[-empyre-] Meillassoux / Harman
Timothy Morton
timothymorton303 at gmail.com
Thu Jun 28 03:23:41 EST 2012
Thanks for this Davin. I have it queued up. Tim
http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
On Jun 27, 2012, at 3:53 AM, davin heckman <davinheckman at gmail.com> wrote:
> I have an article that I wrote about a year ago which discusses black
> boxes, poetics, and default settings: Inside Out of the Box: Default
> Settings and Electronic Poetics
> http://www.dichtung-digital.org/2010/heckman/heckman.htm
>
> It might be a nice complement to the conversation.
>
> I will take a look at Graham's quadruple object.
>
> Davin
>
> On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 at 12:12 AM, Timothy Morton
> <timothymorton303 at gmail.com> wrote:
>> Hi---each entity (a thought, an amethyst geode, a bartender) emits spacetime just as Einstein argued . Graham's The Quadruple Object and my not yet out Realist Magic go into this.
>>
>> Each entity "times" in the way Heidegger reserves for Da-sein and Derrida reserves to the trace.
>>
>> Time and space are not neutral containers but are emergent properties of beings.
>>
>> Tim
>>
>>
>>
>> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>>
>> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:15 PM, davin heckman <davinheckman at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> You are right.... I should do more reading. I find the thoughts
>>> engaging and, since I am in transit, I am eager to get more
>>> information where I can.
>>>
>>> Ultimately, underneath my questions, I suppose, are some thoughts on
>>> relationality and time. You have all of these things that have to do
>>> with chairs, but only the chair is the chair. And there are these
>>> things that have to do with chairs, but which are real in their own
>>> right. But an idea about a chair kind of flickers in and out of
>>> consciousness, never having a discrete edge, and only become something
>>> definitive when their edges are marked out in some way. It's tempting
>>> to think that one's writing about a thought is separate from the
>>> thought itself, but typically the act of writing or performing a
>>> thought tends to calcify and reinforce it through a feedback loop.
>>> Every time one thinks about a chair, one does not invent a new object.
>>> Similar to a computer program pulling modular entities and reusing
>>> them again and again, our thoughts repeat the concept in our
>>> imagination. On the other hand, imaginary iterations are not the same
>>> as digital iterations. Less like a computer, we pull the modular
>>> concept into action and interpret it with a variety of tones. I
>>> wouldn't want to say these singular thoughts don't exist, but on the
>>> other hand, they don't have the same reality as those thoughts which
>>> are articulated and taken up into collective discourse.... and even
>>> still, a discursive "thing" gains a level of significance when it
>>> represents some empirical process.
>>>
>>> I care about this because a chair changes from one moment to the next.
>>> It becomes materially altered as time unfolds, yet we are comfortable
>>> saying that the chair on day one is that chair on day five. In other
>>> words, each moment does not unleash a separate chair. In my mind,
>>> "weight" might be its subjective intensity, its empirical durability,
>>> its social hegemony, its procedural utility, its digital ubiquity, its
>>> aesthetic elegance.... though none of these qualities are directly
>>> analogous to the other, suggesting that there are a variety of types
>>> of being.
>>>
>>> All these thoughts are a jumble.... I'll take your advice and do some reading.
>>>
>>> Davin
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 11:28 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu> wrote:
>>>> A chair is a chair. A picture of a chair is a picture of a chair. A
>>>> definition of a chair is a definition of a chair. None are all chairs, but
>>>> all have something to do with chairs. At least, that's the OOO contention.
>>>> There are no planes of existence… except for Harman (and Tim, to some
>>>> extent), who distinguishes sensual from real objects. For Graham, the idea
>>>> of a chair is different from the real chair, which recedes from all
>>>> encounters. I think this is maybe the conclusion you arrive at in your
>>>> second paragraph below.
>>>>
>>>> NOTHING about OOO privileges the material (i.e., the tangible, physical)
>>>> chair primacy over the others. As for "the same weight" — well, that depends
>>>> on what you mean by "weight." What do you mean?
>>>>
>>>> I hate to say it, but it's maybe not possible to make further progress
>>>> without reading some of this material in depth…
>>>>
>>>> Ian
>>>>
>>>> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:13 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Ian and Tim,
>>>>
>>>> Do the differences with which we treat objects syncs up with
>>>> ontological difference, and thus, is there something to some of the
>>>> different categorizations we could possibly develop for objects?
