[-empyre-] Meillassoux / Harman

[Robert Jackson]

Hi All,

It's worth noting that Kosuth was a conceptual artist who explicitly
followed in the lineage of Duchamp and the 'demonstration' of idea: that is
to say, the conceptual delivery of art as information and the separation of
'art' from 'aesthetics' - (his famous Art Forum essay 'art after
philosophy' says as much). Hardly any of these elements chime with the
privileging of the discrete object in OOO.

As Ian mentioned - The fact the OOO is threatening a lot of 40 - 50 year
old structuralist-poststructuralist assumptions doesn't stop at philosophy
or cultural theory. In the arts - pretty soon we'll start seeing bigger
conflicts between proponents of the Duchamp lineage and whatever
manifestation OOO and art happen to collide in. IMO Duchamp has a lot to
answer for, especially in the dross of conceptual creative malaise which
contemporary art can't get out of. Duchamp is now no longer avantgarde -
but what Greenberg accurately described as 'avant gardist'. It's consists
not of sincerity but of demonstration - and its expiration date is nigh.

Besides the inevitable disagreements/agreements on what objects are, or how
they relate, I think OOO has brought depth back into the heart of discrete
entities, with a realist equivalent twist.

best
Rob


On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 at 5:12 AM, Timothy Morton
<timothymorton303 at gmail.com>wrote:

> Hi---each entity (a thought, an amethyst geode, a bartender) emits
> spacetime just as Einstein argued . Graham's The Quadruple Object and my
> not yet out Realist Magic go into this.
>
> Each entity "times" in the way Heidegger reserves for Da-sein and Derrida
> reserves to the trace.
>
> Time and space are not neutral containers but are emergent properties of
> beings.
>
> Tim
>
>
>
> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
>
> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:15 PM, davin heckman <davinheckman at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>  > You are right....  I should do more reading.  I find the thoughts
> > engaging and, since I am in transit, I am eager to get more
> > information where I can.
> >
> > Ultimately, underneath my questions, I suppose, are some thoughts on
> > relationality and time.  You have all of these things that have to do
> > with chairs, but only the chair is the chair.  And there are these
> > things that have to do with chairs, but which are real in their own
> > right.  But an idea about a chair kind of flickers in and out of
> > consciousness, never having a discrete edge, and only become something
> > definitive when their edges are marked out in some way. It's tempting
> > to think that one's writing about a thought is separate from the
> > thought itself, but typically the act of writing or performing a
> > thought tends to calcify and reinforce it through a feedback loop.
> > Every time one thinks about a chair, one does not invent a new object.
> > Similar to a computer program pulling modular entities and reusing
> > them again and again, our thoughts repeat the concept in our
> > imagination.  On the other hand, imaginary iterations are not the same
> > as digital iterations.  Less like a computer, we pull the modular
> > concept into action and interpret it with a variety of tones.  I
> > wouldn't want to say these singular thoughts don't exist, but on the
> > other hand, they don't have the same reality as those thoughts which
> > are articulated and taken up into collective discourse....  and even
> > still, a discursive "thing" gains a level of significance when it
> > represents some empirical process.
> >
> > I care about this because a chair changes from one moment to the next.
> > It becomes materially altered as time unfolds, yet we are comfortable
> > saying that the chair on day one is that chair on day five.  In other
> > words, each moment does not unleash a separate chair.  In my mind,
> > "weight" might be its subjective intensity, its empirical durability,
> > its social hegemony, its procedural utility, its digital ubiquity, its
> > aesthetic elegance....  though none of these qualities are directly
> > analogous to the other, suggesting that there are a variety of types
> > of being.
> >
> > All these thoughts are a jumble....  I'll take your advice and do some
> reading.
> >
> > Davin
> >
> > On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 11:28 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>
> wrote:
> >> A chair is a chair. A picture of a chair is a picture of a chair. A
> >> definition of a chair is a definition of a chair. None are all chairs,
> but
> >> all have something to do with chairs. At least, that's the OOO
> contention.
