[-empyre-] The Playsthetics of Experimental Digital Games: Week 2 subtopics and questions
Sebastian Deterding
sebastian at codingconduct.cc
Mon Mar 17 04:33:58 EST 2014
Dear Bart,
I had hoped this would stir a bit of controversy :).
But more seriously, my point exactly is that the strong
counter-reactions gamification instils often result from the offended
being deeply wedded to the very same modernist romantic notions of play
as the natural, the anti-rational, the non-instrumental that Huizinga
exemplifies. That's exactly the argument Sutton-Smith makes with
analyzing ancient and modern play rhetorics. That's implied (to me) in
Malaby's point that our notions of "play" are modernist cultural ideas,
not anthropological universals. That's entailed in Victor Turner's
analyses of pre-modern liminal and modern liminoid phenomena (the full
argument here: http://goo.gl/b1Fsxt).
Do "experimental games", as they are understood and practiced within a
specific "art assemblage"/community, present something radically
different? Absolutely. They represent (in that community/assemblage)
traditional high/late modernist, avant-garde conceptions and values of
art: authentic self-expression ("radical honesty"), critical reflection
and transformation of standing social orders, formal and performative
reflexivity and self-referentiality, etc. pp. (What Turner called
liminoid, what Sutton-Smith named the play rhetorics of self and
imagination).
I do not claim that gamification is anything like that. In fact, within
the communities/assemblages that currently practice gamification –
marketers, psychologists, business consultants, etc. – you find
classical technocentric, technodeterministic, instrumental, almost
Baconian rhetorics of progress (what Mozorov so wonderfully labeled
"technical solutionism"). They take the ends and orders of society as a
given and assume that we just need better technical means of achieving
them, voilá: gamification. In a sense, gamification is a return to the
pre-modern liminal, where play is fully integrated and funtionalized
into the reproduction of social oder like as was in pre-modern rites of
passage.
Thus, these two bundles of communities and practices and rhetorics
couldn't be more diametrically opposed -- on one level of analysis. But
my point is that on another level of analysis, both are deviations from
the existing dominant modernist rhetoric of play as frivolity, as "the
non-instrumental". I make this claim not to defend of justify
gamification, let alone legitizime it as "just another form of
experimental art" (that would be truly bizarre), but as a mere first act
of analytic description of what is happening. I don't want to throw
criticality out the window with that. I just, personally, see it as a
second step.
That is, I do not say that gamification as practiced today doesn't
entail many things I find ethically questionable or appaling (it does),
nor that gamification as currently practiced engages in the
instrumentalization of one of the last human practices that is framed in
modern societies as non-instrumental, often resulting in a form of
de-alienated exploitation, as e.g. PJ Rey argues, uncritically
reproducing and reinforcing the standing social order -- it is guilty as
charged, and something I personally find ethically troublesome as well.
Aristotelian virtue-ethicist that I am, I see play as a human practice
closest to eudaimonia (http://codingconduct.cc/Paideia-as-Paidia). But
good Rortyan ironist that I also am, I am aware that these are my values
and ethical norms, and I try to keep separate – ultimately in vein, of
course, but as best as I can – the analytic description of gamification
and experimental games as parts of a larger social shift from their
critical evaluation. If one takes the stance that social research ought
and cannot but be normative and critical, that's fine with me, but I
continue to see value in keeping analytical and critical concerns
separate, if only as a strategic ritual.
Adorno writes in the "Toy Shop" fragment in "Minima Moralia" (3rd ed.
London: Verso 2005, pp. 227-228):
"A child seeing the tightrope-walkers singing, the pipes playing, the
girls fetching water, the coachmen driving, thinks all this is happening
for the joy of doing so; he can’t imagine that these people also have to
eat and drink, go to bed and get up again. We, however, know what is at
stake. Namely, earning a living, which commandeers all these activities
as mere means, reduces them to interchangeable, abstract labor-time. The
quality of things ceases to be their essence and becomes the accidental
appearance of their value. The ‘equivalent form’ mars all perceptions;
what is no longer irradiated by the light of its own self-determination
as ‘joy in doing,’ pales to the eye." Our organs grasp nothing sensuous
in isolation, but notice whether a color, a sound, a movement is there
for its own sake or something else; wearied by a false variety, they
steep all in gray, disappointed by the deceptive claim of qualities
still to be there at all, while they conform to the purposes of
appropriation, indeed largely owe their existence to it alone.
Disenchantment with the contemplated world is the sensorium's reaction
to its objective role as a "commodity world." Only when purified of
appropriation would things be colorful and useful at once: under
universal compulsion the two cannot be reconciled. Children are not so
much, as Hebbel thought, subject to illusions of "captivating variety,"
as still aware, in their spontaneous perception, of the contradiction
between phenomenon and fungibility that the resigned adult no longer
sees, and they shun it. Play is their defense. The unerring child is
struck by the "peculiarity of the equivalent form": "use value becomes
the form of manifestation, the phenomenal form of its opposite, value."
