[-empyre-] Meillassoux / Harman
Peter Gratton
pmgratton at gmail.com
Thu Jun 28 08:00:17 EST 2012
Thanks Tim. Otherwise, I was going to say to the advance of the "mesh"
which non-synchronous and fully temporal?
On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 4:46 AM, Timothy Morton
<timothymorton303 at gmail.com>wrote:
> Yes--this is where Graham and I differ Peter. For me what is called
> "present" I just a metaphysical construct and what truly exists is past and
> future... Tim
>
> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>
> On Jun 27, 2012, at 3:02 AM, Peter Gratton <pmgratton at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hi all,
> I'm actually completing a book on SR this month. I do find much
> invigorating in this work. But I want to note one thing: for Harman,
> entities *do not *emit time. It is but a "tension in its sensual
> qualities"--that is, not in it "hidden" reality. See his diagram on p. 114
> of the *Quadruple Object*. In his essay "The Road to Objects," Harman
> sums up his view:
>
> According to the object-oriented model *only the present exists*: only
> objects with their qualities, *locked into* whatever their duels of the
> moment might be. In that sense, times seems to be illusory, though not for
> the usual reason that time is just a fourth spatial dimension always
> already present from the start. *Instead time does not exist simply
> because only the present ever exists.* Nonetheless, time as a lived
> experience [i.e, within the sensuous—here he follows Husserl to the letter]
> cannot be denied. We do not encounter a static frame of reality, but *seem
> * to *feel* a passage of time. It is not pure chaos shifting wildly from
> one second to the next, since there is chance with *apparent* endurance.
> Sensual objects endure despite swirling oscillations in their surface
> adumbrations, and this is precisely what is meant by the experience of *
> time*. Time can be defined as the tension between sensual objects and
> their sensual qualities.[i] <http://?ui=2&view=bsp&ver=ohhl4rw8mbn4#_edn1>
>
> Thus the relation of objects is "apparent" and at the "sensuous"
> level--not at the level of the real object and its real qualities. And thus
> things in themselves are forever present. This, to say the least, needs to
> be discussed whenever OOO comes up: since if objects *in their reality*are forever in the present, then how to explain objects such as music,
> films, or, as Harman discussed in a recent interview, "The Arab Street."
> This is what Husserl realized in his time lectures of 1905-1911: moving
> beyond the mathematical, he realizes that he must think how to adequately
> explain music, for example--hence his theory of protensions and retentions.
> And nevermind Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze, etc. My task in my work is to
> think a real time.
>
> ------------------------------
>
> [i] <http://?ui=2&view=bsp&ver=ohhl4rw8mbn4#_ednref1> “The Road to
> Objects,” 176, my emphases.
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 at 2:12 PM, Timothy Morton <
> timothymorton303 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi---each entity (a thought, an amethyst geode, a bartender) emits
>> spacetime just as Einstein argued . Graham's The Quadruple Object and my
>> not yet out Realist Magic go into this.
>>
>> Each entity "times" in the way Heidegger reserves for Da-sein and Derrida
>> reserves to the trace.
>>
>> Time and space are not neutral containers but are emergent properties of
>> beings.
>>
>> Tim
>>
>>
>>
>> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>>
>> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:15 PM, davin heckman <davinheckman at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> > You are right.... I should do more reading. I find the thoughts
>> > engaging and, since I am in transit, I am eager to get more
>> > information where I can.
>> >
>> > Ultimately, underneath my questions, I suppose, are some thoughts on
>> > relationality and time. You have all of these things that have to do
>> > with chairs, but only the chair is the chair. And there are these
>> > things that have to do with chairs, but which are real in their own
>> > right. But an idea about a chair kind of flickers in and out of
>> > consciousness, never having a discrete edge, and only become something
>> > definitive when their edges are marked out in some way. It's tempting
>> > to think that one's writing about a thought is separate from the
>> > thought itself, but typically the act of writing or performing a
>> > thought tends to calcify and reinforce it through a feedback loop.
>> > Every time one thinks about a chair, one does not invent a new object.
>> > Similar to a computer program pulling modular entities and reusing
>> > them again and again, our thoughts repeat the concept in our
>> > imagination. On the other hand, imaginary iterations are not the same
>> > as digital iterations. Less like a computer, we pull the modular
>> > concept into action and interpret it with a variety of tones. I
>> > wouldn't want to say these singular thoughts don't exist, but on the
>> > other hand, they don't have the same reality as those thoughts which
>> > are articulated and taken up into collective discourse.... and even
>> > still, a discursive "thing" gains a level of significance when it
>> > represents some empirical process.
>> >
>> > I care about this because a chair changes from one moment to the next.
>> > It becomes materially altered as time unfolds, yet we are comfortable
>> > saying that the chair on day one is that chair on day five. In other
>> > words, each moment does not unleash a separate chair. In my mind,
>> > "weight" might be its subjective intensity, its empirical durability,
>> > its social hegemony, its procedural utility, its digital ubiquity, its
>> > aesthetic elegance.... though none of these qualities are directly
>> > analogous to the other, suggesting that there are a variety of types
>> > of being.
>> >
>> > All these thoughts are a jumble.... I'll take your advice and do some
>> reading.
>> >
>> > Davin
>> >
>> > On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 11:28 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>
>> wrote:
>> >> A chair is a chair. A picture of a chair is a picture of a chair. A
>> >> definition of a chair is a definition of a chair. None are all chairs,
>> but
>> >> all have something to do with chairs. At least, that's the OOO
>> contention.
>> >> There are no planes of existence… except for Harman (and Tim, to some
>> >> extent), who distinguishes sensual from real objects. For Graham, the
>> idea
>> >> of a chair is different from the real chair, which recedes from all
>> >> encounters. I think this is maybe the conclusion you arrive at in your
>> >> second paragraph below.
>> >>
>> >> NOTHING about OOO privileges the material (i.e., the tangible,
>> physical)
>> >> chair primacy over the others. As for "the same weight" — well, that
>> depends
>> >> on what you mean by "weight." What do you mean?
