On Jun 20, 2012, at 5:51 AM, davin heckman <davinheckman at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Thank you Ian, for these thoughts. My initial encounter with this
>>
>>
>> work came via a brief discussion of "flat ontology," which I found
>>
>>
>> somewhat offputting. I followed up by reading through the re:press
>>
>>
>> book. What I like the most, I suppose, is the sense that the
>>
>>
>> discussions are in motion with a lot of people participating.
>>
>>
>>
>> Reading some of the discussion of mereology, I find they resonate with
>>
>>
>> one of my favorite passages from Hegel. Pardon me for cannibalizing
>>
>>
>> another piece of writing (a draft of which can be found here:
>>
>>
>> http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/disturbed-dialectic-literary-criticism).
>>
>>
>> *
>>
>>
>> In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the dialectical process:
>>
>>
>>
>> "The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one
>>
>>
>> might say the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the
>>
>>
>> fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false
>>
>>
>> manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of
>>
>>
>> it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another,
>>
>>
>> they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the
>>
>>
>> same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in
>>
>>
>> which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary
>>
>>
>> as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of
>>
>>
>> the whole." [1]
>>
>>
>>
>> Viewed from within the Hegelian process, the Real is positioned
>>
>>
>> outside its present manifestations, consisting, rather, of the dynamic
>>
>>
>> processes that comprise its totality.
>>
>>
>>
>> This insight, crucial to critical practice, requires revision in light
>>
>>
>> of technical change. By revision, I do not mean that we need to
>>
>>
>> fundamentally alter Hegel’s argument, I only mean to suggest that we
>>
>>
>> see this passage with respect to new temporal modalities that have
>>
>>
>> shaken up the pursuit of knowledge.
>>
>>
>> *
>>
>>
>> I come at many of the same issues, but my inclination lead me to
>>
>>
>> embrace a kind of "humanism," but one which cannot easily understand
>>
>>
>> as we continually muddle the conversations of humanism with an
>>
>>
>> ontology that is expressed in our metaphors. One grip I have with the
>>
>>
>> use of Deleuze or McLuhan, is the idea that our capacity to
>>
>>
>> personalize prosthetics has a tendency to be reduced to a situation in
>>
>>
>> which it becomes possible to imagine that we see machines,
>>
>>
>> interpersonal relationships, people with tools, etc. as the same
>>
>>
>> thing. When, in fact, my psychic investment in my bike or computer,
>>
>>
>> while deep, is not nearly as deep or as complex as my psychic
>>
>>
>> investment in my (which I can only refer to as mine with a sense of
>>
>>
>> obligation to, rather than ownership over) child. If my bike decided
>>
>>
>> to bite me.....which it can't, even if it can hurt me.... I would not
>>
>>
>> feel so simultaneously restrained in my response AND emotionally
>>
>>
>> florid as I would if my 8 year old bit me for some crazy reason (but
>>
>>
>> with my three year old, I he is only a missed nap away from engaging
>>
>>
>> in something so obvious and horrible as biting someone). A bike, on
>>
>>
>> the other hand, can hurt me a lot more than a bite from a toddler, and
>>
>>
>> I suppose I am not above kicking a bike and yelling.... but I have
>>
>>
>> very limited feelings about a bike malfunction or hitting my thumb
>>
>>
>> with a hammer. On the other hand, a bike goes wherever I want it to
>>
>>
>> go (except when there's an accident)..... a toddler, not so much....
>>
>>
>> an eight year old, he usually comes with a counter proposal (and it is
>>
>>
>> a monstrous adult that would treat kids like a bike, insist that they
>>
>>
>> only go where told, speak when it is demanded). A lot of really deep
>>
>>
>> thinking about human subjectivty simply does not go this far.... and
>>
>>
>> part of this has to do with a poor understanding of objects. What is
>>
>>
>> worse is when this understanding infects interpersonal relationships
>>
>>
>> in the context of a Randian sort of world where there is "no such
>>
>>
>> thing as society, only individuals" (yet, bosses treat workers like
>>
>>
>> bikes and bad boyfriends treat their partners like robots).
>>
>>
>>
>> I am very excited to read more. I feel like it is important to free
>>
>>
>> our thinking from patterns and habits of the past. In particular, the
>>
>>
>> culture of academic citation has gone from being about finding good
>>
>>
>> ideas where they are to deriving authority from the aura of the great
>>
>>
>> figure. I also have no problem with accumulations of wisdom that
>>
>>
>> translate into an inherited perspective, but this can't close us off
>>
>>
>> to thinking. So.... thank you for this!
