[-empyre-] Meillassoux / Harman

Wed Jun 27 18:53:52 EST 2012

I have an article that I wrote about a year ago which discusses black
boxes, poetics, and default settings:  Inside Out of the Box: Default
Settings and Electronic Poetics
http://www.dichtung-digital.org/2010/heckman/heckman.htm

It might be a nice complement to the conversation.

I will take a look at Graham's quadruple object.

Davin

On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 at 12:12 AM, Timothy Morton
<timothymorton303 at gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi---each entity (a thought, an amethyst geode, a bartender) emits spacetime just as Einstein argued . Graham's The Quadruple Object and my not yet out Realist Magic go into this.
>
> Each entity "times" in the way Heidegger reserves for Da-sein and Derrida reserves to the trace.
>
> Time and space are not neutral containers but are emergent properties of beings.
>
> Tim
>
>
>
> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>
> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:15 PM, davin heckman <davinheckman at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> You are right....  I should do more reading.  I find the thoughts
>> engaging and, since I am in transit, I am eager to get more
>> information where I can.
>>
>> Ultimately, underneath my questions, I suppose, are some thoughts on
>> relationality and time.  You have all of these things that have to do
>> with chairs, but only the chair is the chair.  And there are these
>> things that have to do with chairs, but which are real in their own
>> right.  But an idea about a chair kind of flickers in and out of
>> consciousness, never having a discrete edge, and only become something
>> definitive when their edges are marked out in some way. It's tempting
>> to think that one's writing about a thought is separate from the
>> thought itself, but typically the act of writing or performing a
>> thought tends to calcify and reinforce it through a feedback loop.
>> Every time one thinks about a chair, one does not invent a new object.
>> Similar to a computer program pulling modular entities and reusing
>> them again and again, our thoughts repeat the concept in our
>> imagination.  On the other hand, imaginary iterations are not the same
>> as digital iterations.  Less like a computer, we pull the modular
>> concept into action and interpret it with a variety of tones.  I
>> wouldn't want to say these singular thoughts don't exist, but on the
>> other hand, they don't have the same reality as those thoughts which
>> are articulated and taken up into collective discourse....  and even
>> still, a discursive "thing" gains a level of significance when it
>> represents some empirical process.
>>
>> I care about this because a chair changes from one moment to the next.
>> It becomes materially altered as time unfolds, yet we are comfortable
>> saying that the chair on day one is that chair on day five.  In other
>> words, each moment does not unleash a separate chair.  In my mind,
>> "weight" might be its subjective intensity, its empirical durability,
>> its social hegemony, its procedural utility, its digital ubiquity, its
>> aesthetic elegance....  though none of these qualities are directly
>> analogous to the other, suggesting that there are a variety of types
>> of being.
>>
>> All these thoughts are a jumble....  I'll take your advice and do some reading.
>>
>> Davin
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 11:28 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu> wrote:
>>> A chair is a chair. A picture of a chair is a picture of a chair. A
>>> definition of a chair is a definition of a chair. None are all chairs, but
>>> all have something to do with chairs. At least, that's the OOO contention.
>>> There are no planes of existence… except for Harman (and Tim, to some
>>> extent), who distinguishes sensual from real objects. For Graham, the idea
>>> of a chair is different from the real chair, which recedes from all
>>> encounters. I think this is maybe the conclusion you arrive at in your
>>> second paragraph below.
>>>
>>> NOTHING about OOO privileges the material (i.e., the tangible, physical)
>>> chair primacy over the others. As for "the same weight" — well, that depends
>>> on what you mean by "weight." What do you mean?
>>>
>>> I hate to say it, but it's maybe not possible to make further progress
>>> without reading some of this material in depth…
>>>
>>> Ian
>>>
>>> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:13 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>>>
>>> Ian and Tim,
>>>
>>> Do the differences with which we treat objects syncs up with
>>> ontological difference, and thus, is there something to some of the
>>> different categorizations we could possibly develop for objects?
>>>
>>> I do think there is plenty of room to see these things from a fresh
>>> perspective, but I also wonder if not, for instance, Kosuth's chairs
>>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_and_Three_Chairs> highlight the ways
>>> that discrete objects can differ from each other, but also the ways in
>>> which there are consistencies that can yoke them together in odd ways.