>> >>
>> >> I hate to say it, but it's maybe not possible to make further progress
>> >> without reading some of this material in depth…
>> >>
>> >> Ian
>> >>
>> >> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:13 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Ian and Tim,
>> >>
>> >> Do the differences with which we treat objects syncs up with
>> >> ontological difference, and thus, is there something to some of the
>> >> different categorizations we could possibly develop for objects?
>> >>
>> >> I do think there is plenty of room to see these things from a fresh
>> >> perspective, but I also wonder if not, for instance, Kosuth's chairs
>> >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_and_Three_Chairs> highlight the ways
>> >> that discrete objects can differ from each other, but also the ways in
>> >> which there are consistencies that can yoke them together in odd ways.
>> >> A picture of a chair is not a chair, a definition of chair is not a
>> >> chair, instructions about a chair is not a chair, a chair as a
>> >> sculpture is not necessarily a chair..... yet, in some fundamental
>> >> way, all are chairs.... in a general sense of their concept and
>> >> recognition. Put all three things together, and you have a "chair"
>> >> which occupies all three planes of existence simultaneously. On the
>> >> other hand, they can occupy niches within conceptual frameworks (a
>> >> chair within a game, for instance, can be very "real" to the other
>> >> objects in the game).
>> >>
>> >> Each way of recognizing the chair (the picture, instructions, the
>> >> chair as chair, chair as sculpture, three chairs as conceptual work,
>> >> etc) would suggest that each is a distinct object in some sense, which
>> >> makes me wonder then, whether or not all other possible thoughts about
>> >> a chair have being, or if we afford the material object of the chair
>> >> primacy. In which case, does a digital rendering of the chair carry
>> >> the same weight as an unexpressed idea about a chair, too. At some
>> >> point, doesn't ontology lead into this thicket?
>> >>
>> >> Davin
>> >>
>> >> On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 9:08 PM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu
>> >
>> >> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> There is no reason why holding that everything exists equally entails
>> >>
>> >> "reducing all that can be known about a being to a simple recognition
>> of
>> >>
>> >> being."
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Ian
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Jun 24, 2012, at 5:44 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I agree, this is a good starting point.... that all things that exist
>> >>
>> >> have being as their common condition of existence (that is, they are
>> >>
>> >> not "not beings"), which is a sort of foundational ontological
>> >>
>> >> similarity. But if the only significant ontological claim we can make
>> >>
>> >> about things is either yes or no, do they exist or not, then this
>> >>
>> >> means all things carry this single quality, which is to say that there
>> >>
>> >> is no difference between things. If we admit difference, then we must
>> >>
>> >> account for those differences in meaningful ways. For instance,
>> >>
>> >> waffle #1 differs from waffle #2 in a different way than waffle #1
>> >>
>> >> differs from a toaster (or waffle #1 changes in the course of being
>> >>
>> >> eaten, it is still in one meaningful sense the "same" waffle after it
>> >>
>> >> has been bitten, but in another sense, it is a different waffle, too.
>> >>
>> >> While both toasters and waffles are different from something like an
>> >>
>> >> idea or a "memory" rendered in media (a waffle recipe or story about
>> >>
>> >> waffles) or a process habituated in muscle memory (the habit of making
>> >>
>> >> a waffle or eating one).
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> My concern is that if we reduce all that can be known about being to a
>> >>
>> >> simple recognition of being, we commit to a kind of abstraction and
>> >>
>> >> alienation from being of the sort that happens when markets try to
>> >>
>> >> mediate everything through the common denominator of dollars.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Davin
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:46 PM, Timothy Morton
>> >>
>> >> <timothymorton303 at gmail.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Hi Davin,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> We obviously treat different entities differently.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> But this is not the same as saying that these entities are
>> ontologically
>> >>
>> >> different.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Yours, Tim
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Jun 20, 2012, at 5:51 AM, davin heckman <davinheckman at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Thank you Ian, for these thoughts. My initial encounter with this
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> work came via a brief discussion of "flat ontology," which I found
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> somewhat offputting. I followed up by reading through the re:press
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> book. What I like the most, I suppose, is the sense that the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> discussions are in motion with a lot of people participating.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Reading some of the discussion of mereology, I find they resonate with
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> one of my favorite passages from Hegel. Pardon me for cannibalizing
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> another piece of writing (a draft of which can be found here:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/disturbed-dialectic-literary-criticism
>> ).
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> *
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the dialectical
>> process:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> "The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> might say the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> the whole." [1]
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Viewed from within the Hegelian process, the Real is positioned
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> outside its present manifestations, consisting, rather, of the dynamic
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> processes that comprise its totality.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> This insight, crucial to critical practice, requires revision in light
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> of technical change. By revision, I do not mean that we need to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> fundamentally alter Hegel’s argument, I only mean to suggest that we
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> see this passage with respect to new temporal modalities that have
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> shaken up the pursuit of knowledge.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> *
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I come at many of the same issues, but my inclination lead me to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> embrace a kind of "humanism," but one which cannot easily understand
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> as we continually muddle the conversations of humanism with an
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> ontology that is expressed in our metaphors. One grip I have with the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> use of Deleuze or McLuhan, is the idea that our capacity to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> personalize prosthetics has a tendency to be reduced to a situation in
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> which it becomes possible to imagine that we see machines,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> interpersonal relationships, people with tools, etc. as the same
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> thing. When, in fact, my psychic investment in my bike or computer,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> while deep, is not nearly as deep or as complex as my psychic
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> investment in my (which I can only refer to as mine with a sense of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> obligation to, rather than ownership over) child. If my bike decided
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> to bite me.....which it can't, even if it can hurt me.... I would not
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> feel so simultaneously restrained in my response AND emotionally
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> florid as I would if my 8 year old bit me for some crazy reason (but
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> with my three year old, I he is only a missed nap away from engaging
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> in something so obvious and horrible as biting someone). A bike, on
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> the other hand, can hurt me a lot more than a bite from a toddler, and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I suppose I am not above kicking a bike and yelling.... but I have
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> very limited feelings about a bike malfunction or hitting my thumb
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> with a hammer. On the other hand, a bike goes wherever I want it to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> go (except when there's an accident)..... a toddler, not so much....