> >> There are no planes of existence… except for Harman (and Tim, to some
> >> extent), who distinguishes sensual from real objects. For Graham, the
> idea
> >> of a chair is different from the real chair, which recedes from all
> >> encounters. I think this is maybe the conclusion you arrive at in your
> >> second paragraph below.
> >>
> >> NOTHING about OOO privileges the material (i.e., the tangible, physical)
> >> chair primacy over the others. As for "the same weight" — well, that
> depends
> >> on what you mean by "weight." What do you mean?
> >>
> >> I hate to say it, but it's maybe not possible to make further progress
> >> without reading some of this material in depth…
> >>
> >> Ian
> >>
> >> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:13 AM, davin heckman wrote:
> >>
> >> Ian and Tim,
> >>
> >> Do the differences with which we treat objects syncs up with
> >> ontological difference, and thus, is there something to some of the
> >> different categorizations we could possibly develop for objects?
> >>
> >> I do think there is plenty of room to see these things from a fresh
> >> perspective, but I also wonder if not, for instance, Kosuth's chairs
> >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_and_Three_Chairs> highlight the ways
> >> that discrete objects can differ from each other, but also the ways in
> >> which there are consistencies that can yoke them together in odd ways.
> >> A picture of a chair is not a chair, a definition of chair is not a
> >> chair, instructions about a chair is not a chair, a chair as a
> >> sculpture is not necessarily a chair.....  yet, in some fundamental
> >> way, all are chairs.... in a general sense of their concept and
> >> recognition.  Put all three things together, and you have a "chair"
> >> which occupies all three planes of existence simultaneously.  On the
> >> other hand, they can occupy niches within conceptual frameworks (a
> >> chair within a game, for instance, can be very "real" to the other
> >> objects in the game).
> >>
> >> Each way of recognizing the chair (the picture, instructions, the
> >> chair as chair, chair as sculpture, three chairs as conceptual work,
> >> etc) would suggest that each is a distinct object in some sense, which
> >> makes me wonder then, whether or not all other possible thoughts about
> >> a chair have being, or if we afford the material object of the chair
> >> primacy.  In which case, does a digital rendering of the chair carry
> >> the same weight as an unexpressed idea about a chair, too.  At some
> >> point, doesn't ontology lead into this thicket?
> >>
> >> Davin
> >>
> >> On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 9:08 PM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> There is no reason why holding that everything exists equally entails
> >>
> >> "reducing all that can be known about a being to a simple recognition of
> >>
> >> being."
> >>
> >>
> >> Ian
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Jun 24, 2012, at 5:44 AM, davin heckman wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> I agree, this is a good starting point....  that all things that exist
> >>
> >> have being as their common condition of existence (that is, they are
> >>
> >> not "not beings"), which is a sort of foundational ontological
> >>
> >> similarity.  But if the only significant ontological claim we can make
> >>
> >> about things is either yes or no, do they exist or not, then this
> >>
> >> means all things carry this single quality, which is to say that there
> >>
> >> is no difference between things.  If we admit difference, then we must
> >>
> >> account for those differences in meaningful ways.  For instance,
> >>
> >> waffle #1 differs from waffle #2 in a different way than waffle #1
> >>
> >> differs from a toaster (or waffle #1 changes in the course of being
> >>
> >> eaten, it is still in one meaningful sense the "same" waffle after it
> >>
> >> has been bitten, but in another sense, it is a different waffle, too.
> >>
> >> While both toasters and waffles are different from something like an
> >>
> >> idea or a "memory" rendered in media (a waffle recipe or story about
> >>
> >> waffles) or a process habituated in muscle memory (the habit of making
> >>
> >> a waffle or eating one).
> >>
> >>
> >> My concern is that if we reduce all that can be known about being to a
> >>
> >> simple recognition of being, we commit to a kind of abstraction and
> >>
> >> alienation from being of the sort that happens when markets try to
> >>
> >> mediate everything through the common denominator of dollars.