>>> A picture of a chair is not a chair, a definition of chair is not a
>>> chair, instructions about a chair is not a chair, a chair as a
>>> sculpture is not necessarily a chair.....  yet, in some fundamental
>>> way, all are chairs.... in a general sense of their concept and
>>> recognition.  Put all three things together, and you have a "chair"
>>> which occupies all three planes of existence simultaneously.  On the
>>> other hand, they can occupy niches within conceptual frameworks (a
>>> chair within a game, for instance, can be very "real" to the other
>>> objects in the game).
>>>
>>> Each way of recognizing the chair (the picture, instructions, the
>>> chair as chair, chair as sculpture, three chairs as conceptual work,
>>> etc) would suggest that each is a distinct object in some sense, which
>>> makes me wonder then, whether or not all other possible thoughts about
>>> a chair have being, or if we afford the material object of the chair
>>> primacy.  In which case, does a digital rendering of the chair carry
>>> the same weight as an unexpressed idea about a chair, too.  At some
>>> point, doesn't ontology lead into this thicket?
>>>
>>> Davin
>>>
>>> On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 9:08 PM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> There is no reason why holding that everything exists equally entails
>>>
>>> "reducing all that can be known about a being to a simple recognition of
>>>
>>> being."
>>>
>>>
>>> Ian
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Jun 24, 2012, at 5:44 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> I agree, this is a good starting point....  that all things that exist
>>>
>>> have being as their common condition of existence (that is, they are
>>>
>>> not "not beings"), which is a sort of foundational ontological
>>>
>>> similarity.  But if the only significant ontological claim we can make
>>>
>>> about things is either yes or no, do they exist or not, then this
>>>
>>> means all things carry this single quality, which is to say that there
>>>
>>> is no difference between things.  If we admit difference, then we must
>>>
>>> account for those differences in meaningful ways.  For instance,
>>>
>>> waffle #1 differs from waffle #2 in a different way than waffle #1
>>>
>>> differs from a toaster (or waffle #1 changes in the course of being
>>>
>>> eaten, it is still in one meaningful sense the "same" waffle after it
>>>
>>> has been bitten, but in another sense, it is a different waffle, too.
>>>
>>> While both toasters and waffles are different from something like an
>>>
>>> idea or a "memory" rendered in media (a waffle recipe or story about
>>>
>>> waffles) or a process habituated in muscle memory (the habit of making
>>>
>>> a waffle or eating one).
>>>
>>>
>>> My concern is that if we reduce all that can be known about being to a
>>>
>>> simple recognition of being, we commit to a kind of abstraction and
>>>
>>> alienation from being of the sort that happens when markets try to
>>>
>>> mediate everything through the common denominator of dollars.
>>>
>>>
>>> Davin
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:46 PM, Timothy Morton
>>>
>>> <timothymorton303 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Hi Davin,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> We obviously treat different entities differently.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But this is not the same as saying that these entities are ontologically
>>>
>>> different.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Yours, Tim
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Jun 20, 2012, at 5:51 AM, davin heckman <davinheckman at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thank you Ian, for these thoughts.  My initial encounter with this
>>>
>>>
>>> work came via a brief discussion of "flat ontology," which I found
>>>
>>>
>>> somewhat offputting.  I followed up by reading through the re:press
>>>
>>>
>>> book.  What I like the most, I suppose, is the sense that the
>>>
>>>
>>> discussions are in motion with a lot of people participating.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Reading some of the discussion of mereology, I find they resonate with
>>>
>>>
>>> one of my favorite passages from Hegel.  Pardon me for cannibalizing
>>>
>>>
>>> another piece of writing (a draft of which can be found here:
>>>
>>>
>>> http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/disturbed-dialectic-literary-criticism).
>>>
>>>
>>> *
>>>
>>>
>>> In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the dialectical process:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one
>>>
>>>
>>> might say the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the
>>>
>>>
>>> fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false
>>>
>>>
>>> manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of
>>>
>>>
>>> it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another,
>>>
>>>
>>> they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the
>>>
>>>
>>> same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in
>>>
>>>
>>> which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary
>>>
>>>
>>> as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of
>>>
>>>
>>> the whole." [1]
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Viewed from within the Hegelian process, the Real is positioned
>>>
>>>
>>> outside its present manifestations, consisting, rather, of the dynamic
>>>
>>>
>>> processes that comprise its totality.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> This insight, crucial to critical practice, requires revision in light
>>>
>>>
>>> of technical change. By revision, I do not mean that we need to
>>>
>>>
>>> fundamentally alter Hegel’s argument, I only mean to suggest that we
>>>
>>>
>>> see this passage with respect to new temporal modalities that have
>>>
>>>
>>> shaken up the pursuit of knowledge.