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> an eight year old, he usually comes with a counter proposal (and it is
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> a monstrous adult that would treat kids like a bike, insist that they
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> only go where told, speak when it is demanded). A lot of really deep
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> thinking about human subjectivty simply does not go this far.... and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> part of this has to do with a poor understanding of objects. What is
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> worse is when this understanding infects interpersonal relationships
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> in the context of a Randian sort of world where there is "no such
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> thing as society, only individuals" (yet, bosses treat workers like
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> bikes and bad boyfriends treat their partners like robots).
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I am very excited to read more. I feel like it is important to free
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> our thinking from patterns and habits of the past. In particular, the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> culture of academic citation has gone from being about finding good
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> ideas where they are to deriving authority from the aura of the great
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> figure. I also have no problem with accumulations of wisdom that
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> translate into an inherited perspective, but this can't close us off
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> to thinking. So.... thank you for this!
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Davin
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Ian Bogost <
>> ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>
>> >>
>> >> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Davin,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I'm about to disappear into a mess of meetings, but let me offer a
>> brief
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> response:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> What you're touching on here is what Levi Byrant sometimes calls the
>> "weird
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> mereology" of OOO. The song isn't "just" the sound waves (what Harman
>> calls
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> an underming position) nor is it just the social context of creation
>> and use
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> (an overmining position). A song is a song, and indeed, the song in an
>> MP3
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> file is a different thing than the song as an abstraction in human
>> culture.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Neither is more object nor more real (well, "real" has a different
>> meaning
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> for Harman than it does for Levi and me).
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I talk about this a bit in the first chapter of Alien Phenomenology,
>> and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Levi does as well in the mereology section of Democracy of Objects.
>> Also,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> here are a blog post from Levi on the subject that weaves the two
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> together:
>> >>
>> >> http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/08/12/more-strange-mereology/
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I'm not answering sufficiently but wanted to get something out to you
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> rapidly.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> ib
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Ian Bogost, Ph.D.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Professor
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Director, Graduate Program in Digital Media
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Georgia Institute of Technology
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Digital Media/TSRB 320B
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> 85 Fifth Street NW
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Atlanta, GA 30308-1030
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> ibogost at gatech.edu
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> +1 (404) 894-1160 (tel)
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> +1 (404) 894-2833 (fax)
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Jun 15, 2012, at 4:11 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Ian,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Since we are on the topic of OOO, I was wondering what the ontological
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> status of something like a song is? I have to admit, I have a real
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> hard time swallowing a pure ontology that essentially defines the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> subjective as outside of being, as a sort of on or off proposition, as
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> opposed to also a turning on (or is it being turned on? Or simply to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> be turned or to turn?) (I am generally skeptical about a variety of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> posthumanisms that go beyond a critique of a monolithic Humanism,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> because I think that consciousness carries specific tendencies that
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> seem to fundamentally frame all possibilities for knowledge). However
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> it is entirely possible that I am missing out on a discussion that has
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> been unfolding without me.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> But here's my thought: With a song, you have something that can be
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> rendered in "objective" form.... maybe an mp3 file or a sheet of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> notes or record or something. If this is what we mean by a song,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> then, fine, that's an object. But a song only really starts doing
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> something when it is unfolding within the context of memory and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> anticipation. It only is a song when it is listened to by a subject,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> which is to say it is an object that has a singular temporal being as
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> it is listened to, which is distinct from how it is being listened to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> and replayed even by the same user. (And we aren't even beginning to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> talk about non-recorded music). The only way a song becomes a purely
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> discrete object is when it is removed from its temporal existence and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> understood as a totality, and detached from an audience. And while we
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> can sit around and all talk about, say, "Another One Bites the Dust,"
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> after we squeeze it into a conceptual file type and label it, the fact
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> that we can discuss something that can only mean something if is
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> experienced as a process AND an object within the context of a
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> experience, suggests that sometimes being is realized by the relations
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> of things, rather than the things themselves. My suggestion is that
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> the ontological nature of the song cannot be described in objective
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> terms without missing what a song is. Without the non-objective
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> component of its being, a song is just sound. If we say, well, "Hey,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> when this sound occurs, people do X, Y, and Z," we can find ourself
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> thinking that these effects are produced by the object, but this sort
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> of thought experiment only gives us half an understanding of the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> object's being. You also have to think of that song in relation to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> the current context, to itself over time, to the individual and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> collective experience of its audience, to the culture, etc. Again, a
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> great means to produce estrangement, but not the complete account of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> what the thing is. At the risk of sounding chauvinistic, I can see
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> that it might be expedient to regard a distant moon without regard to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> its historical relationship to the human. It's useful to think of a
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> distant moon as a quantity of data. But the closer we get to human
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> existence, the more likely we are to encounter types of things that
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> exist, but that cannot be understood properly as a bundle of discrete
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> data. Maybe there are some texts that address precisly these sorts of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> concerns.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> This is where I think ontology cannot simply be objective. It must,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> of course, be able to establish the differences between things, to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> render those things it claims to understand in discrete form, insofar
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> as they can be considered as such. On the other hand, we know that
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> most of what the world is made of is common and that the laws of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> physics, for instance, harness discrete things under a kind of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> continuity. So, along with the conditions of radical difference that
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> a philosophy of objects implies, there are the conditions of radical
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> connectivity. Both features are equally present, which is to say they
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> offer us little in the way of productive knowledge EXCEPT insofar as
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> we can bind and sever, cut or tie, digitize or analogize within this
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> framework of matter. The 21st century loves digitizing things.....