> >>
> >>
> >> Davin
> >>
> >>
> >> On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:46 PM, Timothy Morton
> >>
> >> <timothymorton303 at gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> Hi Davin,
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> We obviously treat different entities differently.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> But this is not the same as saying that these entities are ontologically
> >>
> >> different.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Yours, Tim
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Jun 20, 2012, at 5:51 AM, davin heckman <davinheckman at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Thank you Ian, for these thoughts.  My initial encounter with this
> >>
> >>
> >> work came via a brief discussion of "flat ontology," which I found
> >>
> >>
> >> somewhat offputting.  I followed up by reading through the re:press
> >>
> >>
> >> book.  What I like the most, I suppose, is the sense that the
> >>
> >>
> >> discussions are in motion with a lot of people participating.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Reading some of the discussion of mereology, I find they resonate with
> >>
> >>
> >> one of my favorite passages from Hegel.  Pardon me for cannibalizing
> >>
> >>
> >> another piece of writing (a draft of which can be found here:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/disturbed-dialectic-literary-criticism
> ).
> >>
> >>
> >> *
> >>
> >>
> >> In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the dialectical process:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> "The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one
> >>
> >>
> >> might say the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the
> >>
> >>
> >> fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false
> >>
> >>
> >> manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of
> >>
> >>
> >> it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another,
> >>
> >>
> >> they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the
> >>
> >>
> >> same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in
> >>
> >>
> >> which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary
> >>
> >>
> >> as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of
> >>
> >>
> >> the whole." [1]
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Viewed from within the Hegelian process, the Real is positioned
> >>
> >>
> >> outside its present manifestations, consisting, rather, of the dynamic
> >>
> >>
> >> processes that comprise its totality.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> This insight, crucial to critical practice, requires revision in light
> >>
> >>
> >> of technical change. By revision, I do not mean that we need to
> >>
> >>
> >> fundamentally alter Hegel’s argument, I only mean to suggest that we
> >>
> >>
> >> see this passage with respect to new temporal modalities that have
> >>
> >>
> >> shaken up the pursuit of knowledge.
> >>
> >>
> >> *
> >>
> >>
> >> I come at many of the same issues, but my inclination lead me to
> >>
> >>
> >> embrace a kind of "humanism," but one which cannot easily understand
> >>
> >>
> >> as we continually muddle the conversations of humanism with an
> >>
> >>
> >> ontology that is expressed in our metaphors.  One grip I have with the
> >>
> >>
> >> use of Deleuze or McLuhan, is the idea that our capacity to
> >>
> >>
> >> personalize prosthetics has a tendency to be reduced to a situation in
> >>
> >>
> >> which it becomes possible to imagine that we see machines,
> >>
> >>
> >> interpersonal relationships, people with tools, etc. as the same
> >>
> >>
> >> thing.  When, in fact, my psychic investment in my bike or computer,
> >>
> >>
> >> while deep, is not nearly as deep or as complex as my psychic
> >>
> >>
> >> investment in my (which I can only refer to as mine with a sense of
> >>
> >>
> >> obligation to, rather than ownership over) child.  If my bike decided
> >>
> >>
> >> to bite me.....which it can't, even if it can hurt me....  I would not
> >>
> >>
> >> feel so simultaneously restrained in my response AND emotionally
> >>
> >>
> >> florid as I would if my 8 year old bit me for some crazy reason (but
> >>
> >>
> >> with my three year old, I he is only a missed nap away from engaging
> >>
> >>
> >> in something so obvious and horrible as biting someone).  A bike, on
> >>
> >>
> >> the other hand, can hurt me a lot more than a bite from a toddler, and
> >>
> >>
> >> I suppose I am not above kicking a bike and yelling....  but I have
> >>
> >>
> >> very limited feelings about a bike malfunction or hitting my thumb
> >>
> >>
> >> with a hammer.  On the other hand, a bike goes wherever I want it to
> >>
> >>
> >> go (except when there's an accident).....  a toddler, not so much....