>>>
>>>
>>> *
>>>
>>>
>>> I come at many of the same issues, but my inclination lead me to
>>>
>>>
>>> embrace a kind of "humanism," but one which cannot easily understand
>>>
>>>
>>> as we continually muddle the conversations of humanism with an
>>>
>>>
>>> ontology that is expressed in our metaphors.  One grip I have with the
>>>
>>>
>>> use of Deleuze or McLuhan, is the idea that our capacity to
>>>
>>>
>>> personalize prosthetics has a tendency to be reduced to a situation in
>>>
>>>
>>> which it becomes possible to imagine that we see machines,
>>>
>>>
>>> interpersonal relationships, people with tools, etc. as the same
>>>
>>>
>>> thing.  When, in fact, my psychic investment in my bike or computer,
>>>
>>>
>>> while deep, is not nearly as deep or as complex as my psychic
>>>
>>>
>>> investment in my (which I can only refer to as mine with a sense of
>>>
>>>
>>> obligation to, rather than ownership over) child.  If my bike decided
>>>
>>>
>>> to bite me.....which it can't, even if it can hurt me....  I would not
>>>
>>>
>>> feel so simultaneously restrained in my response AND emotionally
>>>
>>>
>>> florid as I would if my 8 year old bit me for some crazy reason (but
>>>
>>>
>>> with my three year old, I he is only a missed nap away from engaging
>>>
>>>
>>> in something so obvious and horrible as biting someone).  A bike, on
>>>
>>>
>>> the other hand, can hurt me a lot more than a bite from a toddler, and
>>>
>>>
>>> I suppose I am not above kicking a bike and yelling....  but I have
>>>
>>>
>>> very limited feelings about a bike malfunction or hitting my thumb
>>>
>>>
>>> with a hammer.  On the other hand, a bike goes wherever I want it to
>>>
>>>
>>> go (except when there's an accident).....  a toddler, not so much....
>>>
>>>
>>> an eight year old, he usually comes with a counter proposal (and it is
>>>
>>>
>>> a monstrous adult that would treat kids like a bike, insist that they
>>>
>>>
>>> only go where told, speak when it is demanded).  A lot of really deep
>>>
>>>
>>> thinking about human subjectivty simply does not go this far....  and
>>>
>>>
>>> part of this has to do with a poor understanding of objects.  What is
>>>
>>>
>>> worse is when this understanding infects interpersonal relationships
>>>
>>>
>>> in the context of a Randian sort of world where there is "no such
>>>
>>>
>>> thing as society, only individuals" (yet, bosses treat workers like
>>>
>>>
>>> bikes and bad boyfriends treat their partners like robots).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I am very excited to read more.  I feel like it is important to free
>>>
>>>
>>> our thinking from patterns and habits of the past.  In particular, the
>>>
>>>
>>> culture of academic citation has gone from being about finding good
>>>
>>>
>>> ideas where they are to deriving authority from the aura of the great
>>>
>>>
>>> figure.  I also have no problem with accumulations of wisdom that
>>>
>>>
>>> translate into an inherited perspective, but this can't close us off
>>>
>>>
>>> to thinking.  So....  thank you for this!
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Davin
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>
>>>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Davin,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm about to disappear into a mess of meetings, but let me offer a brief
>>>
>>>
>>> response:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What you're touching on here is what Levi Byrant sometimes calls the "weird
>>>
>>>
>>> mereology" of OOO. The song isn't "just" the sound waves (what Harman calls
>>>
>>>
>>> an underming position) nor is it just the social context of creation and use
>>>
>>>
>>> (an overmining position). A song is a song, and indeed, the song in an MP3
>>>
>>>
>>> file is a different thing than the song as an abstraction in human culture.
>>>
>>>
>>> Neither is more object nor more real (well, "real" has a different meaning
>>>
>>>
>>> for Harman than it does for Levi and me).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I talk about this a bit in the first chapter of Alien Phenomenology, and
>>>
>>>
>>> Levi does as well in the mereology section of Democracy of Objects. Also,
>>>
>>>
>>> here are a  blog post from Levi on the subject that weaves the two
>>>
>>>
>>> together:
>>>
>>> http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/08/12/more-strange-mereology/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm not answering sufficiently but wanted to get something out to you
>>>
>>>
>>> rapidly.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ib
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Ian Bogost, Ph.D.