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> it helps computers see the world, it helps them count us, predict our
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> behavior, weigh it, value it, direct it, etc. But the digital is only
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> half of our existence.... the analog process is equally present in
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> language and cognition.... and it is just as equpped to help us
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> understand the world by creating categories of things and identifying
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> common qualities. In "Notes on the Uncanny," Freud identifies this
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> struggle as productive of a kind of unsettling (the person that acts
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> like an object/the object that acts like a person)... but it does not
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> simply have to be a "scary" process.... the move from discrete to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> connected or from one into multiple can also be deeply satisfying and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> reassuring of being. If both processes are equally useful, then what
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> presides over these two tendencies? Temporal consciousness that can
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> mobilize processes of digitization and analogy? Another place to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> think through this is in relation to a variety of attempts at
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> taxonomy. At some point, a poodle has to be a poodle and a wolf has
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> to be a wolf, but in relation to squids, both can be canines. We
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> could say that well, we are talking about layers of qualities that
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> enable us to categorize this object or that object. But without the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> history of the poodle we don't really know how one canine can be a
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> fashion accessory and the other is a part of a wild ecology, all of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> which (domesticating work dogs, turning tool animals into fashion
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> animals, thinking about animals as people, killing wild animals,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> restoring wildness, etc) radically alter the parameters of being based
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> on thoughts about being. To take it back to queer thought, around the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> bend of singular identities is the knowlege that such queerness does
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> not preclude deep relationality. My reading is that the fruits of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> this thought are an affirmation of the idea that the well-worn paths
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> of prescribed human behavior do not necessarily lead to earnest
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> relationships, it is not to reject relationship itself in favor of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> individualism because capitalism has been doing this since the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> transformation of labor into commodity.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Why does this matter? I care about politics, but I am not going to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> say that OOO cleaves to this or that kind of politics.... it doesn't
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> matter. If a statement is discernibly true, then I have an obligation
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> to bend my ideas around the true statement. And my sense, based on
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> very limited reading, is that OOO is trying to figure out what we can
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> know about being. So, while it is worth considering the political
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> implications of speculative thought, I think Galloway is a bit wrong
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> to suggest that something is "bourgeois" or something just because
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> financial markets also offer a flat ontology via capital. The only
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> thing that really matters is whether or not a philosophy can get us to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> a mutually agreed upon knowledge of the world that can be transmitted
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> effectively from one context to another and continue to be useful.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I have been lazy about following this month's discussion, but I like
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> the idea of queering technology, of the productively broken tool. It
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> is an area that has affinities with regards to my own reading of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> electronic literature..... taking Jakobson's discussion of poetics up
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> through Darko Suvin's discussion of "cognitive estrangement," and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> looking at the ways that digital literary practices perform a similar
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> process with regards to instrumental languages. My thought is that OOO
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> is productive in that it asks us to engage in a thought experiment
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> about pure objectivitiy, and in doing so, reveals the critical
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> necessity of subjective and intersubjective aspects of human being
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> that are embedded in our broader assertions about being. I think that
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> a lot of the "posthumanisms" try to simply go beyond something that we
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> have never understood in the first place: that being human is
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> essentially a kind of queer existence, all the much more so when we
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> insist that it is not. For my part, I want my human rights. So while
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I am sympathetic, generally, with many of the aims of the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> posthumanists I encounter, I generally think that "Humanism" has yet
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> to adequately describe being human. Like Habermas said of modernity,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> it's daunting and messy and incomplete (like most things worth doing).
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Living in Norway right now (moving in a couple weeks, unfortunately),
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> humanism seems to be working out pretty well here. The problems of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> the world do not stem from a love of humanity, they stem from our
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> growing estrangment from humanity and increased clustering into
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> paranoid, exclusionary enclaves (Why do you think everyone watches
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Zombie movies? Blasting away at legions of dirty anthropoidal morons
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> trying to eat what you have, a perfect gospel for post democratic
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> capitalism). In a world of Darwinian evolution, we are not entirely
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> selected, we alter the landscape of an objective process through our
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> dialogue with an objective sphere that exists, that we inhabit, and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> that we think about, but which does not simply constitute us.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I admit these thoughts are poorly formed.... and I am very busy these
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> days.... so I might not be able to reply as quickly as I would
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> normally. But am very interested in these conversations.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Davin
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Thu, Jun 14, 2012 at 4:16 PM, frederic neyrat <fneyrat at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Hi,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I would like - if possible - to get one or two examples about the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> objects concerned by your statement:"all objects equally exist, but
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> not all objects exist equally." I guess - but I just guess - that the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> first part of the sentence is ontological and the second part could be
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> political, but maybe I'm wrong. Thanks in advance.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Best,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Frederic Neyrat
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> 2012/6/14 Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Ok, sigh, let me try this again.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> The "as much as" is not a judgement of value, but of existence. This
>> is the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> fundamental disagreement that played out in the comments to Galloway's
>> work
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> and in the many responses elsewhere. The world is big and contains many
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> things. I've put this principle thusly: "all objects equally exist,
>> but not
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> all objects exist equally."
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> It's possible that such a metaphysical position isn't for everyone.
>> But if
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> your idea of "being political" is as exclusionary and deprecatory as
>> both
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Galloway's post and my limited experience thusfar here on empyre, then
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> perhaps you can explain why that a model worth aspiring for? Why that
>> is
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> virtuous and righteous?
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Ian
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Jun 14, 2012, at 2:57 PM, Rob Myers wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On 06/14/2012 07:02 PM, Ian Bogost wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> As for queer and feminist formulations, I agree with the spirit of what
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> you say, but I'll reiterate my observation that SR/OOO is moving in a
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> slightly different direction—one that concerns toasters and quasars as
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> much as human subjects (note the "as much as" here). Why not take this
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> work for what it is, at least for starters, rather than for what it
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> isn't?