> >>
> >>
> >> an eight year old, he usually comes with a counter proposal (and it is
> >>
> >>
> >> a monstrous adult that would treat kids like a bike, insist that they
> >>
> >>
> >> only go where told, speak when it is demanded).  A lot of really deep
> >>
> >>
> >> thinking about human subjectivty simply does not go this far....  and
> >>
> >>
> >> part of this has to do with a poor understanding of objects.  What is
> >>
> >>
> >> worse is when this understanding infects interpersonal relationships
> >>
> >>
> >> in the context of a Randian sort of world where there is "no such
> >>
> >>
> >> thing as society, only individuals" (yet, bosses treat workers like
> >>
> >>
> >> bikes and bad boyfriends treat their partners like robots).
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> I am very excited to read more.  I feel like it is important to free
> >>
> >>
> >> our thinking from patterns and habits of the past.  In particular, the
> >>
> >>
> >> culture of academic citation has gone from being about finding good
> >>
> >>
> >> ideas where they are to deriving authority from the aura of the great
> >>
> >>
> >> figure.  I also have no problem with accumulations of wisdom that
> >>
> >>
> >> translate into an inherited perspective, but this can't close us off
> >>
> >>
> >> to thinking.  So....  thank you for this!
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Davin
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu
> >
> >>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> Davin,
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> I'm about to disappear into a mess of meetings, but let me offer a brief
> >>
> >>
> >> response:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> What you're touching on here is what Levi Byrant sometimes calls the
> "weird
> >>
> >>
> >> mereology" of OOO. The song isn't "just" the sound waves (what Harman
> calls
> >>
> >>
> >> an underming position) nor is it just the social context of creation
> and use
> >>
> >>
> >> (an overmining position). A song is a song, and indeed, the song in an
> MP3
> >>
> >>
> >> file is a different thing than the song as an abstraction in human
> culture.
> >>
> >>
> >> Neither is more object nor more real (well, "real" has a different
> meaning
> >>
> >>
> >> for Harman than it does for Levi and me).
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> I talk about this a bit in the first chapter of Alien Phenomenology, and
> >>
> >>
> >> Levi does as well in the mereology section of Democracy of Objects.
> Also,
> >>
> >>
> >> here are a  blog post from Levi on the subject that weaves the two
> >>
> >>
> >> together:
> >>
> >> http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/08/12/more-strange-mereology/
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> I'm not answering sufficiently but wanted to get something out to you
> >>
> >>
> >> rapidly.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> ib
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Ian Bogost, Ph.D.
> >>
> >>
> >> Professor
> >>
> >>
> >> Director, Graduate Program in Digital Media
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Georgia Institute of Technology
> >>
> >>
> >> Digital Media/TSRB 320B
> >>
> >>
> >> 85 Fifth Street NW
> >>
> >>
> >> Atlanta, GA 30308-1030
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> ibogost at gatech.edu
> >>
> >>
> >> +1 (404) 894-1160 (tel)
> >>
> >>
> >> +1 (404) 894-2833 (fax)
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Jun 15, 2012, at 4:11 AM, davin heckman wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Ian,
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Since we are on the topic of OOO, I was wondering what the ontological
> >>
> >>
> >> status of something like a song is?  I have to admit, I have a real
> >>
> >>
> >> hard time swallowing a pure ontology that essentially defines the
> >>
> >>
> >> subjective as outside of being, as a sort of on or off proposition, as
> >>
> >>
> >> opposed to also a turning on (or is it being turned on? Or simply to
> >>
> >>
> >> be turned or to turn?) (I am generally skeptical about a variety of
> >>
> >>
> >> posthumanisms that go beyond a critique of a monolithic Humanism,
> >>
> >>