>>>
>>>
>>> Professor
>>>
>>>
>>> Director, Graduate Program in Digital Media
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Georgia Institute of Technology
>>>
>>>
>>> Digital Media/TSRB 320B
>>>
>>>
>>> 85 Fifth Street NW
>>>
>>>
>>> Atlanta, GA 30308-1030
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ibogost at gatech.edu
>>>
>>>
>>> +1 (404) 894-1160 (tel)
>>>
>>>
>>> +1 (404) 894-2833 (fax)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Jun 15, 2012, at 4:11 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Ian,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Since we are on the topic of OOO, I was wondering what the ontological
>>>
>>>
>>> status of something like a song is?  I have to admit, I have a real
>>>
>>>
>>> hard time swallowing a pure ontology that essentially defines the
>>>
>>>
>>> subjective as outside of being, as a sort of on or off proposition, as
>>>
>>>
>>> opposed to also a turning on (or is it being turned on? Or simply to
>>>
>>>
>>> be turned or to turn?) (I am generally skeptical about a variety of
>>>
>>>
>>> posthumanisms that go beyond a critique of a monolithic Humanism,
>>>
>>>
>>> because I think that consciousness carries specific tendencies that
>>>
>>>
>>> seem to fundamentally frame all possibilities for knowledge).  However
>>>
>>>
>>> it is entirely possible that I am missing out on a discussion that has
>>>
>>>
>>> been unfolding without me.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But here's my thought:  With a song, you have something that can be
>>>
>>>
>>> rendered in "objective" form....  maybe an mp3 file or a sheet of
>>>
>>>
>>> notes or record or something.  If this is what we mean by a song,
>>>
>>>
>>> then, fine, that's an object.  But a song only really starts doing
>>>
>>>
>>> something when it is unfolding within the context of memory and
>>>
>>>
>>> anticipation.  It only is a song when it is listened to by a subject,
>>>
>>>
>>> which is to say it is an object that has a singular temporal being as
>>>
>>>
>>> it is listened to, which is distinct from how it is being listened to
>>>
>>>
>>> and replayed even by the same user.  (And we aren't even beginning to
>>>
>>>
>>> talk about non-recorded music).  The only way a song becomes a purely
>>>
>>>
>>> discrete object is when it is removed from its temporal existence and
>>>
>>>
>>> understood as a totality, and detached from an audience.  And while we
>>>
>>>
>>> can sit around and all talk about, say, "Another One Bites the Dust,"
>>>
>>>
>>> after we squeeze it into a conceptual file type and label it, the fact
>>>
>>>
>>> that we can discuss something that can only mean something if is
>>>
>>>
>>> experienced as a process AND an object within the context of a
>>>
>>>
>>> experience, suggests that sometimes being is realized by the relations
>>>
>>>
>>> of things, rather than the things themselves.  My suggestion is that
>>>
>>>
>>> the ontological nature of the song cannot be described in objective
>>>
>>>
>>> terms without missing what a song is.  Without the non-objective
>>>
>>>
>>> component of its being, a song is just sound.  If we say, well, "Hey,
>>>
>>>
>>> when this sound occurs, people do X, Y, and Z," we can find ourself
>>>
>>>
>>> thinking that these effects are produced by the object, but this sort
>>>
>>>
>>> of thought experiment only gives us half an understanding of the
>>>
>>>
>>> object's being.  You also have to think of that song in relation to
>>>
>>>
>>> the current context, to itself over time, to the individual and
>>>
>>>
>>> collective experience of its audience, to the culture, etc. Again, a
>>>
>>>
>>> great means to produce estrangement, but not the complete account of
>>>
>>>
>>> what the thing is.  At the risk of sounding chauvinistic, I can see
>>>
>>>
>>> that it might be expedient to regard a distant moon without regard to
>>>
>>>
>>> its historical relationship to the human.  It's useful to think of a
>>>
>>>
>>> distant moon as a quantity of data.  But the closer we get to human
>>>
>>>
>>> existence, the more likely we are to encounter types of things that
>>>
>>>
>>> exist, but that cannot be understood properly as a bundle of discrete
>>>
>>>
>>> data.  Maybe there are some texts that address precisly these sorts of
>>>
>>>
>>> concerns.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> This is where I think ontology cannot simply be objective.  It must,
>>>
>>>
>>> of course, be able to establish the differences between things, to
>>>
>>>
>>> render those things it claims to understand in discrete form, insofar
>>>
>>>
>>> as they can be considered as such.  On the other hand, we know that
>>>
>>>
>>> most of what the world is made of is common and that the laws of
>>>
>>>
>>> physics, for instance, harness discrete things under a kind of
>>>
>>>
>>> continuity.  So, along with the conditions of radical difference that
>>>
>>>
>>> a philosophy of objects implies, there are the conditions of radical
>>>
>>>
>>> connectivity.  Both features are equally present, which is to say they
>>>
>>>
>>> offer us little in the way of productive knowledge EXCEPT insofar as
>>>
>>>
>>> we can bind and sever, cut or tie, digitize or analogize within this
>>>
>>>
>>> framework of matter.  The 21st century loves digitizing things.....