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> The "as much as" is precisely the problem.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Galloway's critique of OOO that Zach mentioned explains why:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> http://itself.wordpress.com/2012/06/03/a-response-to-graham-harmans-marginalia-on-radical-thinking/
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> But I wouldn't lump Meillassoux in with Harman. I think Meillassoux's
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> philosophy can indeed be interesting for this debate because of its
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> embracing of contingency and possibility.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> - Rob.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >>
>> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >>
>> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> empyre forum
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> empyre forum
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > empyre forum
>> > empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> > http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>> _______________________________________________
>> empyre forum
>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>
>
>
>
> --
>
> --
> Peter Gratton
> pmgratton at gmail.com
> Spring-Summer 2012, Visiting Fellow, Humanities Research Centre, Australia
> National University
> Co-Editor, *Society and Space <http://www.envplan.com/D.html> *(Environment
> and Planning D)
> *Society and Space* open site <http://www.societyandspace.com/>
> Philosophy in a Time of Error weblog<http://philosophyinatimeoferror.wordpress.com/>
> Department of Philosophy
> Memorial University of Newfoundland
> St. John's, NF
> A1C 5S7 CANADA
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 at 2:12 PM, Timothy Morton <
> timothymorton303 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi---each entity (a thought, an amethyst geode, a bartender) emits
>> spacetime just as Einstein argued . Graham's The Quadruple Object and my
>> not yet out Realist Magic go into this.
>>
>> Each entity "times" in the way Heidegger reserves for Da-sein and Derrida
>> reserves to the trace.
>>
>> Time and space are not neutral containers but are emergent properties of
>> beings.
>>
>> Tim
>>
>>
>>
>> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>>
>> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:15 PM, davin heckman <davinheckman at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> > You are right.... I should do more reading. I find the thoughts
>> > engaging and, since I am in transit, I am eager to get more
>> > information where I can.
>> >
>> > Ultimately, underneath my questions, I suppose, are some thoughts on
>> > relationality and time. You have all of these things that have to do
>> > with chairs, but only the chair is the chair. And there are these
>> > things that have to do with chairs, but which are real in their own
>> > right. But an idea about a chair kind of flickers in and out of
>> > consciousness, never having a discrete edge, and only become something
>> > definitive when their edges are marked out in some way. It's tempting
>> > to think that one's writing about a thought is separate from the
>> > thought itself, but typically the act of writing or performing a
>> > thought tends to calcify and reinforce it through a feedback loop.
>> > Every time one thinks about a chair, one does not invent a new object.
>> > Similar to a computer program pulling modular entities and reusing
>> > them again and again, our thoughts repeat the concept in our
>> > imagination. On the other hand, imaginary iterations are not the same
>> > as digital iterations. Less like a computer, we pull the modular
>> > concept into action and interpret it with a variety of tones. I
>> > wouldn't want to say these singular thoughts don't exist, but on the
>> > other hand, they don't have the same reality as those thoughts which
>> > are articulated and taken up into collective discourse.... and even
>> > still, a discursive "thing" gains a level of significance when it
>> > represents some empirical process.
>> >
>> > I care about this because a chair changes from one moment to the next.
>> > It becomes materially altered as time unfolds, yet we are comfortable
>> > saying that the chair on day one is that chair on day five. In other
>> > words, each moment does not unleash a separate chair. In my mind,
>> > "weight" might be its subjective intensity, its empirical durability,
>> > its social hegemony, its procedural utility, its digital ubiquity, its
>> > aesthetic elegance.... though none of these qualities are directly
>> > analogous to the other, suggesting that there are a variety of types
>> > of being.
>> >
>> > All these thoughts are a jumble.... I'll take your advice and do some
>> reading.
>> >
>> > Davin
>> >
>> > On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 11:28 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>
>> wrote:
>> >> A chair is a chair. A picture of a chair is a picture of a chair. A
>> >> definition of a chair is a definition of a chair. None are all chairs,
>> but
>> >> all have something to do with chairs. At least, that's the OOO
>> contention.
>> >> There are no planes of existence… except for Harman (and Tim, to some
>> >> extent), who distinguishes sensual from real objects. For Graham, the
>> idea
>> >> of a chair is different from the real chair, which recedes from all
>> >> encounters. I think this is maybe the conclusion you arrive at in your
>> >> second paragraph below.
>> >>
>> >> NOTHING about OOO privileges the material (i.e., the tangible,
>> physical)
>> >> chair primacy over the others. As for "the same weight" — well, that
>> depends
>> >> on what you mean by "weight." What do you mean?
>> >>
>> >> I hate to say it, but it's maybe not possible to make further progress
>> >> without reading some of this material in depth…
>> >>
>> >> Ian
>> >>
>> >> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:13 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Ian and Tim,
>> >>
>> >> Do the differences with which we treat objects syncs up with
>> >> ontological difference, and thus, is there something to some of the
>> >> different categorizations we could possibly develop for objects?
>> >>
>> >> I do think there is plenty of room to see these things from a fresh
>> >> perspective, but I also wonder if not, for instance, Kosuth's chairs
>> >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_and_Three_Chairs> highlight the ways
>> >> that discrete objects can differ from each other, but also the ways in
>> >> which there are consistencies that can yoke them together in odd ways.
>> >> A picture of a chair is not a chair, a definition of chair is not a
>> >> chair, instructions about a chair is not a chair, a chair as a
>> >> sculpture is not necessarily a chair..... yet, in some fundamental
>> >> way, all are chairs.... in a general sense of their concept and
>> >> recognition. Put all three things together, and you have a "chair"
>> >> which occupies all three planes of existence simultaneously. On the
>> >> other hand, they can occupy niches within conceptual frameworks (a
>> >> chair within a game, for instance, can be very "real" to the other
>> >> objects in the game).
>> >>
>> >> Each way of recognizing the chair (the picture, instructions, the
>> >> chair as chair, chair as sculpture, three chairs as conceptual work,
>> >> etc) would suggest that each is a distinct object in some sense, which
>> >> makes me wonder then, whether or not all other possible thoughts about
>> >> a chair have being, or if we afford the material object of the chair
>> >> primacy. In which case, does a digital rendering of the chair carry
>> >> the same weight as an unexpressed idea about a chair, too. At some
>> >> point, doesn't ontology lead into this thicket?