> >> because I think that consciousness carries specific tendencies that
> >>
> >>
> >> seem to fundamentally frame all possibilities for knowledge).  However
> >>
> >>
> >> it is entirely possible that I am missing out on a discussion that has
> >>
> >>
> >> been unfolding without me.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> But here's my thought:  With a song, you have something that can be
> >>
> >>
> >> rendered in "objective" form....  maybe an mp3 file or a sheet of
> >>
> >>
> >> notes or record or something.  If this is what we mean by a song,
> >>
> >>
> >> then, fine, that's an object.  But a song only really starts doing
> >>
> >>
> >> something when it is unfolding within the context of memory and
> >>
> >>
> >> anticipation.  It only is a song when it is listened to by a subject,
> >>
> >>
> >> which is to say it is an object that has a singular temporal being as
> >>
> >>
> >> it is listened to, which is distinct from how it is being listened to
> >>
> >>
> >> and replayed even by the same user.  (And we aren't even beginning to
> >>
> >>
> >> talk about non-recorded music).  The only way a song becomes a purely
> >>
> >>
> >> discrete object is when it is removed from its temporal existence and
> >>
> >>
> >> understood as a totality, and detached from an audience.  And while we
> >>
> >>
> >> can sit around and all talk about, say, "Another One Bites the Dust,"
> >>
> >>
> >> after we squeeze it into a conceptual file type and label it, the fact
> >>
> >>
> >> that we can discuss something that can only mean something if is
> >>
> >>
> >> experienced as a process AND an object within the context of a
> >>
> >>
> >> experience, suggests that sometimes being is realized by the relations
> >>
> >>
> >> of things, rather than the things themselves.  My suggestion is that
> >>
> >>
> >> the ontological nature of the song cannot be described in objective
> >>
> >>
> >> terms without missing what a song is.  Without the non-objective
> >>
> >>
> >> component of its being, a song is just sound.  If we say, well, "Hey,
> >>
> >>
> >> when this sound occurs, people do X, Y, and Z," we can find ourself
> >>
> >>
> >> thinking that these effects are produced by the object, but this sort
> >>
> >>
> >> of thought experiment only gives us half an understanding of the
> >>
> >>
> >> object's being.  You also have to think of that song in relation to
> >>
> >>
> >> the current context, to itself over time, to the individual and
> >>
> >>
> >> collective experience of its audience, to the culture, etc. Again, a
> >>
> >>
> >> great means to produce estrangement, but not the complete account of
> >>
> >>
> >> what the thing is.  At the risk of sounding chauvinistic, I can see
> >>
> >>
> >> that it might be expedient to regard a distant moon without regard to
> >>
> >>
> >> its historical relationship to the human.  It's useful to think of a
> >>
> >>
> >> distant moon as a quantity of data.  But the closer we get to human
> >>
> >>
> >> existence, the more likely we are to encounter types of things that
> >>
> >>
> >> exist, but that cannot be understood properly as a bundle of discrete
> >>
> >>
> >> data.  Maybe there are some texts that address precisly these sorts of
> >>
> >>
> >> concerns.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> This is where I think ontology cannot simply be objective.  It must,
> >>
> >>
> >> of course, be able to establish the differences between things, to
> >>
> >>
> >> render those things it claims to understand in discrete form, insofar
> >>
> >>
> >> as they can be considered as such.  On the other hand, we know that
> >>
> >>
> >> most of what the world is made of is common and that the laws of
> >>
> >>
> >> physics, for instance, harness discrete things under a kind of
> >>
> >>
> >> continuity.  So, along with the conditions of radical difference that
> >>
> >>
> >> a philosophy of objects implies, there are the conditions of radical
> >>
> >>
> >> connectivity.  Both features are equally present, which is to say they
> >>
> >>
> >> offer us little in the way of productive knowledge EXCEPT insofar as
> >>
> >>
> >> we can bind and sever, cut or tie, digitize or analogize within this
> >>
> >>
> >> framework of matter.  The 21st century loves digitizing things.....