>>>>
>>>> I do think there is plenty of room to see these things from a fresh
>>>> perspective, but I also wonder if not, for instance, Kosuth's chairs
>>>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_and_Three_Chairs> highlight the ways
>>>> that discrete objects can differ from each other, but also the ways in
>>>> which there are consistencies that can yoke them together in odd ways.
>>>> A picture of a chair is not a chair, a definition of chair is not a
>>>> chair, instructions about a chair is not a chair, a chair as a
>>>> sculpture is not necessarily a chair..... yet, in some fundamental
>>>> way, all are chairs.... in a general sense of their concept and
>>>> recognition. Put all three things together, and you have a "chair"
>>>> which occupies all three planes of existence simultaneously. On the
>>>> other hand, they can occupy niches within conceptual frameworks (a
>>>> chair within a game, for instance, can be very "real" to the other
>>>> objects in the game).
>>>>
>>>> Each way of recognizing the chair (the picture, instructions, the
>>>> chair as chair, chair as sculpture, three chairs as conceptual work,
>>>> etc) would suggest that each is a distinct object in some sense, which
>>>> makes me wonder then, whether or not all other possible thoughts about
>>>> a chair have being, or if we afford the material object of the chair
>>>> primacy. In which case, does a digital rendering of the chair carry
>>>> the same weight as an unexpressed idea about a chair, too. At some
>>>> point, doesn't ontology lead into this thicket?
>>>>
>>>> Davin
>>>>
>>>> On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 9:08 PM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> There is no reason why holding that everything exists equally entails
>>>>
>>>> "reducing all that can be known about a being to a simple recognition of
>>>>
>>>> being."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Ian
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Jun 24, 2012, at 5:44 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I agree, this is a good starting point.... that all things that exist
>>>>
>>>> have being as their common condition of existence (that is, they are
>>>>
>>>> not "not beings"), which is a sort of foundational ontological
>>>>
>>>> similarity. But if the only significant ontological claim we can make
>>>>
>>>> about things is either yes or no, do they exist or not, then this
>>>>
>>>> means all things carry this single quality, which is to say that there
>>>>
>>>> is no difference between things. If we admit difference, then we must
>>>>
>>>> account for those differences in meaningful ways. For instance,
>>>>
>>>> waffle #1 differs from waffle #2 in a different way than waffle #1
>>>>
>>>> differs from a toaster (or waffle #1 changes in the course of being
>>>>
>>>> eaten, it is still in one meaningful sense the "same" waffle after it
>>>>
>>>> has been bitten, but in another sense, it is a different waffle, too.
>>>>
>>>> While both toasters and waffles are different from something like an
>>>>
>>>> idea or a "memory" rendered in media (a waffle recipe or story about
>>>>
>>>> waffles) or a process habituated in muscle memory (the habit of making
>>>>
>>>> a waffle or eating one).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> My concern is that if we reduce all that can be known about being to a
>>>>
>>>> simple recognition of being, we commit to a kind of abstraction and
>>>>
>>>> alienation from being of the sort that happens when markets try to
>>>>
>>>> mediate everything through the common denominator of dollars.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Davin
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:46 PM, Timothy Morton
>>>>
>>>> <timothymorton303 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hi Davin,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> We obviously treat different entities differently.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But this is not the same as saying that these entities are ontologically
>>>>
>>>> different.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yours, Tim
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Jun 20, 2012, at 5:51 AM, davin heckman <davinheckman at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Thank you Ian, for these thoughts. My initial encounter with this
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> work came via a brief discussion of "flat ontology," which I found
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> somewhat offputting. I followed up by reading through the re:press
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> book. What I like the most, I suppose, is the sense that the
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> discussions are in motion with a lot of people participating.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Reading some of the discussion of mereology, I find they resonate with
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> one of my favorite passages from Hegel. Pardon me for cannibalizing
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> another piece of writing (a draft of which can be found here:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/disturbed-dialectic-literary-criticism).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the dialectical process:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> "The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> might say the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> the whole." [1]
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Viewed from within the Hegelian process, the Real is positioned
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> outside its present manifestations, consisting, rather, of the dynamic
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> processes that comprise its totality.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This insight, crucial to critical practice, requires revision in light
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> of technical change. By revision, I do not mean that we need to
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> fundamentally alter Hegel’s argument, I only mean to suggest that we
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> see this passage with respect to new temporal modalities that have
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> shaken up the pursuit of knowledge.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I come at many of the same issues, but my inclination lead me to
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> embrace a kind of "humanism," but one which cannot easily understand
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> as we continually muddle the conversations of humanism with an
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ontology that is expressed in our metaphors. One grip I have with the
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> use of Deleuze or McLuhan, is the idea that our capacity to
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> personalize prosthetics has a tendency to be reduced to a situation in
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> which it becomes possible to imagine that we see machines,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> interpersonal relationships, people with tools, etc. as the same
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> thing. When, in fact, my psychic investment in my bike or computer,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> while deep, is not nearly as deep or as complex as my psychic
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> investment in my (which I can only refer to as mine with a sense of
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> obligation to, rather than ownership over) child. If my bike decided
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> to bite me.....which it can't, even if it can hurt me.... I would not
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> feel so simultaneously restrained in my response AND emotionally
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> florid as I would if my 8 year old bit me for some crazy reason (but
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> with my three year old, I he is only a missed nap away from engaging
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> in something so obvious and horrible as biting someone). A bike, on
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> the other hand, can hurt me a lot more than a bite from a toddler, and
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I suppose I am not above kicking a bike and yelling.... but I have
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> very limited feelings about a bike malfunction or hitting my thumb
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> with a hammer. On the other hand, a bike goes wherever I want it to
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> go (except when there's an accident)..... a toddler, not so much....