>>
>>
>>
>> Davin
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>
>>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Davin,
>>
>>
>>
>> I'm about to disappear into a mess of meetings, but let me offer a brief
>>
>>
>> response:
>>
>>
>>
>> What you're touching on here is what Levi Byrant sometimes calls the "weird
>>
>>
>> mereology" of OOO. The song isn't "just" the sound waves (what Harman calls
>>
>>
>> an underming position) nor is it just the social context of creation and use
>>
>>
>> (an overmining position). A song is a song, and indeed, the song in an MP3
>>
>>
>> file is a different thing than the song as an abstraction in human culture.
>>
>>
>> Neither is more object nor more real (well, "real" has a different meaning
>>
>>
>> for Harman than it does for Levi and me).
>>
>>
>>
>> I talk about this a bit in the first chapter of Alien Phenomenology, and
>>
>>
>> Levi does as well in the mereology section of Democracy of Objects. Also,
>>
>>
>> here are a blog post from Levi on the subject that weaves the two
>>
>>
>> together:
>>
>> http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/08/12/more-strange-mereology/
>>
>>
>>
>> I'm not answering sufficiently but wanted to get something out to you
>>
>>
>> rapidly.
>>
>>
>>
>> ib
>>
>>
>>
>> Ian Bogost, Ph.D.
>>
>>
>> Professor
>>
>>
>> Director, Graduate Program in Digital Media
>>
>>
>>
>> Georgia Institute of Technology
>>
>>
>> Digital Media/TSRB 320B
>>
>>
>> 85 Fifth Street NW
>>
>>
>> Atlanta, GA 30308-1030
>>
>>
>>
>> ibogost at gatech.edu
>>
>>
>> +1 (404) 894-1160 (tel)
>>
>>
>> +1 (404) 894-2833 (fax)
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Jun 15, 2012, at 4:11 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Ian,
>>
>>
>>
>> Since we are on the topic of OOO, I was wondering what the ontological
>>
>>
>> status of something like a song is? I have to admit, I have a real
>>
>>
>> hard time swallowing a pure ontology that essentially defines the
>>
>>
>> subjective as outside of being, as a sort of on or off proposition, as
>>
>>
>> opposed to also a turning on (or is it being turned on? Or simply to
>>
>>
>> be turned or to turn?) (I am generally skeptical about a variety of
>>
>>
>> posthumanisms that go beyond a critique of a monolithic Humanism,
>>
>>
>> because I think that consciousness carries specific tendencies that
>>
>>
>> seem to fundamentally frame all possibilities for knowledge). However
>>
>>
>> it is entirely possible that I am missing out on a discussion that has
>>
>>
>> been unfolding without me.
>>
>>
>>
>> But here's my thought: With a song, you have something that can be
>>
>>
>> rendered in "objective" form.... maybe an mp3 file or a sheet of
>>
>>
>> notes or record or something. If this is what we mean by a song,
>>
>>
>> then, fine, that's an object. But a song only really starts doing
>>
>>
>> something when it is unfolding within the context of memory and
>>
>>
>> anticipation. It only is a song when it is listened to by a subject,
>>
>>
>> which is to say it is an object that has a singular temporal being as
>>
>>
>> it is listened to, which is distinct from how it is being listened to
>>
>>
>> and replayed even by the same user. (And we aren't even beginning to
>>
>>
>> talk about non-recorded music). The only way a song becomes a purely
>>
>>
>> discrete object is when it is removed from its temporal existence and
>>
>>
>> understood as a totality, and detached from an audience. And while we
>>
>>
>> can sit around and all talk about, say, "Another One Bites the Dust,"
>>
>>
>> after we squeeze it into a conceptual file type and label it, the fact
>>
>>
>> that we can discuss something that can only mean something if is
>>
>>
>> experienced as a process AND an object within the context of a
>>
>>
>> experience, suggests that sometimes being is realized by the relations
>>
>>
>> of things, rather than the things themselves. My suggestion is that
>>
>>
>> the ontological nature of the song cannot be described in objective
>>
>>
>> terms without missing what a song is. Without the non-objective
>>
>>
>> component of its being, a song is just sound. If we say, well, "Hey,
>>
>>
>> when this sound occurs, people do X, Y, and Z," we can find ourself
>>
>>
>> thinking that these effects are produced by the object, but this sort
>>
>>
>> of thought experiment only gives us half an understanding of the
>>
>>
>> object's being. You also have to think of that song in relation to
>>
>>
>> the current context, to itself over time, to the individual and
>>
>>
>> collective experience of its audience, to the culture, etc. Again, a
>>
>>
>> great means to produce estrangement, but not the complete account of
>>
>>
>> what the thing is. At the risk of sounding chauvinistic, I can see
>>
>>
>> that it might be expedient to regard a distant moon without regard to
>>
>>
>> its historical relationship to the human. It's useful to think of a
>>
>>
>> distant moon as a quantity of data. But the closer we get to human
>>
>>
>> existence, the more likely we are to encounter types of things that
>>
>>
>> exist, but that cannot be understood properly as a bundle of discrete
>>
>>
>> data. Maybe there are some texts that address precisly these sorts of
>>
>>
>> concerns.