> >>
> >>
> >> it helps computers see the world, it helps them count us, predict our
> >>
> >>
> >> behavior, weigh it, value it, direct it, etc.  But the digital is only
> >>
> >>
> >> half of our existence....  the analog process is equally present in
> >>
> >>
> >> language and cognition....  and it is just as equpped to help us
> >>
> >>
> >> understand the world by creating categories of things and identifying
> >>
> >>
> >> common qualities.  In "Notes on the Uncanny," Freud identifies this
> >>
> >>
> >> struggle as productive of a kind of unsettling (the person that acts
> >>
> >>
> >> like an object/the object that acts like a person)...  but it does not
> >>
> >>
> >> simply have to be a "scary" process....  the move from discrete to
> >>
> >>
> >> connected or from one into multiple can also be deeply satisfying and
> >>
> >>
> >> reassuring of being.  If both processes are equally useful, then what
> >>
> >>
> >> presides over these two tendencies?  Temporal consciousness that can
> >>
> >>
> >> mobilize processes of digitization and analogy?  Another place to
> >>
> >>
> >> think through this is in relation to a variety of attempts at
> >>
> >>
> >> taxonomy.  At some point, a poodle has to be a poodle and a wolf has
> >>
> >>
> >> to be a wolf, but in relation to squids, both can be canines.  We
> >>
> >>
> >> could say that well, we are talking about layers of qualities that
> >>
> >>
> >> enable us to categorize this object or that object.  But without the
> >>
> >>
> >> history of the poodle we don't really know how one canine can be a
> >>
> >>
> >> fashion accessory and the other is a part of a wild ecology, all of
> >>
> >>
> >> which (domesticating work dogs, turning tool animals into fashion
> >>
> >>
> >> animals, thinking about animals as people, killing wild animals,
> >>
> >>
> >> restoring wildness, etc) radically alter the parameters of being based
> >>
> >>
> >> on thoughts about being.  To take it back to queer thought, around the
> >>
> >>
> >> bend of singular identities is the knowlege that such queerness does
> >>
> >>
> >> not preclude deep relationality.  My reading is that the fruits of
> >>
> >>
> >> this thought are an affirmation of the idea that the well-worn paths
> >>
> >>
> >> of prescribed human behavior do not necessarily lead to earnest
> >>
> >>
> >> relationships, it is not to reject relationship itself in favor of
> >>
> >>
> >> individualism because capitalism has been doing this since the
> >>
> >>
> >> transformation of labor into commodity.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Why does this matter?  I care about politics, but I am not going to
> >>
> >>
> >> say that OOO cleaves to this or that kind of politics....  it doesn't
> >>
> >>
> >> matter.  If a statement is discernibly true, then I have an obligation
> >>
> >>
> >> to bend my ideas around the true statement.  And my sense, based on
> >>
> >>
> >> very limited reading, is that OOO is trying to figure out what we can
> >>
> >>
> >> know about being.  So, while it is worth considering the political
> >>
> >>
> >> implications of speculative thought, I think Galloway is a bit wrong
> >>
> >>
> >> to suggest that something is "bourgeois" or something just because
> >>
> >>
> >> financial markets also offer a flat ontology via capital.  The only
> >>
> >>
> >> thing that really matters is whether or not a philosophy can get us to
> >>
> >>
> >> a mutually agreed upon knowledge of the world that can be transmitted
> >>
> >>
> >> effectively from one context to another and continue to be useful.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> I have been lazy about following this month's discussion, but I like
> >>
> >>
> >> the idea of queering technology, of the productively broken tool.  It
> >>
> >>
> >> is an area that has affinities with regards to my own reading of
> >>
> >>
> >> electronic literature.....  taking Jakobson's discussion of poetics up
> >>
> >>
> >> through Darko Suvin's discussion of "cognitive estrangement," and
> >>
> >>
> >> looking at the ways that digital literary practices perform a similar
> >>
> >>
> >> process with regards to instrumental languages. My thought is that OOO
> >>
> >>
> >> is productive in that it asks us to engage in a thought experiment
> >>
> >>
> >> about pure objectivitiy, and in doing so, reveals the critical
> >>
> >>
> >> necessity of subjective and intersubjective aspects of human being
> >>
> >>
> >> that are embedded in our broader assertions about being.  I think that
> >>
> >>
> >> a lot of the "posthumanisms" try to simply go beyond something that we
> >>
> >>
> >> have never understood in the first place: that being human is
> >>
> >>
> >> essentially a kind of queer existence, all the much more so when we
> >>
> >>
> >> insist that it is not. For my part, I want my human rights.  So while
> >>
> >>
> >> I am sympathetic, generally, with many of the aims of the
> >>
> >>
> >> posthumanists I encounter, I generally think that "Humanism" has yet
> >>
> >>
> >> to adequately describe being human.  Like Habermas said of modernity,
> >>
> >>
> >> it's daunting and messy and incomplete (like most things worth doing).