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> an eight year old, he usually comes with a counter proposal (and it is
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> a monstrous adult that would treat kids like a bike, insist that they
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> only go where told, speak when it is demanded). A lot of really deep
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> thinking about human subjectivty simply does not go this far.... and
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> part of this has to do with a poor understanding of objects. What is
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> worse is when this understanding infects interpersonal relationships
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> in the context of a Randian sort of world where there is "no such
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> thing as society, only individuals" (yet, bosses treat workers like
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> bikes and bad boyfriends treat their partners like robots).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I am very excited to read more. I feel like it is important to free
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> our thinking from patterns and habits of the past. In particular, the
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> culture of academic citation has gone from being about finding good
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ideas where they are to deriving authority from the aura of the great
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> figure. I also have no problem with accumulations of wisdom that
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> translate into an inherited perspective, but this can't close us off
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> to thinking. So.... thank you for this!
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Davin
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>
>>>>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Davin,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I'm about to disappear into a mess of meetings, but let me offer a brief
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> response:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> What you're touching on here is what Levi Byrant sometimes calls the "weird
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> mereology" of OOO. The song isn't "just" the sound waves (what Harman calls
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> an underming position) nor is it just the social context of creation and use
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> (an overmining position). A song is a song, and indeed, the song in an MP3
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> file is a different thing than the song as an abstraction in human culture.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Neither is more object nor more real (well, "real" has a different meaning
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> for Harman than it does for Levi and me).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I talk about this a bit in the first chapter of Alien Phenomenology, and
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Levi does as well in the mereology section of Democracy of Objects. Also,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> here are a blog post from Levi on the subject that weaves the two
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> together:
>>>>
>>>> http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/08/12/more-strange-mereology/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I'm not answering sufficiently but wanted to get something out to you
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> rapidly.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ib
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Ian Bogost, Ph.D.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Professor
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Director, Graduate Program in Digital Media
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Georgia Institute of Technology
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Digital Media/TSRB 320B
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 85 Fifth Street NW
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Atlanta, GA 30308-1030
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ibogost at gatech.edu
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> +1 (404) 894-1160 (tel)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> +1 (404) 894-2833 (fax)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Jun 15, 2012, at 4:11 AM, davin heckman wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Ian,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Since we are on the topic of OOO, I was wondering what the ontological
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> status of something like a song is? I have to admit, I have a real
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> hard time swallowing a pure ontology that essentially defines the
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> subjective as outside of being, as a sort of on or off proposition, as
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> opposed to also a turning on (or is it being turned on? Or simply to
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> be turned or to turn?) (I am generally skeptical about a variety of
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> posthumanisms that go beyond a critique of a monolithic Humanism,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> because I think that consciousness carries specific tendencies that
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> seem to fundamentally frame all possibilities for knowledge). However
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> it is entirely possible that I am missing out on a discussion that has
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> been unfolding without me.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But here's my thought: With a song, you have something that can be
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> rendered in "objective" form.... maybe an mp3 file or a sheet of
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> notes or record or something. If this is what we mean by a song,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> then, fine, that's an object. But a song only really starts doing
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> something when it is unfolding within the context of memory and
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> anticipation. It only is a song when it is listened to by a subject,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> which is to say it is an object that has a singular temporal being as
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> it is listened to, which is distinct from how it is being listened to
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> and replayed even by the same user. (And we aren't even beginning to
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> talk about non-recorded music). The only way a song becomes a purely
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> discrete object is when it is removed from its temporal existence and
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> understood as a totality, and detached from an audience. And while we
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> can sit around and all talk about, say, "Another One Bites the Dust,"
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> after we squeeze it into a conceptual file type and label it, the fact
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> that we can discuss something that can only mean something if is
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> experienced as a process AND an object within the context of a
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> experience, suggests that sometimes being is realized by the relations
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> of things, rather than the things themselves. My suggestion is that
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> the ontological nature of the song cannot be described in objective
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> terms without missing what a song is. Without the non-objective
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> component of its being, a song is just sound. If we say, well, "Hey,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> when this sound occurs, people do X, Y, and Z," we can find ourself
