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depersonalisation to which my grandmother was subjected as Alzheimer's dise=
ase operated upon her. I say "operated" because it seemed to me that my gra=
ndmother, or, at least, the new and ultimate version of her, was the work o=
f the disease, its opus, its own sculpture. Indeed, this was not a diminish=
ed person in front of me, the same woman weaker than she used to be, lessen=
ed, spoiled. No, this was a stranger who didn't recognise me, who didn't re=
cognise herself because she had undoubtedly never met her before."

And: "I was perfectly aware - along with everyone who must endure the same =
spectacle in their own lives - that this absence, this disaffection, this s=
trangeness to oneself were, without any possible doubt, the paradoxical sig=
ns of profound pain. Later, I learned that Alzheimer's disease is a cerebra=
l pathology. Could it be that the brain suffers? Could it be that this suff=
ering manifests itself in the form of indifference to suffering? In the for=
m of the inability to experience suffering as one's own? Could it be that t=
here is a type of suffering that creates a new identity, the unknown identi=
ty of an unknown person who suffers? Could it be that cerebral suffering is=
 precisely such suffering?"

(I'd also like respectfully to ask the opposite: if it could be that an as =
yet for us unknown person, an identity in the process of creation, can be e=
qual to cerebral suffering, in the sense in which Deleuze issues the Stoic =
challenge of being equal to the wound which afflicts us? or in other words,=
 acting?)
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