> >>
> >>
> >> Living in Norway right now (moving in a couple weeks, unfortunately),
> >>
> >>
> >> humanism seems to be working out pretty well here.  The problems of
> >>
> >>
> >> the world do not stem from a love of humanity, they stem from our
> >>
> >>
> >> growing estrangment from humanity and increased clustering into
> >>
> >>
> >> paranoid, exclusionary enclaves (Why do you think everyone watches
> >>
> >>
> >> Zombie movies? Blasting away at legions of dirty anthropoidal morons
> >>
> >>
> >> trying to eat what you have, a perfect gospel for post democratic
> >>
> >>
> >> capitalism).  In a world of Darwinian evolution, we are not entirely
> >>
> >>
> >> selected, we alter the landscape of an objective process through our
> >>
> >>
> >> dialogue with an objective sphere that exists, that we inhabit, and
> >>
> >>
> >> that we think about, but which does not simply constitute us.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> I admit these thoughts are poorly formed....  and I am very busy these
> >>
> >>
> >> days....  so I might not be able to reply as quickly as I would
> >>
> >>
> >> normally.  But am very interested in these conversations.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Davin
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Thu, Jun 14, 2012 at 4:16 PM, frederic neyrat <fneyrat at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> I would like - if possible - to get one or two examples about the
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> objects concerned by your statement:"all objects equally exist, but
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> not all objects exist equally." I guess - but I just guess - that the
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> first part of the sentence is ontological and the second part could be
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> political, but maybe I'm wrong. Thanks in advance.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Best,
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Frederic Neyrat
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> 2012/6/14 Ian Bogost <ian.bogost at lcc.gatech.edu>:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Ok, sigh, let me try this again.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> The "as much as" is not a judgement of value, but of existence. This is
> the
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> fundamental disagreement that played out in the comments to Galloway's
> work
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> and in the many responses elsewhere. The world is big and contains many
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> things. I've put this principle thusly: "all objects equally exist, but
> not
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> all objects exist equally."
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> It's possible that such a metaphysical position isn't for everyone. But
> if
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> your idea of "being political" is as exclusionary and deprecatory as
> both
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Galloway's post and my limited experience thusfar here on empyre, then
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> perhaps you can explain why that a model worth aspiring for? Why that is
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> virtuous and righteous?
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Ian
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Jun 14, 2012, at 2:57 PM, Rob Myers wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 06/14/2012 07:02 PM, Ian Bogost wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> As for queer and feminist formulations, I agree with the spirit of what
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> you say, but I'll reiterate my observation that SR/OOO is moving in a
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> slightly different direction—one that concerns toasters and quasars as
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> much as human subjects (note the "as much as" here). Why not take this
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> work for what it is, at least for starters, rather than for what it
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> isn't?
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> The "as much as" is precisely the problem.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Galloway's critique of OOO that Zach mentioned explains why:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> http://itself.wordpress.com/2012/06/03/a-response-to-graham-harmans-marginalia-on-radical-thinking/
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> But I wouldn't lump Meillassoux in with Harman. I think Meillassoux's
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> philosophy can indeed be interesting for this debate because of its
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> embracing of contingency and possibility.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> - Rob.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> empyre forum
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> empyre forum
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> empyre forum
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >>
> >>
> >> empyre forum
> >>
> >>
> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
> >>
> >>
> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >>
> >>
> >> empyre forum
> >>
> >>
> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
> >>
> >>
> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >>
> >>
> >> empyre forum
> >>
> >>
> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
> >>
> >>
> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >>
> >>
> >> empyre forum
> >>
> >>
> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
> >>
> >>
> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >>
> >> empyre forum
> >>
> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
> >>
> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >>
> >> empyre forum
> >>
> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
> >>
> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> empyre forum
> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> empyre forum
> >> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
> > _______________________________________________
> > empyre forum
> > empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
> > http://www.subtle.net/empyre
> _______________________________________________
> empyre forum
> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>
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