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> thinking that these effects are produced by the object, but this sort
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> of thought experiment only gives us half an understanding of the
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> object's being. You also have to think of that song in relation to
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> the current context, to itself over time, to the individual and
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> collective experience of its audience, to the culture, etc. Again, a
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> great means to produce estrangement, but not the complete account of
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> what the thing is. At the risk of sounding chauvinistic, I can see
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> that it might be expedient to regard a distant moon without regard to
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> its historical relationship to the human. It's useful to think of a
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> distant moon as a quantity of data. But the closer we get to human
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> existence, the more likely we are to encounter types of things that
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> exist, but that cannot be understood properly as a bundle of discrete
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> data. Maybe there are some texts that address precisly these sorts of
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> concerns.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This is where I think ontology cannot simply be objective. It must,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> of course, be able to establish the differences between things, to
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> render those things it claims to understand in discrete form, insofar
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> as they can be considered as such. On the other hand, we know that
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> most of what the world is made of is common and that the laws of
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> physics, for instance, harness discrete things under a kind of
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> continuity. So, along with the conditions of radical difference that
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> a philosophy of objects implies, there are the conditions of radical
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> connectivity. Both features are equally present, which is to say they
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> offer us little in the way of productive knowledge EXCEPT insofar as
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> we can bind and sever, cut or tie, digitize or analogize within this
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> framework of matter. The 21st century loves digitizing things.....
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> it helps computers see the world, it helps them count us, predict our
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> behavior, weigh it, value it, direct it, etc. But the digital is only
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> half of our existence.... the analog process is equally present in
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> language and cognition.... and it is just as equpped to help us
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> understand the world by creating categories of things and identifying
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> common qualities. In "Notes on the Uncanny," Freud identifies this
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> struggle as productive of a kind of unsettling (the person that acts
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> like an object/the object that acts like a person)... but it does not
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> simply have to be a "scary" process.... the move from discrete to
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> connected or from one into multiple can also be deeply satisfying and
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> reassuring of being. If both processes are equally useful, then what
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> presides over these two tendencies? Temporal consciousness that can
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> mobilize processes of digitization and analogy? Another place to
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> think through this is in relation to a variety of attempts at
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> taxonomy. At some point, a poodle has to be a poodle and a wolf has
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> to be a wolf, but in relation to squids, both can be canines. We
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> could say that well, we are talking about layers of qualities that
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> enable us to categorize this object or that object. But without the
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> history of the poodle we don't really know how one canine can be a
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> fashion accessory and the other is a part of a wild ecology, all of
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> which (domesticating work dogs, turning tool animals into fashion
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> animals, thinking about animals as people, killing wild animals,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> restoring wildness, etc) radically alter the parameters of being based
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> on thoughts about being. To take it back to queer thought, around the
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> bend of singular identities is the knowlege that such queerness does
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> not preclude deep relationality. My reading is that the fruits of
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> this thought are an affirmation of the idea that the well-worn paths
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> of prescribed human behavior do not necessarily lead to earnest
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> relationships, it is not to reject relationship itself in favor of
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> individualism because capitalism has been doing this since the
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> transformation of labor into commodity.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Why does this matter? I care about politics, but I am not going to
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> say that OOO cleaves to this or that kind of politics.... it doesn't
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> matter. If a statement is discernibly true, then I have an obligation
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> to bend my ideas around the true statement. And my sense, based on
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> very limited reading, is that OOO is trying to figure out what we can
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> know about being. So, while it is worth considering the political
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> implications of speculative thought, I think Galloway is a bit wrong
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> to suggest that something is "bourgeois" or something just because
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> financial markets also offer a flat ontology via capital. The only
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> thing that really matters is whether or not a philosophy can get us to
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> a mutually agreed upon knowledge of the world that can be transmitted
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> effectively from one context to another and continue to be useful.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I have been lazy about following this month's discussion, but I like
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> the idea of queering technology, of the productively broken tool. It
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> is an area that has affinities with regards to my own reading of