In his purposeless activity the child, by a subterfuge, sides with
use-value against exchange value. Just because he deprives the things
with which he plays of their mediated usefulness, he seeks to rescue in
them what is benign towards men and not what subserves the exchange
relation that equally deforms men and things. The little truck travels
nowhere and the tiny barrels on them are empty; yet they remain true to
their destiny by not performing, not participating in the process of
abstraction that levels down that destiny, but instead abide as
allegories of what they are specifically for. Scattered, it is true,
but not ensnared, they wait to see whether society will finally remove
the social stigma on them; whether the vital processes between men and
things, praxis, will cease to be practical. The unreality of games
gives notice that reality is not yet real. Unconsciously they rehearse
the right life."
I really like that passage. I think it comes close to Aristotle's notion
of eudaimonia, and my personal notion of what the good or right life is
that we as humans should aspire to, and why play is important. I think
gamification as currently practiced is the antithesis of this, and thus,
the antithesis of what I personally value and aspire to. Learning from
play to me entails the *promise* of getting us closer to eudaimonia, to
"the right life". That's why I'm interested in the whole "gamification"
thing. But I am also aware that these sentiments and arguments are --
good ethological evidence regarding the universality of play
notwithstanding -- culturally particular. And as an analyst of my own
society, I see a shift happening in our contemporary rhetorics of games
that I would like to describe before then engaging in critical evaluation.
Sebastian
Am 3/13/14 4:33 PM, schrieb Bart Simon:
> ----------empyre- soft-skinned space----------------------
> Well just to mix it up and generate some week 1/2 cross talk I thought
> I would tussle with Sebastian just a little bit
>
> On 3/11/2014 9:50 PM, Sebastian Deterding wrote:
>> But finally to Sandra’s question regarding the relation of
>> experimental games to gamification and the ludification of culture.
>> If we take the analytic conception of “experimental” as “deviating
>> from existing conventions”, then odd as it may sound, both
>> experimental games and gamification present two instances of the same
>> deviation – namely of our culturally prevalent conception of what
>> games are *for*. If we take scholars like Huizinga or Caillois as
>> representatives of the dominant modernist discourses about the
>> “proper” social place or function of games for adults, then “we
>> moderns” considered games to be “outside ‘ordinary’ life” and “with
>> no material interest” (Huizinga 1955, 13), “separate” and
>> “unproductive” (Caillois 2001, 9-10) – a space free from the demands
>> of social norms and uses. Somewhat paradoxically, the expected,
>> demanded, normalized social function and purpose of games in
>> modernity has been to be without function and purpose. At most, we
>> tolerated their value for childhood development or as leisurely
>> restoration for work, but even in that, we reproduced very specific,
>> modernist rhetorics of play and games. In Brian Sutton-Smith’s terms,
>> our dominant modernist rhetorics of games were those of frivolity
>> (they’re worthless) or progress (they support productivity through
>> learning or rest).
>
> This has got to be the strangest defense of gamification that I have
> ever heard (and don't get me wrong I love strange defenses). So
> gamification as the functional extension of of game processes into
> everyday lifeword (or maybe vice versa) is usually the critical
> marxist's nightmare. Henri Lefebvre wrote passionately of just this
> sort of thing in terms of the colonization of everydayness (which has
> a lot in common with play) and poor Huizenga who tried in vain to
> argue that the essence of play as culture could resist modernist
> rationalization and all its iron cage consequences. Suddenly,
> gamification as the functionalization of play in the face of the
> conservative play romanticists (the play theory equivalent of
> tree-huggers perhaps) gets to be experimental and avant-guard. That
> such an argument (everything has a function) is consistent with the
> logic of capital itself is enough to make me try hugging trees again
> (I know, I know... nothing is sacred, but honestly... must we throw
> in the towel so easily). I am not yet ready to give up the idea of
> experimental games as more than a matter of anything goes or even
> "deviation from existing conventions."
>
> While I am on this though I thought I would mention something I never
> got to last week which is the sense that experiment is also sometimes
> a form of practice without commitment or responsibility, as in "don't
> worry... its just an experiment. no harm, no foul." Such a phrase
> often serves as a justification for "anything goes" simply because it
> is an "experiment."
>
> In this sense one can experiment (with games or otherwise) without a
> commitment to the consequences of one's experiment or experimental
> attitude. In this mode, an experimental game is just a matter of doing
> things differently (deviating from norms) but I think we are trying
> to suggest that experimental game design is predicated on some other
> social, cultural and maybe even material commitments to specific
> consequences of these experiments. And so, I disagree with the
> others... trying different things in game design is not the same thing
> as experimental game design and I would try to stand with Huizenga and
> keep gamification at bay as well. Function creep and the impulse to
> see what we can make games do to us is definately experimental (with
> almost no ethical oversight I might add) but it is not experimental
> game design.
>
> Maybe we can also take on the art function question that Sebastian is
> using as leverage for gamification but I'll save that for later
>
> cheers,
> Bart
>
>
>
--
Cheers,
Sebastian
-------------------------------------------------------------
Sebastian Deterding | coding conduct
Mail: sebastian at codingconduct.cc | Twitter: @dingstweets
Web: http://codingconduct.cc | Skype: sebastiandeterding
US mobile: +1 (585) 747-8616 | DE mobile: +49 15140030044
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