>> >>
>> >> Davin
>> >>
>> >> On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 9:08 PM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu
>> >
>> >> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> There is no reason why holding that everything exists equally entails
>> >>
>> >> "reducing all that can be known about a being to a simple recognition
>> of
>> >>
>> >> being."
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Ian
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Jun 24, 2012, at 5:44 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I agree, this is a good starting point.... that all things that exist
>> >>
>> >> have being as their common condition of existence (that is, they are
>> >>
>> >> not "not beings"), which is a sort of foundational ontological
>> >>
>> >> similarity. But if the only significant ontological claim we can make
>> >>
>> >> about things is either yes or no, do they exist or not, then this
>> >>
>> >> means all things carry this single quality, which is to say that there
>> >>
>> >> is no difference between things. If we admit difference, then we must
>> >>
>> >> account for those differences in meaningful ways. For instance,
>> >>
>> >> waffle #1 differs from waffle #2 in a different way than waffle #1
>> >>
>> >> differs from a toaster (or waffle #1 changes in the course of being
>> >>
>> >> eaten, it is still in one meaningful sense the "same" waffle after it
>> >>
>> >> has been bitten, but in another sense, it is a different waffle, too.
>> >>
>> >> While both toasters and waffles are different from something like an
>> >>
>> >> idea or a "memory" rendered in media (a waffle recipe or story about
>> >>
>> >> waffles) or a process habituated in muscle memory (the habit of making
>> >>
>> >> a waffle or eating one).
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> My concern is that if we reduce all that can be known about being to a
>> >>
>> >> simple recognition of being, we commit to a kind of abstraction and
>> >>
>> >> alienation from being of the sort that happens when markets try to
>> >>
>> >> mediate everything through the common denominator of dollars.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Davin
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:46 PM, Timothy Morton
>> >>
>> >> <timothymorton303 at gmail.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Hi Davin,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> We obviously treat different entities differently.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> But this is not the same as saying that these entities are
>> ontologically
>> >>
>> >> different.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Yours, Tim
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Jun 20, 2012, at 5:51 AM, davin heckman <davinheckman at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Thank you Ian, for these thoughts. My initial encounter with this
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> work came via a brief discussion of "flat ontology," which I found
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> somewhat offputting. I followed up by reading through the re:press
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> book. What I like the most, I suppose, is the sense that the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> discussions are in motion with a lot of people participating.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Reading some of the discussion of mereology, I find they resonate with
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> one of my favorite passages from Hegel. Pardon me for cannibalizing
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> another piece of writing (a draft of which can be found here:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/disturbed-dialectic-literary-criticism
>> ).
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> *
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the dialectical
>> process:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> "The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> might say the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> the whole." [1]
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Viewed from within the Hegelian process, the Real is positioned
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> outside its present manifestations, consisting, rather, of the dynamic
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> processes that comprise its totality.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> This insight, crucial to critical practice, requires revision in light
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> of technical change. By revision, I do not mean that we need to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> fundamentally alter Hegel’s argument, I only mean to suggest that we
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> see this passage with respect to new temporal modalities that have
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> shaken up the pursuit of knowledge.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> *
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I come at many of the same issues, but my inclination lead me to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> embrace a kind of "humanism," but one which cannot easily understand
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> as we continually muddle the conversations of humanism with an
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> ontology that is expressed in our metaphors. One grip I have with the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> use of Deleuze or McLuhan, is the idea that our capacity to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> personalize prosthetics has a tendency to be reduced to a situation in
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> which it becomes possible to imagine that we see machines,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> interpersonal relationships, people with tools, etc. as the same
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> thing. When, in fact, my psychic investment in my bike or computer,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> while deep, is not nearly as deep or as complex as my psychic
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> investment in my (which I can only refer to as mine with a sense of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> obligation to, rather than ownership over) child. If my bike decided
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> to bite me.....which it can't, even if it can hurt me.... I would not
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> feel so simultaneously restrained in my response AND emotionally
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> florid as I would if my 8 year old bit me for some crazy reason (but
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> with my three year old, I he is only a missed nap away from engaging
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> in something so obvious and horrible as biting someone). A bike, on
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> the other hand, can hurt me a lot more than a bite from a toddler, and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I suppose I am not above kicking a bike and yelling.... but I have
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> very limited feelings about a bike malfunction or hitting my thumb
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> with a hammer. On the other hand, a bike goes wherever I want it to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> go (except when there's an accident)..... a toddler, not so much....
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> an eight year old, he usually comes with a counter proposal (and it is
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> a monstrous adult that would treat kids like a bike, insist that they
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> only go where told, speak when it is demanded). A lot of really deep
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> thinking about human subjectivty simply does not go this far.... and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> part of this has to do with a poor understanding of objects. What is
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> worse is when this understanding infects interpersonal relationships
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> in the context of a Randian sort of world where there is "no such
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> thing as society, only individuals" (yet, bosses treat workers like
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> bikes and bad boyfriends treat their partners like robots).
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I am very excited to read more. I feel like it is important to free
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> our thinking from patterns and habits of the past. In particular, the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> culture of academic citation has gone from being about finding good
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> ideas where they are to deriving authority from the aura of the great
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> figure. I also have no problem with accumulations of wisdom that
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> translate into an inherited perspective, but this can't close us off
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> to thinking. So.... thank you for this!
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Davin
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Ian Bogost <
>> ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>
>> >>
>> >> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Davin,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I'm about to disappear into a mess of meetings, but let me offer a
>> brief
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> response:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> What you're touching on here is what Levi Byrant sometimes calls the
>> "weird
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> mereology" of OOO. The song isn't "just" the sound waves (what Harman
>> calls
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> an underming position) nor is it just the social context of creation
>> and use
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> (an overmining position). A song is a song, and indeed, the song in an
>> MP3
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> file is a different thing than the song as an abstraction in human
>> culture.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Neither is more object nor more real (well, "real" has a different
>> meaning
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> for Harman than it does for Levi and me).