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> electronic literature..... taking Jakobson's discussion of poetics up
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> through Darko Suvin's discussion of "cognitive estrangement," and
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> looking at the ways that digital literary practices perform a similar
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> process with regards to instrumental languages. My thought is that OOO
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> is productive in that it asks us to engage in a thought experiment
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> about pure objectivitiy, and in doing so, reveals the critical
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> necessity of subjective and intersubjective aspects of human being
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> that are embedded in our broader assertions about being. I think that
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> a lot of the "posthumanisms" try to simply go beyond something that we
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> have never understood in the first place: that being human is
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> essentially a kind of queer existence, all the much more so when we
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> insist that it is not. For my part, I want my human rights. So while
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I am sympathetic, generally, with many of the aims of the
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> posthumanists I encounter, I generally think that "Humanism" has yet
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> to adequately describe being human. Like Habermas said of modernity,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> it's daunting and messy and incomplete (like most things worth doing).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Living in Norway right now (moving in a couple weeks, unfortunately),
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> humanism seems to be working out pretty well here. The problems of
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> the world do not stem from a love of humanity, they stem from our
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> growing estrangment from humanity and increased clustering into
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> paranoid, exclusionary enclaves (Why do you think everyone watches
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Zombie movies? Blasting away at legions of dirty anthropoidal morons
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> trying to eat what you have, a perfect gospel for post democratic
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> capitalism). In a world of Darwinian evolution, we are not entirely
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> selected, we alter the landscape of an objective process through our
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> dialogue with an objective sphere that exists, that we inhabit, and
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> that we think about, but which does not simply constitute us.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I admit these thoughts are poorly formed.... and I am very busy these
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> days.... so I might not be able to reply as quickly as I would
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> normally. But am very interested in these conversations.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Davin
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Jun 14, 2012 at 4:16 PM, frederic neyrat <fneyrat at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I would like - if possible - to get one or two examples about the
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> objects concerned by your statement:"all objects equally exist, but
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> not all objects exist equally." I guess - but I just guess - that the
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> first part of the sentence is ontological and the second part could be
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> political, but maybe I'm wrong. Thanks in advance.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Frederic Neyrat
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 2012/6/14 Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Ok, sigh, let me try this again.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The "as much as" is not a judgement of value, but of existence. This is the
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> fundamental disagreement that played out in the comments to Galloway's work
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> and in the many responses elsewhere. The world is big and contains many
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> things. I've put this principle thusly: "all objects equally exist, but not
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> all objects exist equally."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It's possible that such a metaphysical position isn't for everyone. But if
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> your idea of "being political" is as exclusionary and deprecatory as both
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Galloway's post and my limited experience thusfar here on empyre, then
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> perhaps you can explain why that a model worth aspiring for? Why that is
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> virtuous and righteous?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Ian
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Jun 14, 2012, at 2:57 PM, Rob Myers wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 06/14/2012 07:02 PM, Ian Bogost wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> As for queer and feminist formulations, I agree with the spirit of what
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> you say, but I'll reiterate my observation that SR/OOO is moving in a
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> slightly different direction—one that concerns toasters and quasars as
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> much as human subjects (note the "as much as" here). Why not take this
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> work for what it is, at least for starters, rather than for what it
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> isn't?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The "as much as" is precisely the problem.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Galloway's critique of OOO that Zach mentioned explains why:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> http://itself.wordpress.com/2012/06/03/a-response-to-graham-harmans-marginalia-on-radical-thinking/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But I wouldn't lump Meillassoux in with Harman. I think Meillassoux's
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> philosophy can indeed be interesting for this debate because of its
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> embracing of contingency and possibility.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> - Rob.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> empyre forum
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> empyre forum
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> empyre forum
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> empyre forum
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>>
>>>>
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> empyre forum
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>>
>>>>
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>>>>
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>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> empyre forum
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>>
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>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>
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>>>>
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>>>>
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>>>>
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>
>>>> empyre forum
>>>>
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>>>>
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>>>> _______________________________________________
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