>>>
>>>
>>> it helps computers see the world, it helps them count us, predict our
>>>
>>>
>>> behavior, weigh it, value it, direct it, etc.  But the digital is only
>>>
>>>
>>> half of our existence....  the analog process is equally present in
>>>
>>>
>>> language and cognition....  and it is just as equpped to help us
>>>
>>>
>>> understand the world by creating categories of things and identifying
>>>
>>>
>>> common qualities.  In "Notes on the Uncanny," Freud identifies this
>>>
>>>
>>> struggle as productive of a kind of unsettling (the person that acts
>>>
>>>
>>> like an object/the object that acts like a person)...  but it does not
>>>
>>>
>>> simply have to be a "scary" process....  the move from discrete to
>>>
>>>
>>> connected or from one into multiple can also be deeply satisfying and
>>>
>>>
>>> reassuring of being.  If both processes are equally useful, then what
>>>
>>>
>>> presides over these two tendencies?  Temporal consciousness that can
>>>
>>>
>>> mobilize processes of digitization and analogy?  Another place to
>>>
>>>
>>> think through this is in relation to a variety of attempts at
>>>
>>>
>>> taxonomy.  At some point, a poodle has to be a poodle and a wolf has
>>>
>>>
>>> to be a wolf, but in relation to squids, both can be canines.  We
>>>
>>>
>>> could say that well, we are talking about layers of qualities that
>>>
>>>
>>> enable us to categorize this object or that object.  But without the
>>>
>>>
>>> history of the poodle we don't really know how one canine can be a
>>>
>>>
>>> fashion accessory and the other is a part of a wild ecology, all of
>>>
>>>
>>> which (domesticating work dogs, turning tool animals into fashion
>>>
>>>
>>> animals, thinking about animals as people, killing wild animals,
>>>
>>>
>>> restoring wildness, etc) radically alter the parameters of being based
>>>
>>>
>>> on thoughts about being.  To take it back to queer thought, around the
>>>
>>>
>>> bend of singular identities is the knowlege that such queerness does
>>>
>>>
>>> not preclude deep relationality.  My reading is that the fruits of
>>>
>>>
>>> this thought are an affirmation of the idea that the well-worn paths
>>>
>>>
>>> of prescribed human behavior do not necessarily lead to earnest
>>>
>>>
>>> relationships, it is not to reject relationship itself in favor of
>>>
>>>
>>> individualism because capitalism has been doing this since the
>>>
>>>
>>> transformation of labor into commodity.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Why does this matter?  I care about politics, but I am not going to
>>>
>>>
>>> say that OOO cleaves to this or that kind of politics....  it doesn't
>>>
>>>
>>> matter.  If a statement is discernibly true, then I have an obligation
>>>
>>>
>>> to bend my ideas around the true statement.  And my sense, based on
>>>
>>>
>>> very limited reading, is that OOO is trying to figure out what we can
>>>
>>>
>>> know about being.  So, while it is worth considering the political
>>>
>>>
>>> implications of speculative thought, I think Galloway is a bit wrong
>>>
>>>
>>> to suggest that something is "bourgeois" or something just because
>>>
>>>
>>> financial markets also offer a flat ontology via capital.  The only
>>>
>>>
>>> thing that really matters is whether or not a philosophy can get us to
>>>
>>>
>>> a mutually agreed upon knowledge of the world that can be transmitted
>>>
>>>
>>> effectively from one context to another and continue to be useful.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I have been lazy about following this month's discussion, but I like
>>>
>>>
>>> the idea of queering technology, of the productively broken tool.  It
>>>
>>>
>>> is an area that has affinities with regards to my own reading of
>>>
>>>
>>> electronic literature.....  taking Jakobson's discussion of poetics up
>>>
>>>
>>> through Darko Suvin's discussion of "cognitive estrangement," and
>>>
>>>
>>> looking at the ways that digital literary practices perform a similar
>>>
>>>
>>> process with regards to instrumental languages. My thought is that OOO
>>>
>>>
>>> is productive in that it asks us to engage in a thought experiment
>>>
>>>
>>> about pure objectivitiy, and in doing so, reveals the critical
>>>
>>>
>>> necessity of subjective and intersubjective aspects of human being
>>>
>>>
>>> that are embedded in our broader assertions about being.  I think that
>>>
>>>
>>> a lot of the "posthumanisms" try to simply go beyond something that we
>>>
>>>
>>> have never understood in the first place: that being human is
>>>
>>>
>>> essentially a kind of queer existence, all the much more so when we
>>>
>>>
>>> insist that it is not. For my part, I want my human rights.  So while
>>>
>>>
>>> I am sympathetic, generally, with many of the aims of the
>>>
>>>
>>> posthumanists I encounter, I generally think that "Humanism" has yet
>>>
>>>
>>> to adequately describe being human.  Like Habermas said of modernity,
>>>
>>>
>>> it's daunting and messy and incomplete (like most things worth doing).