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I talk about this a bit in the first chapter of Alien Phenomenology,
>> and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Levi does as well in the mereology section of Democracy of Objects.
>> Also,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> here are a blog post from Levi on the subject that weaves the two
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> together:
>> >>
>> >> http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/08/12/more-strange-mereology/
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I'm not answering sufficiently but wanted to get something out to you
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> rapidly.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> ib
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Ian Bogost, Ph.D.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Professor
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Director, Graduate Program in Digital Media
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Georgia Institute of Technology
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Digital Media/TSRB 320B
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> 85 Fifth Street NW
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Atlanta, GA 30308-1030
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> ibogost at gatech.edu
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> +1 (404) 894-1160 (tel)
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> +1 (404) 894-2833 (fax)
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Jun 15, 2012, at 4:11 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Ian,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Since we are on the topic of OOO, I was wondering what the ontological
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> status of something like a song is? I have to admit, I have a real
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> hard time swallowing a pure ontology that essentially defines the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> subjective as outside of being, as a sort of on or off proposition, as
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> opposed to also a turning on (or is it being turned on? Or simply to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> be turned or to turn?) (I am generally skeptical about a variety of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> posthumanisms that go beyond a critique of a monolithic Humanism,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> because I think that consciousness carries specific tendencies that
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> seem to fundamentally frame all possibilities for knowledge). However
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> it is entirely possible that I am missing out on a discussion that has
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> been unfolding without me.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> But here's my thought: With a song, you have something that can be
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> rendered in "objective" form.... maybe an mp3 file or a sheet of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> notes or record or something. If this is what we mean by a song,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> then, fine, that's an object. But a song only really starts doing
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> something when it is unfolding within the context of memory and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> anticipation. It only is a song when it is listened to by a subject,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> which is to say it is an object that has a singular temporal being as
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> it is listened to, which is distinct from how it is being listened to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> and replayed even by the same user. (And we aren't even beginning to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> talk about non-recorded music). The only way a song becomes a purely
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> discrete object is when it is removed from its temporal existence and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> understood as a totality, and detached from an audience. And while we
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> can sit around and all talk about, say, "Another One Bites the Dust,"
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> after we squeeze it into a conceptual file type and label it, the fact
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> that we can discuss something that can only mean something if is
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> experienced as a process AND an object within the context of a
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> experience, suggests that sometimes being is realized by the relations
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> of things, rather than the things themselves. My suggestion is that
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> the ontological nature of the song cannot be described in objective
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> terms without missing what a song is. Without the non-objective
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> component of its being, a song is just sound. If we say, well, "Hey,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> when this sound occurs, people do X, Y, and Z," we can find ourself
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> thinking that these effects are produced by the object, but this sort
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> of thought experiment only gives us half an understanding of the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> object's being. You also have to think of that song in relation to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> the current context, to itself over time, to the individual and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> collective experience of its audience, to the culture, etc. Again, a
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> great means to produce estrangement, but not the complete account of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> what the thing is. At the risk of sounding chauvinistic, I can see
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> that it might be expedient to regard a distant moon without regard to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> its historical relationship to the human. It's useful to think of a
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> distant moon as a quantity of data. But the closer we get to human
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> existence, the more likely we are to encounter types of things that
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> exist, but that cannot be understood properly as a bundle of discrete
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> data. Maybe there are some texts that address precisly these sorts of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> concerns.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> This is where I think ontology cannot simply be objective. It must,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> of course, be able to establish the differences between things, to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> render those things it claims to understand in discrete form, insofar
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> as they can be considered as such. On the other hand, we know that
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> most of what the world is made of is common and that the laws of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> physics, for instance, harness discrete things under a kind of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> continuity. So, along with the conditions of radical difference that
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> a philosophy of objects implies, there are the conditions of radical
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> connectivity. Both features are equally present, which is to say they
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> offer us little in the way of productive knowledge EXCEPT insofar as
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> we can bind and sever, cut or tie, digitize or analogize within this
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> framework of matter. The 21st century loves digitizing things.....
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> it helps computers see the world, it helps them count us, predict our
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> behavior, weigh it, value it, direct it, etc. But the digital is only
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> half of our existence.... the analog process is equally present in
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> language and cognition.... and it is just as equpped to help us
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> understand the world by creating categories of things and identifying
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> common qualities. In "Notes on the Uncanny," Freud identifies this
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> struggle as productive of a kind of unsettling (the person that acts
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> like an object/the object that acts like a person)... but it does not
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> simply have to be a "scary" process.... the move from discrete to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> connected or from one into multiple can also be deeply satisfying and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> reassuring of being. If both processes are equally useful, then what
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> presides over these two tendencies? Temporal consciousness that can
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> mobilize processes of digitization and analogy? Another place to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> think through this is in relation to a variety of attempts at
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> taxonomy. At some point, a poodle has to be a poodle and a wolf has
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> to be a wolf, but in relation to squids, both can be canines. We
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> could say that well, we are talking about layers of qualities that
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> enable us to categorize this object or that object. But without the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> history of the poodle we don't really know how one canine can be a
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> fashion accessory and the other is a part of a wild ecology, all of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> which (domesticating work dogs, turning tool animals into fashion
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> animals, thinking about animals as people, killing wild animals,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> restoring wildness, etc) radically alter the parameters of being based
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> on thoughts about being. To take it back to queer thought, around the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> bend of singular identities is the knowlege that such queerness does
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> not preclude deep relationality. My reading is that the fruits of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> this thought are an affirmation of the idea that the well-worn paths
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> of prescribed human behavior do not necessarily lead to earnest
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> relationships, it is not to reject relationship itself in favor of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> individualism because capitalism has been doing this since the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> transformation of labor into commodity.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Why does this matter? I care about politics, but I am not going to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> say that OOO cleaves to this or that kind of politics.... it doesn't
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> matter. If a statement is discernibly true, then I have an obligation
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> to bend my ideas around the true statement. And my sense, based on
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> very limited reading, is that OOO is trying to figure out what we can
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> know about being. So, while it is worth considering the political
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> implications of speculative thought, I think Galloway is a bit wrong
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> to suggest that something is "bourgeois" or something just because
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> financial markets also offer a flat ontology via capital. The only
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> thing that really matters is whether or not a philosophy can get us to
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> a mutually agreed upon knowledge of the world that can be transmitted
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> effectively from one context to another and continue to be useful.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I have been lazy about following this month's discussion, but I like
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> the idea of queering technology, of the productively broken tool. It
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> is an area that has affinities with regards to my own reading of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> electronic literature..... taking Jakobson's discussion of poetics up
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> through Darko Suvin's discussion of "cognitive estrangement," and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> looking at the ways that digital literary practices perform a similar
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> process with regards to instrumental languages. My thought is that OOO
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> is productive in that it asks us to engage in a thought experiment
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> about pure objectivitiy, and in doing so, reveals the critical
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> necessity of subjective and intersubjective aspects of human being
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> that are embedded in our broader assertions about being. I think that
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> a lot of the "posthumanisms" try to simply go beyond something that we
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> have never understood in the first place: that being human is
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> essentially a kind of queer existence, all the much more so when we
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> insist that it is not. For my part, I want my human rights. So while
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I am sympathetic, generally, with many of the aims of the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> posthumanists I encounter, I generally think that "Humanism" has yet
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> to adequately describe being human. Like Habermas said of modernity,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> it's daunting and messy and incomplete (like most things worth doing).