>>
>>
>>
>> This is where I think ontology cannot simply be objective. It must,
>>
>>
>> of course, be able to establish the differences between things, to
>>
>>
>> render those things it claims to understand in discrete form, insofar
>>
>>
>> as they can be considered as such. On the other hand, we know that
>>
>>
>> most of what the world is made of is common and that the laws of
>>
>>
>> physics, for instance, harness discrete things under a kind of
>>
>>
>> continuity. So, along with the conditions of radical difference that
>>
>>
>> a philosophy of objects implies, there are the conditions of radical
>>
>>
>> connectivity. Both features are equally present, which is to say they
>>
>>
>> offer us little in the way of productive knowledge EXCEPT insofar as
>>
>>
>> we can bind and sever, cut or tie, digitize or analogize within this
>>
>>
>> framework of matter. The 21st century loves digitizing things.....
>>
>>
>> it helps computers see the world, it helps them count us, predict our
>>
>>
>> behavior, weigh it, value it, direct it, etc. But the digital is only
>>
>>
>> half of our existence.... the analog process is equally present in
>>
>>
>> language and cognition.... and it is just as equpped to help us
>>
>>
>> understand the world by creating categories of things and identifying
>>
>>
>> common qualities. In "Notes on the Uncanny," Freud identifies this
>>
>>
>> struggle as productive of a kind of unsettling (the person that acts
>>
>>
>> like an object/the object that acts like a person)... but it does not
>>
>>
>> simply have to be a "scary" process.... the move from discrete to
>>
>>
>> connected or from one into multiple can also be deeply satisfying and
>>
>>
>> reassuring of being. If both processes are equally useful, then what
>>
>>
>> presides over these two tendencies? Temporal consciousness that can
>>
>>
>> mobilize processes of digitization and analogy? Another place to
>>
>>
>> think through this is in relation to a variety of attempts at
>>
>>
>> taxonomy. At some point, a poodle has to be a poodle and a wolf has
>>
>>
>> to be a wolf, but in relation to squids, both can be canines. We
>>
>>
>> could say that well, we are talking about layers of qualities that
>>
>>
>> enable us to categorize this object or that object. But without the
>>
>>
>> history of the poodle we don't really know how one canine can be a
>>
>>
>> fashion accessory and the other is a part of a wild ecology, all of
>>
>>
>> which (domesticating work dogs, turning tool animals into fashion
>>
>>
>> animals, thinking about animals as people, killing wild animals,
>>
>>
>> restoring wildness, etc) radically alter the parameters of being based
>>
>>
>> on thoughts about being. To take it back to queer thought, around the
>>
>>
>> bend of singular identities is the knowlege that such queerness does
>>
>>
>> not preclude deep relationality. My reading is that the fruits of
>>
>>
>> this thought are an affirmation of the idea that the well-worn paths
>>
>>
>> of prescribed human behavior do not necessarily lead to earnest
>>
>>
>> relationships, it is not to reject relationship itself in favor of
>>
>>
>> individualism because capitalism has been doing this since the
>>
>>
>> transformation of labor into commodity.
>>
>>
>>
>> Why does this matter? I care about politics, but I am not going to
>>
>>
>> say that OOO cleaves to this or that kind of politics.... it doesn't
>>
>>
>> matter. If a statement is discernibly true, then I have an obligation
>>
>>
>> to bend my ideas around the true statement. And my sense, based on
>>
>>
>> very limited reading, is that OOO is trying to figure out what we can
>>
>>
>> know about being. So, while it is worth considering the political
>>
>>
>> implications of speculative thought, I think Galloway is a bit wrong
>>
>>
>> to suggest that something is "bourgeois" or something just because
>>
>>
>> financial markets also offer a flat ontology via capital. The only
>>
>>
>> thing that really matters is whether or not a philosophy can get us to
>>
>>
>> a mutually agreed upon knowledge of the world that can be transmitted
>>
>>
>> effectively from one context to another and continue to be useful.