>>>
>>>
>>> Living in Norway right now (moving in a couple weeks, unfortunately),
>>>
>>>
>>> humanism seems to be working out pretty well here.  The problems of
>>>
>>>
>>> the world do not stem from a love of humanity, they stem from our
>>>
>>>
>>> growing estrangment from humanity and increased clustering into
>>>
>>>
>>> paranoid, exclusionary enclaves (Why do you think everyone watches
>>>
>>>
>>> Zombie movies? Blasting away at legions of dirty anthropoidal morons
>>>
>>>
>>> trying to eat what you have, a perfect gospel for post democratic
>>>
>>>
>>> capitalism).  In a world of Darwinian evolution, we are not entirely
>>>
>>>
>>> selected, we alter the landscape of an objective process through our
>>>
>>>
>>> dialogue with an objective sphere that exists, that we inhabit, and
>>>
>>>
>>> that we think about, but which does not simply constitute us.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I admit these thoughts are poorly formed....  and I am very busy these
>>>
>>>
>>> days....  so I might not be able to reply as quickly as I would
>>>
>>>
>>> normally.  But am very interested in these conversations.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Davin
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jun 14, 2012 at 4:16 PM, frederic neyrat <fneyrat at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I would like - if possible - to get one or two examples about the
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> objects concerned by your statement:"all objects equally exist, but
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> not all objects exist equally." I guess - but I just guess - that the
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> first part of the sentence is ontological and the second part could be
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> political, but maybe I'm wrong. Thanks in advance.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Frederic Neyrat
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2012/6/14 Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Ok, sigh, let me try this again.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The "as much as" is not a judgement of value, but of existence. This is the
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> fundamental disagreement that played out in the comments to Galloway's work
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> and in the many responses elsewhere. The world is big and contains many
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> things. I've put this principle thusly: "all objects equally exist, but not
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> all objects exist equally."
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It's possible that such a metaphysical position isn't for everyone. But if
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> your idea of "being political" is as exclusionary and deprecatory as both
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Galloway's post and my limited experience thusfar here on empyre, then
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> perhaps you can explain why that a model worth aspiring for? Why that is
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> virtuous and righteous?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Ian
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Jun 14, 2012, at 2:57 PM, Rob Myers wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 06/14/2012 07:02 PM, Ian Bogost wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> As for queer and feminist formulations, I agree with the spirit of what
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> you say, but I'll reiterate my observation that SR/OOO is moving in a
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> slightly different direction—one that concerns toasters and quasars as
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> much as human subjects (note the "as much as" here). Why not take this
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> work for what it is, at least for starters, rather than for what it
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> isn't?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The "as much as" is precisely the problem.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Galloway's critique of OOO that Zach mentioned explains why:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> http://itself.wordpress.com/2012/06/03/a-response-to-graham-harmans-marginalia-on-radical-thinking/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But I wouldn't lump Meillassoux in with Harman. I think Meillassoux's
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> philosophy can indeed be interesting for this debate because of its
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> embracing of contingency and possibility.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> - Rob.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> empyre forum
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> empyre forum
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
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>>>
>>>
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>>> _______________________________________________
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>>
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>>>
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>>>
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>>>
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>>>
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>> _______________________________________________
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