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Living in Norway right now (moving in a couple weeks, unfortunately),
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> humanism seems to be working out pretty well here. The problems of
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> the world do not stem from a love of humanity, they stem from our
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> growing estrangment from humanity and increased clustering into
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> paranoid, exclusionary enclaves (Why do you think everyone watches
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Zombie movies? Blasting away at legions of dirty anthropoidal morons
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> trying to eat what you have, a perfect gospel for post democratic
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> capitalism). In a world of Darwinian evolution, we are not entirely
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> selected, we alter the landscape of an objective process through our
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> dialogue with an objective sphere that exists, that we inhabit, and
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> that we think about, but which does not simply constitute us.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I admit these thoughts are poorly formed.... and I am very busy these
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> days.... so I might not be able to reply as quickly as I would
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> normally. But am very interested in these conversations.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Davin
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Thu, Jun 14, 2012 at 4:16 PM, frederic neyrat <fneyrat at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Hi,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I would like - if possible - to get one or two examples about the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> objects concerned by your statement:"all objects equally exist, but
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> not all objects exist equally." I guess - but I just guess - that the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> first part of the sentence is ontological and the second part could be
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> political, but maybe I'm wrong. Thanks in advance.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Best,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Frederic Neyrat
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> 2012/6/14 Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Ok, sigh, let me try this again.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> The "as much as" is not a judgement of value, but of existence. This
>> is the
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> fundamental disagreement that played out in the comments to Galloway's
>> work
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> and in the many responses elsewhere. The world is big and contains many
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> things. I've put this principle thusly: "all objects equally exist,
>> but not
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> all objects exist equally."
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> It's possible that such a metaphysical position isn't for everyone.
>> But if
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> your idea of "being political" is as exclusionary and deprecatory as
>> both
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Galloway's post and my limited experience thusfar here on empyre, then
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> perhaps you can explain why that a model worth aspiring for? Why that
>> is
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> virtuous and righteous?
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Ian
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Jun 14, 2012, at 2:57 PM, Rob Myers wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On 06/14/2012 07:02 PM, Ian Bogost wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> As for queer and feminist formulations, I agree with the spirit of what
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> you say, but I'll reiterate my observation that SR/OOO is moving in a
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> slightly different direction—one that concerns toasters and quasars as
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> much as human subjects (note the "as much as" here). Why not take this
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> work for what it is, at least for starters, rather than for what it
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> isn't?
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> The "as much as" is precisely the problem.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Galloway's critique of OOO that Zach mentioned explains why:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> http://itself.wordpress.com/2012/06/03/a-response-to-graham-harmans-marginalia-on-radical-thinking/
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> But I wouldn't lump Meillassoux in with Harman. I think Meillassoux's
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> philosophy can indeed be interesting for this debate because of its
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> embracing of contingency and possibility.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> - Rob.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >>
>> >>
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>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >>
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>> >>
>> >>
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>> >>
>> >>
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>> >>
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >>
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>> >>
>> >>
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>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >>
>> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>> >>
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>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >> empyre forum
>> >>
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>> >>
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>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> empyre forum
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>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> empyre forum
>> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
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>
>
>
> --
>
> --
> Peter Gratton
> pmgratton at gmail.com
> Spring-Summer 2012, Visiting Fellow, Humanities Research Centre, Australia
> National University
> Co-Editor, *Society and Space <http://www.envplan.com/D.html> *(Environment
> and Planning D)
> *Society and Space* open site <http://www.societyandspace.com/>
> Philosophy in a Time of Error weblog<http://philosophyinatimeoferror.wordpress.com/>
> Department of Philosophy
> Memorial University of Newfoundland
> St. John's, NF
> A1C 5S7 CANADA
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> empyre forum
> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> empyre forum
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--
--
Peter Gratton
pmgratton at gmail.com
Spring-Summer 2012, Visiting Fellow, Humanities Research Centre, Australia
National University
Co-Editor, *Society and Space <http://www.envplan.com/D.html> *(Environment
and Planning D)
*Society and Space* open site <http://www.societyandspace.com/>
Philosophy in a Time of Error
weblog<http://philosophyinatimeoferror.wordpress.com/>
Department of Philosophy
Memorial University of Newfoundland
St. John's, NF
A1C 5S7 CANADA
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