>>
>>
>>
>> I have been lazy about following this month's discussion, but I like
>>
>>
>> the idea of queering technology, of the productively broken tool. It
>>
>>
>> is an area that has affinities with regards to my own reading of
>>
>>
>> electronic literature..... taking Jakobson's discussion of poetics up
>>
>>
>> through Darko Suvin's discussion of "cognitive estrangement," and
>>
>>
>> looking at the ways that digital literary practices perform a similar
>>
>>
>> process with regards to instrumental languages. My thought is that OOO
>>
>>
>> is productive in that it asks us to engage in a thought experiment
>>
>>
>> about pure objectivitiy, and in doing so, reveals the critical
>>
>>
>> necessity of subjective and intersubjective aspects of human being
>>
>>
>> that are embedded in our broader assertions about being. I think that
>>
>>
>> a lot of the "posthumanisms" try to simply go beyond something that we
>>
>>
>> have never understood in the first place: that being human is
>>
>>
>> essentially a kind of queer existence, all the much more so when we
>>
>>
>> insist that it is not. For my part, I want my human rights. So while
>>
>>
>> I am sympathetic, generally, with many of the aims of the
>>
>>
>> posthumanists I encounter, I generally think that "Humanism" has yet
>>
>>
>> to adequately describe being human. Like Habermas said of modernity,
>>
>>
>> it's daunting and messy and incomplete (like most things worth doing).
>>
>>
>> Living in Norway right now (moving in a couple weeks, unfortunately),
>>
>>
>> humanism seems to be working out pretty well here. The problems of
>>
>>
>> the world do not stem from a love of humanity, they stem from our
>>
>>
>> growing estrangment from humanity and increased clustering into
>>
>>
>> paranoid, exclusionary enclaves (Why do you think everyone watches
>>
>>
>> Zombie movies? Blasting away at legions of dirty anthropoidal morons
>>
>>
>> trying to eat what you have, a perfect gospel for post democratic
>>
>>
>> capitalism). In a world of Darwinian evolution, we are not entirely
>>
>>
>> selected, we alter the landscape of an objective process through our
>>
>>
>> dialogue with an objective sphere that exists, that we inhabit, and
>>
>>
>> that we think about, but which does not simply constitute us.
>>
>>
>>
>> I admit these thoughts are poorly formed.... and I am very busy these
>>
>>
>> days.... so I might not be able to reply as quickly as I would
>>
>>
>> normally. But am very interested in these conversations.
>>
>>
>>
>> Davin
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 14, 2012 at 4:16 PM, frederic neyrat <fneyrat at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I would like - if possible - to get one or two examples about the
>>
>>
>>
>> objects concerned by your statement:"all objects equally exist, but
>>
>>
>>
>> not all objects exist equally." I guess - but I just guess - that the
>>
>>
>>
>> first part of the sentence is ontological and the second part could be
>>
>>
>>
>> political, but maybe I'm wrong. Thanks in advance.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Frederic Neyrat
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2012/6/14 Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>:
>>
>>
>>
>> Ok, sigh, let me try this again.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The "as much as" is not a judgement of value, but of existence. This is the
>>
>>
>>
>> fundamental disagreement that played out in the comments to Galloway's work
>>
>>
>>
>> and in the many responses elsewhere. The world is big and contains many
>>
>>
>>
>> things. I've put this principle thusly: "all objects equally exist, but not
>>
>>
>>
>> all objects exist equally."
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> It's possible that such a metaphysical position isn't for everyone. But if
>>
>>
>>
>> your idea of "being political" is as exclusionary and deprecatory as both
>>
>>
>>
>> Galloway's post and my limited experience thusfar here on empyre, then
>>
>>
>>
>> perhaps you can explain why that a model worth aspiring for? Why that is
>>
>>
>>
>> virtuous and righteous?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Ian
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Jun 14, 2012, at 2:57 PM, Rob Myers wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 06/14/2012 07:02 PM, Ian Bogost wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> As for queer and feminist formulations, I agree with the spirit of what
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> you say, but I'll reiterate my observation that SR/OOO is moving in a
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> slightly different direction—one that concerns toasters and quasars as
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> much as human subjects (note the "as much as" here). Why not take this
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> work for what it is, at least for starters, rather than for what it
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> isn't?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The "as much as" is precisely the problem.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Galloway's critique of OOO that Zach mentioned explains why:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> http://itself.wordpress.com/2012/06/03/a-response-to-graham-harmans-marginalia-on-radical-thinking/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> But I wouldn't lump Meillassoux in with Harman. I think Meillassoux's
>>
>>
>>
>> philosophy can indeed be interesting for this debate because of its
>>
>>
>>
>> embracing of contingency and possibility.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> - Rob.
>>
>>
>>
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